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CM-2089-04

28 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS 9/28

SUBJECT: Major Combat Operations (MCO) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)

- The enclosed MCO JOC (TAB A) is forwarded for your approval in response to Transformation Planning Guidance requirements (TAB B).
- The concept, authored by USJFCOM and approved by the Joint Chiefs, is the culmination of a lengthy development and refmement effort. USJFCOM collaborated with the Services, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff and Defense agencies to produce the inaugural document that will be updated according to the Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan. My staff provided copies of this paper to the Office for Force Transformation for review. This JOC is key to the continued Joint Force transformation and improvement of joint warfighting capabilities.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the JOC.

Approve _____ Disapprove_____ Other_____

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Maj Gen Jack Catton, USAF; Director, J-7; (703) 697-9031

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Major Combat Operations

Joint Operating Concept

September 2004

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As the lead author, US Joint Forces Command matured this concept through the use of joint and Service operational lessons learned and experimentation: numerous co-sponsored joint wargames, seminars, workshops and other concept development venues. Throughout, this process was guided by direct input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During the development of this concept each Service, combatant command, selected members of the Joint and OSD staffs, as well as multinational partners and selected non-DoD agencies made significant contributions. Also included throughout were a host of active and retired flag and junior officers, academics, and professional strategic thinkers.

US Joint Forces Command will continue to use experimentation and lessons learned to refine this concept. Version 2.0 is expected to be staffed in the 3rd quarter 05 timeframe.

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, US Navy

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"War is a continuation ofpolitics with the introduction of different means". "...War is a clash between major interests that is resolved by bloodshed -- that is the only way it differsfrom other conflicts..." Carl Von Clausewitz

Wars embody political conflicts turned violent. They are fought to achieve political aims. Rare will be the case that combat alone will resolve the political confrontation and achieve political aims. To achieve our political aims we need a coherent application of force in both combat and post-combat operations. War is a continuation of politics and it must also, despite its violence, anticipate the continuation of politics during hostilities and upon their conclusion. The following concept concerns one portion of confi-ontation resolution – that of major combat operations – and addresses the fundamental need for unity of purpose with the political aims and coherency of action involving all instruments of national power to achieve those aims.

The Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept (MCO JOC) is a pillar of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs new family of Joint Operations Concepts. It recognizes the complexity and uncertainty of tomorrow's combat environment and the adaptive nature of our potential adversaries. It establishes a framework for the armed forces to transition fi-om the industrial age to the information age in order to better harness our human and organizational capabilities, better target our adversaries' critical nodes, and to place us in greater harmony with the realities of the modern battlespace. It addresses the challenges of conducting large-scale military actions in a distributed, collaborative environment against a militarily capable regional nation state with significant anti-access capabilities and weapons of mass destruction. The central theme of the MCO JOC is to **achieve decisive conclusions to combat and set the conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation; use a joint, interdependent force that swiftly applies overmatching power simultaneously and sequentially, in a set of contiguous and noncontiguous operations; employ joint power at all points of action necessary; and create in the mind of our enemy an asynchronous' perception of our actions—all to compel the**

[1] Asynchronous, in this context, refers to our desire to create an indiscernible pattern in time and space in the mind of our enemy. Our operations, however, must retain unity of purpose and coherency of action.

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enemy to accede to our will. Joint power in the context of this paper includes the integration and appropriate balance of conventional and special operations forces.

To address the future challenges we face in conducting major combat operations, this concept proposes a coherent, effects-based approach used throughout the deployment-employment-sustainment of the combined force. This concept emphasizes the need to incorporate joint, interagency, and coalition power to achieve desired outcomes rather than to simply accomplish discrete tasks. Further, this concept proposes seven core building blocks that form the foundations for US success in future major combat operations as well as eleven principles to help guide the decisions and actions of Operational Commanders in conducting major combat operations. They are:

- Foundations for Major Combat Operations
  1. Fight with a warrior's ethos.
  2. Use a coherent joint force that decides and acts based upon pervasive knowledge.
  3. Develop resourceful leaders.
  4. Train under the right conditions.
  5. Field capabilities to maintain adaptive force dominance.
  6. Uphold the values of American democracy.
  7. Conduct routine operations to gain and maintain operational access.[2]

- How the Joint Force Fights
  1. Start with the strategic purpose in mind.
  2. Achieve decisive outcomes and conclusions.
  3. Employ a knowledge-enhanced, effects-based approach.
  4. Employ a joint, interagency and multinational force with collaborative processes.
  5. Use mission orders throughout the chain of command.
  6. Gain and maintain operational access.[3]
  7. Engage the adversary comprehensively.
  8. Generate relentless pressure by deciding and acting distributively.
  9. Achieve coherency of action.

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[2] *See* also Joint Forcible Entry Operations Concept

[3] Ibid.

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10. Align deployment, employment, and sustainment activities.
11. Protect people, facilities, and equipment throughout the battlespace.

The objective is not merely to destroy the adversary militarily, but to continuously shape the battlespace to effectively engulf him in every dimension. As combined forces are brought to bear from strategic and operational distances with unpredictability, relentlessness, speed, and seeming omnipresence combined to maximize shock, the battlespace as a whole is made increasingly hostile to the adversary, rendering resistance impossible or futile. This concept recognizes that the achievement of desired strategic outcomes relies on the coherent application of all relevant national and multinational means, not just military. It incorporates a superior appreciation of the adversary, the battlespace, and ourselves; and provides better means of shaping these. This concept also requires a degree of interdependence among service forces that had always been desired but had never been achievable. Interdependence relies upon technical connectivity to be sure, but even more important it relies upon breaking down long-developed cultural positions and barriers, eliminating unnecessary redundancies, and better integrating joint force employment. As we work to solve technical problems surrounding an interdependent force, we must also use our training and leader development venues to create a new, coherently joint culture.

In so doing, this concept describes a profound transformation in the way we think about and conduct major combat operations.

This concept is focused on the time horizon just beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), roughly 2015 and rests upon the following assumptions:

Assumption 1: War continues to be an important component of confrontation strategies and remains a fundamentally human endeavor. Our approach to warfighting in the information age must strike a balance between its technological and human elements.
Assumption 2: While the nature of war remains relatively fixed, the conduct of war has changed, is changing and will continue to change. Adversaries will include both state and non-state actors, including transnational organizations, terrorist groups, criminal elements and economic entities. We will often face enemies who operate outside the rule of law

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and are difficult to distinguish fiom noncombatants. These new adversary sets require us to develop new approaches to deterrence measures, warfighting and winning confrontations.

Assumption **3:** Potential regional adversaries in the 2015 timeframe[4] will be well-equipped, well-led, motivated to win, highly adaptive, with global reach in selected capabilities, and possess the will to employ those capabilities in opposition to or in a manner threatening to U.S. national security. They will also likely possess weapons[5] of mass destruction[6] and significant anti-access capabilities. They will observe our warfighting capabilities and methods and adjust their strategies and tactics intelligently in an attempt to counter our advantages. These adversaries will seek to exploit technological breakthroughs in novel ways.

Assumption 4: Technological advances[7] will continue at least at the current pace. Commercially available dual-use technology will continue to proliferate, extending some near-peer like capabilities in selected niches to even the least sophisticated and minimally funded adversaries.

Assumption 5: Service competencies remain the foundation of joint capabilities. The Services provide the cultural identities, domain expertise and core warfighting resources that are vital to implementing this concept.

Assumption ***6:*** The concept outlines three cases of major combat operations. Of the two likely cases, Case One, the high-end regional competitor, has the greatest impact on our total capability requirements and is accordingly the focus of Version 1.0. Case Two, major irregular combat is the other likely case in the 2015 time frame and will be the next case developed in future versions of the concept. Case Three, the peer competitor, while the most dangerous, is not anticipated within the time frame of focus and will be the last of the three developed.

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[4] GLOBAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES: THE DECADES AHEAD Statement for the House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. (Paragraphs 1, 3, and 10).

[5] A Primer on the FUTURE THREAT: The Decades Ahead 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 2, Global Change, Para **6;** Chapter 3, Transnational Issues -- WMD Proliferation.

[6] Implies ability to possess and globally export WMD effects through terrorist cells, special operations forces, intermediate range missiles, and, in some cases, intercontinental range missiles.

[7] GLOBAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES: THE DECADES AHEAD Statement For The House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Future Warfare Trends.

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Section 1 -- INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

"We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the US armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight."

SecDef Rumsfeld's Remarks to National Defense University, 31 Jan 02

1.A Introduction.

The Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for Major Combat Operations (MCO) serves as a means for generating and capturing thought and discussion on the methods for conducting major combat operations in the next decade. Additionally, this concept will provide the foundation for further development and integration of other joint operating, functional, and integrating concepts, as well as influencing Joint and Service transformation. This concept seeks to combine emerging technologies and operational concepts with timeless and enduring principles of military affairs. It departs from current doctrine where it no longer serves, but not simply to satisfy a desire for something new.

The MCO JOC addresses the challenges discussed within the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) paper. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities. *Major combat operations as referred to in this Joint Operating Concept are large-scale operations conducted against a nation state(s) that possesses significant regional military capability, with global reach in selected capabilities, and the will to employ that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to US National Security*[8]. This future adversary will likely possess weapons of mass destruction' and significant anti-access capabilities. This concept describes an operational-level approach to warfighting and conflict resolution that exploits the capability of all instruments of national and multinational power to achieve full spectrum dominance" over an organized and capable adversary. It proposes

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[8] Major combat operations may be conducted against a peer, an irregular competitor or a non-peer competitor with regional focus. For scoping purposes, this joint operating concept is focused on the regional non-peer competitor as discussed in Section 1.B Scope.

[9] A Primer on the FUTURE THREAT: The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 2, Global Change, Para 6; Chapter 3, Transnational Issues -- WMD Proliferation.

[10] "Full spectrum dominance is the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations." Joint Operations Concepts Dated 3 Oct 2003

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a blending of diverse national and coalition nonmilitary capabilities with an overmatching military force.

MCO JOC requires a commitment to transformation within the military and in the way that military power is integrated into other elements of national and coalition influence. People remain the centerpiece of successful operations, but changes within our society, the changing international security environment, and the rapid advance and proliferation of "information age" technologies require fundamental changes in how we approach warfare and conflict resolution.

Expanding potential capabilities through incremental improvements is important; but by simply realizing more of the existing potential capabilities of warfighters and warfighting organizations we can derive greater gains. Being a post-industrial society gives us great potential for the development and exploitation of human capabilities and will. The latent power to be found in the ordinary warfighter and warfighting organization is, by industrial standards, extraordinary. We cannot count on always enjoying material advantages over our adversaries; but we can strive to be more effective with those resources at hand. The exploitation of this potential offers the most profound revolution in military affairs. The MCO JOC guides future force transformation and the way operational commanders think and act when called upon to win our Nation's wars.

1.B Scope.

The scope of a major combat operations concept must address the following three cases:

Case 1 – Major combat operations against a conventional, high-end regional threat

Case 2 – Major irregular combat operations

Case 3 – Major combat operations against a peer competitor

Since no current intelligence estimate forecasts a peer or near-peer competitor in the 2015 timeframe, Version 1.0 of this paper focuses on Case One. This postulated high-end regional competitor possesses some near-peer like capabilities in selected niches.'[1] Such an approach captures the most challenging of the likely adversaries and conditions the US

[1] GLOBAL THREATS *AND* CHALLENGES: THE DECADES AHEAD Statement for the House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. (Paragraphs 1, 3, and 10).

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may face in the next decade. The scope and scale of operations against a regional competitor call attention to coherent, high-tempo, simultaneous operations conducted fiom multiple, distributed locations throughout the theater of war—all based upon pervasive knowledge. These types of operations may entail little or no reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) for selected units.

We must recognize that campaign development factors, as well as force capabilities and sizing will differ between the regional competitor, irregular competitor and the peer. We will require additional types of capabilities suited to the special nature of major irregular combat. Many of the capabilities developed to respond to a regional competitor will clearly apply as we scale up to the peer competitor, but not all. In fact, the sheer scale of a peer changes the character of the fight. **As** a result, developing the capabilities identified in this version of the concept will not provide all of the capabilities needed to address either Case Two or Case Three. Later versions of this concept will further define the full set of required capabilities.

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Section 2 – DESCFUPTION OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM

2.A The Operational Environment."

The terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 marked the start of a new national security era for America. The months that followed revealed a new kind of enemy: elusive, transnational, unconventional—an enemy as different from those of the Cold War or World War II as it was possible to conceive and one who has caused us to think about future war in a new way. These new threats against the United States and her allies seek to avoid our strengths, make many of our long-held assumptions irrelevant, and challenge the forms and conventions of industrial age warfare. The changes brought forth by these events have implications for military force design and operational concepts.

The relative certainty of the bipolar Cold War period is gone. We now face uncertainty and unknowns. Gone are the days when we were relatively sure we should prepare to fight a largely symmetric conventional war, in a defined set of theaters with improved infrastructures, against a doctrinally "template-able" enemy, with fixed alliances, for predetermined political aims. We cannot forecast the type war we will fight, against whom, with whom, where, or for what aims. Our adversaries have adapted and will continue to do so. They study our strengths and quickly devise methods to overcome them. They know that our strength is unmatchable in conventional military operations where we possess distinct advantages in sensors, mobility, and firepower. Some adversaries operate in that seam between illegal and legal activities. They target civilians directly, plan and prepare to operate in areas more civilian than military, and try to avoid detection and attack by blurring the distinction between combatant and noncombatant. They use methods to mitigate our strength and put themselves in a position where they have a chance to win—if only momentarily, or in their own eyes.

The likelihood is high that our adversaries operate from and within large, complex, and hostile urban areas. The implications of MCO in cities are dramatic.[13] In urban combat operations, the US-led coalition achieves its desired end state by understanding,

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[12] See the ***Joint Operational Environment-Into the Future,*** **draft** dated *5* **Mar** 2004, for an expanded discussion of the future operational environment.

[13] For additional detail refer to the Joint Urban Operations Integrating Concept.

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controlling, and exploiting the unique elements of the urban environment (e.g., terrain, infrastructure, population, and information); sensing, locating, and isolating the adversary; and applying power rapidly, precisely, and discriminately. Essentially, an urban area is a complicated and dynamic concentration of physical, social, informational, political, economic, religious, and criminal activities. These activities are constantly interacting, and collectively produce a unique urban culture. When exposed to major combat, this unique urban culture goes into a form of "shock and paralysis." The US-led force must tend to this urban crisis by returning the city to a functioning posture. Urban problems, in the end, tend to require very human solutions. Our joint leader must understand the operative dynamics of fighting in cities.

While the Cold War force designed to respond to a near-peer successfully deterred a general global war, the premise that such a force structure can rapidly and effectively respond to any contingency in today's uncertain global environment requires examination. The likelihood that the United States and her coalition partners will engage in major combat operations with a regional competitor is much greater than the United States conducting major combat operations against a near-peer.[14] We must identify new security concepts and organizations to fit the environment we face, not attempt to fit "our proven" concepts and organizations to the new environment.

A US-led coalition may eventually conduct major combat operations against an adversary who possesses weapons of mass destruction" (WMD). An adversary without the conventional forces necessary to battle a more capable US and coalition force may use this extreme form of warfighting violence. Myriad diplomatic, informational, economic, social, as well as military issues surround both adversary and friendly use of WMD. The US must remain vigilant and capable of dissuading, deterring, limiting, and denying adversary employment of such weapons. If and when WMD are employed against the US, an ally, or friend, the US strategic level response is a political decision, not a military decision. At the operational and tactical levels, US forces must be trained and ready to operate in a WMD environment with little or no degradation in posture.

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[14] A Primer on the **FUTURE** THREAT: The Decades Ahead 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 3, Key Points.

[15] A Primer on the **FUTURE** THREAT: The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 3, Transnational Issues -- WMD Proliferation.

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Operating in a WMD environment may include potential use of US nuclear weapons, when directed by the appropriate authorities, to influence the outcome of operations.

2.B Operational Level of War.

The operational level is that level that links campaigns, major operations, and tactical actions in time, space, and purpose, sequentially and simultaneously, in order to attain strategic or operational aims.[16] The MCO JOC recognizes that required actions for confrontation, conflict resolution, and major combat operations are not only military in nature, but also include the discrete actions associated with other elements of our government and those of our coalition partners. The interaction between these areas increases the complexity of the problem for the commander as evidenced by recent operations and experimental results. A joint force commander acting at the operational level must understand that the actions of the military forces over which he has command must be harmonized with the actions of other elements of government over which he has no authority and with the actions of members of the coalition. Many of these actions occur prior to actual conflict making critical contributions to shaping the confrontation and preparing the battlespace. Furthermore, some of these civilian activities will continue during hostilities, most will expand substantially as hostilities end and they will continue well into the postconflict phase of the intervention.

The next level of complexity concerns simultaneity in military and civilian action. At the operational level, simultaneity takes two forms. The first, deployment, employment, and sustainment actions—military and nonmilitary, US and coalition, physical and information—occur at the same time. The second form takes place in multiple locations within a theater of war, and if the war is global, within multiple theaters.

Thus, the battlespace in which a joint force commander operates is both complex and expansive. Leadership at this level is different in both kind and degree from leadership at the tactical level. The joint force commander makes decisions and takes actions in a much more collaborative way than do tactical commanders. Directive leadership remains, but the joint force commander is also a leader among peer-leaders, something

[16] Derived from the Joint Publication 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" definition and Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."

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uncommon at the tactical level. Exercising responsibility and achieving success at the operational level requires a skill set that is inclusive of, but much broader than, that set needed at the tactical level—it requires operational art.

2.C Operational Art.

Operational art, according to Joint Publication 3-0, describes "the employment of military forces to attain strategic or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating activities of all levels of war." The MCO JOC highlights the incompleteness of this definition. Our understanding of operational art must expand to include both military and nonmilitary instruments of government action.

Operational art begins in the mind and character of the commander. A joint force commander cannot achieve what he cannot conceive. A joint force commander must derive, describe, and communicate a set of clear, achievable effects that must be realized in order to achieve the political aims he is given. He must properly apply the principles of war and other general principles of action to the specific situation in which he is operating and mission he has been assigned. Further, he must balance competing priorities and adjust them continuously as the situation unfolds over time. The application of general principles to specific cases is a form of wisdom and art that technologies can enhance but not replace.

The joint force commander at the operational level is a leader among peer-leaders. This kind of leadership position requires the ability to build trust and confidence among his seniors and subordinates in his personal judgment and action. He must also build trust and confidence among the set of peer-leaders, military and nonmilitary, who, collectively, are responsible for the attainment of US and coalition political aims. Using the interpersonal skill necessary to create systems of trust and confidence is also a form of art that technologies can enhance but not replace.

While unity of purpose and coherency in action begin in the mind of the joint force commander, they are executed in the physical, cognitive, and information domains. The

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physical and information components concern the means the joint force commander uses to translate plans into actions, thus creating the effects he and his peers have identified as necessary to achieve the ends they have been given. The cognitive component involves not only the minds of the commander and his peer-leaders, but the mind of the adversary as well. A key avenue for cognitive effects is information operations and the emerging area of warfare in cyberspace.

The joint force commander also requires sufficient space in which to conduct his operations in the physical domain. This component of operational art recognizes that there is a relationship between numbers and types of forces and the physical space they require. One can have too few as well as too many forces relative to the space in which one is operating and the adversaries one faces. The relationships among the physical domain, forces—both military and nonmilitary—and adversaries are not fixed; they are dynamic. They change as the "terrain" changes, as the adversary adapts, as the opposition stiffens or lessens, and as missions change. Judgment is paramount.

One of the means the joint force commander requires is a deployment and sustainment system that is flexible enough to support his employment schemes as well as those of his peer-leaders. Having the ability to fight is useless if that ability is not accompanied by the ability to deploy and sustain. Further, the ability to fight in a certain style is useless if deployment and sustainment systems cannot support it.

Operational art includes the ability to achieve the proper ends-means relationship.' The means used by the joint force commander and his peer-leaders do not operate in isolation; they operate most effectively within an organizational construct. There is no singular "correct" organizational construct. Rather, "correct" will vary as to the situation, the opponent, and the mission assigned. Regardless of organizational construct, however, there are some constants. Any organization needs ways in which to gather information, change that information into knowledge and then sufficient understanding to use as a basis for making decisions, taking actions, and adapting as the situation unfolds in the unexpected way it will always unfold in war. Any organization will need ways in which to achieve and sustain unity of purpose and coherency in action. Finally, any organization construct will have to be credible to those who must operate within it.

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However, no single, established, fixed organization will be suited to the near-infinite number of possible scenarios we may face.

Perhaps the most important aspect of operational art is the ability to "fit" these elements together--in harmony. Any plan that a joint force commander constructs must satisfy political leadership, attain the political aims assigned, and be constructed collaboratively with his peer-leaders-commanders of our coalition partners, officials from civilian agencies, and leaders from the host nation—who are partners and stakeholders in attaining those aims. Further, the joint force commander's plan must be executable by the forces made available—military and nonmilitary, US and multinational, in the physical and information domains, and within the organization he controls and adapts for the situation. If one of these elements is out of balance, the joint force commander must adjust the others—and continually re-balance as his operations unfold. How and when are matters of his judgment, a matter of his art.

The operational environment the joint force commander faces has expanded. Our understanding of what defines the operational level of war and the operational art must change in response to the changes in the environment. Some of what worked before remains essential; some, however, is distinctly counterproductive. **A** force that can adapt rapidly and successfully in the face of increasing uncertainty is a requirement in this new era. This concept addresses how we will accomplish this important task.

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Section 3 – MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS – THE CONCEPT

"Where there is unity, there is always victory."

--Publilius Syrus (First Century BC)

3.A Synopsis of the Central Idea.

The complexity and uncertainty of the future operational environment shape the conduct of future military operations in partnership with civilian agency activities to achieve our political goals. Given that combat remains a profoundly brutal and human endeavor, the human dimension is central to this concept. Technology does not fight an enemy; people do. Emerging technologies enable future operations, but must not constrain them. Despite unimaginable advances in sensor and information technologies, the *"fog, friction, uncertainty, complexity, and chaos"* surrounding war and combat endure, especially when facing an intelligent and determined adversary or multiple adversaries. Mental preparation is as important as the technical advantage that US forces can bring to bear in combat. But success in combat alone does not guarantee achievement of political aims.

Given this background, the central theme of the MCO JOC is this: **achieve decisive conclusions to combat and set the conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation; use a joint, interdependent force that swiftly applies overmatching power simultaneously and sequentially, in a set of contiguous and noncontiguous operations; employ joint power at all points of action necessary; and create in the mind of our enemy an asynchronous[17] perception of our actions—all to compel the enemy to accede to our will.** These decisive conclusions are enabled by the fluid[18] and coherent[19] application of joint military action in conjunction with interagency and

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[17] Asynchronous, in this context, refers to our desire to create an indiscernible pattern in time and space in the mind of our enemy. Our operations, however, must retain unity of purpose and coherency of action.

[18] Fluidity, in this context, is the ability to readily adapt, shift forces, and redirect operations; the ability to seek out, create, and exploit opportunities and adversary vulnerabilities; and the ability to engage, or appear to engage, an adversary in every dimension, relentlessly, irrespective of his efforts to disengage or to seek advantage. It is analogous to the tendency of fluid to adapt to the shape of any vessel that contains it; to pour through any crack, hole, or gap; and to engulf any object that is immersed in it. It is the manifestation of the emergent behaviors of adaptability and opportunism.

[19] Coherence, in this context, is analogous to qualities of coherent light produced by a laser, as compared to incoherent or ordinary light, produced by a flashlight. Although both focus light, the light produced by a

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coalition power, using an effects-based approach and leveraging pervasive knowledge in a networked environment to increase levels of collaboration, precision, unity of purpose and coherency in action. **As** Figure 1 below depicts, these enablers help us move from today's paradigm of applying overwhelming force to applying overmatching power, fiom deconflicting actions to coherent actions, from mostly sequential to more simultaneous operations, fiom primarily contiguous to more noncontiguous operations, fiom reacting to pro-acting, and from being joint only at the operational level to becoming joint at the point of action?' Additionally, a profound shift in our warfighting concepts occurs when the US aligns and synchronizes deployment, employment, and sustainment activities to



Figure 1

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laser differs from ordinary light in that it is made up of waves all of the same wavelength **and** all in phase (synchronized); ordinary light contains different wavelengths and phase relations. The result is greater power generated by the coherent light of a laser than the incoherent light of **a** flashlight. Ensuring that all available elements of the combined force are "in phase," or coherent stimulates synchronization and synergy that result in increased combat power.

20 "Joint at the point of action" refers to being able to apply the power of any element of the joint force at any point of action the joint commander directs.

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conduct multiple, simultaneous, distributed, decentralized battles and campaigns. For example, employment options expand, allowing operational maneuver from strategic distances as well as from the sea, and tactical vertical maneuver from operational distances-capabilities vital to forcible entry as well as follow-on operations. These employment options contribute to a degree of speed and agility that allows the aggressor no opportunity to adjust his plans, reconfigure his forces, or reconstitute damaged assets. To a considerable extent, these employment options are dependent upon the adequacy of strategic and theater lift, both air and maritime. To proceed without pause and without loss of tempo, all Services are required to increase combat power output per unit of deployment and achieve a degree of interdependence not heretofore realized. The end result is the ability to achieve and maintain adaptive force dominance.

Tomorrow's Operational Commander is key to achieving success. He must be able to generate the right effects at the right time and place to achieve the operational victory in conflict while contributing to the political victory. This requires a clear understanding of the challenges he faces in the future operational environment described earlier, the ability to leverage the six building blocks that form the foundation for combat operations, and apply a set of eleven guiding principles that influence his decision process and subsequent actions in the conduct of major combat operations.

3.B Foundations for Major Combat Operations.

Credible military strength deters potential adversaries. The US military must remain prepared to demonstrate the resolve of the US government and its commitment over time in order to reap the benefits in conflict. The US military no longer has a "grace" period while transitioning to war, no "time-out" for the military to catch up, and absolutely no reprieve for lack of strategic- and operational-level preparedness. Given this unforgiving "compression of time" that affects future US force projection and operations, the US military prepares by focusing on seven core building blocks that form the foundations for US success in future major combat operations:

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1. Fight with a warrior's ethos.
2. Use a coherent joint force that decides and acts based upon pervasive knowledge.
3. Develop resourceful leaders.
4. Train under the right conditions.
5. Field capabilities to maintain adaptive force dominance.
6. Uphold the values of American democracy.
7. Conduct routine Operations to Gain and Maintain Operational Access.

3.B.1 Fight with a Warrior's Ethos.

- Focus on fighting on a day-to-day basis.
- Create unit cohesion. Technology does not fight, people do.
- Instill in the individual a desire to: win, overcome obstacles, and solve problems.
- Reward aggressive action.
- Inspire everyone to believe they are warriors and that every team is a team of warriors.

Warfare routinely puts property, lives, and entire nations at risk. Those who undertake it have a grave responsibility to themselves, their comrades-in-arms, their commands, their Services, and their country. Because of this, it demands ultimate commitment on the part of warfighters. Pursuing warfighting as a job, or even as a career, is not sufficient to do it justice. It must be understood to be a true profession and a way of life. Any other approach to warfighting is unfair to the warfighter and all who rely upon him, with potentially deadly consequences.

The commitment of the warfighter to his profession requires discipline and sacrifice beyond that of ordinary professions. The warfighter must be prepared to endure extreme hardship in the performance of his duty. In order to be able to do these things when circumstances warrant, it is necessary to be always mindful of the need to prepare to do so. This requires an extraordinary focus on the essential elements of warfighting, which

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in turn must be based on the internalization within each warfighter of a peculiar "Warrior Ethos"—a set of values or guiding beliefs.

To be effective in the face of the stresses of war, this ethos must include an emphasis on the values essential to success in warfighting. **A** representative list of such values would include: **Honor** and Integrity–doing what is right, ethically, morally, and legally; **Courage**—overcoming fear, danger, or adversity, both physical and moral; Commitment and Selfless **Service**—putting the welfare of the nation, the combined force, and your subordinates before your own; Loyalty—bearing true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the combined force, and other warfighters; Duty—fulfillment of obligations and acceptance of responsibility for your own actions and those entrusted to your care; Respect—how we treat others reflects upon each of us and all of us; and Excellence—achievement and maintenance of the highest possible standards of performance. These values form the foundation of leadership and the basis for teamwork and unity of action. These values must guide and mold the warfighter at every level and echelon - tactical, operational, and strategic.[21]

The warfighters, guided by a genuine warrior ethos, will dedicate their lives to constant study and practice of the skills necessary to wage war. In this way, they will prepare themselves to perform to the highest possible level when the country calls. To the degree that the combined force is manned by such warfighters, it will have maximized its human potential, and greatly enhanced its warfighting power.

3.B.2 Use a coherent joint force that decides and acts based upon pervasive knowledge.

- Develop joint interdependence among service capabilities and associated force structures.
- Employ a network centric method to collect, fuse, analyze then provide access to information supporting leader decision requirements.

[21] This list of values is representative, not definitive or exhaustive. It is an amalgamation of the core values of each of the Services of the US Armed Forces, as contained in their respective publications.

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- Employ a joint military/interagency decision-making process that uses a collaborative information environment and functions with coalition partners.
- Translate pervasive knowledge and predictive analysis into anticipatory decisions and precise actions to achieve desired effects in a military, interagency, and multinational environment.

The network tools of the information age allow a degree in interdependence among service forces that had always been desired but had never been achievable. Interdependence, to be sure, relies upon technical connectivity that maximizes machine-to-machine interface when and how that makes sense, but even more importantly it relies upon breaking down long-developed cultural positions and barriers. **As** we work to solve technical problems surrounding an interdependent force, we must also use our training and leader development venues to create a new, coherently joint culture.

Core to this new joint culture is the understanding and implementation of proper supporting and supported relationships among military and interagency partners. Proper supporting and supported relationships in the 2015 and beyond environment require an expansion first of our understanding of "forces," "maneuver," and "engagement." Where these terms had referred only to military organizations, they now must apply to other elements of governmental action and national power. The second expansion concerns the dynamic aspect of supporting and supported relationships. Such relationships are not fixed. They are dynamic, and their dynamism results from changes in the battle space. **A** third expansion involves acknowledging that a fully networked coherently joint force can be developed in ways different from the past. In the past, commanders have dealt with the uncertainties and vagrancies of war by owning all they might need. **A** networked and interdependent force can deal with uncertainty and vagrancies through access to capabilities they do not own. This concept envisions a new ownership-to-access balance and sees greater interdependencies among elements of the force. The joint interdependence envisioned in this concept is the key to creating a more coherent warfighting force. Joint interdependency is more than a technical solution; it requires the breaking down of long developed cultural positions and barriers. It is developing and clearly understanding the capabilities the joint force requires and how we can maximize

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combat power and effectiveness with a given force available. This is not to say we move the joint force to a "sole" provider for each capability but instead that we balance our capabilities and core expertise to build a more coherent force.

For a coherent joint force working in a changing battle space, early understanding of potential threats rises in importance. "Understanding" in this context is more than data or information; it is pervasive knowledge. Being able to discern the precise action to take rests upon the ability to understand—not only empirically but also culturally—the nuances of that situation.

Early detection and understanding of an adversary's actions intended to challenge our interests gives us the time to take preventative actions. In many cases, pervasive knowledge will lead to predictive analysis and anticipatory action. Early understanding provides us with opportunities before an adversary takes action that may be lost after he takes it. Preventative action often succeeds using lower amounts or "softer" types of power than that which become necessary after an adversary acts.

Thus the understanding capability we seek is extensive. It is both technical and human. It is part of a multinational, interagency, government and nongovernment system of sensors and analysts. It is, furthermore, equally capable of providing us the intelligence we need regardless of weather conditions, terrain, or social-political conditions in which we must collect the raw information. We will need this capability in cities, jungles, and mountains as well as in open and rolling terrain.

A pervasive knowledge capability is the first step in creating the sense of futility and impunity in the mind of our adversary. This begins with predictive analysis long before hostilities begin. The ability to predict, to understand intention based on patterns, observed behavior, written or observed doctrine, and basic battlespace forensics - all require a change in our habits concerning the distribution of peacetime ISR assets. ISR must relentlessly focus on the most serious emerging threats worldwide with increased concentration as hostilities evolve. Thus, when hostilities begin ISR will have produced the advantage of knowledge through prediction rather than having to develop knowledge through pure discovery in the course of battle or hostilities. This pervasive knowledge system creates the impression that we can "observe" even an adversary's very intent. The adversary, aware of this system, is constantly looking over his shoulder, sure he is

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being watched, followed, tracked, and heard. This is not to say that we will be all knowing. The complexity of warfare will still involve uncertainty and conditions where we will have to fight with incomplete information. Therefore, we must be confident in how we are organized, trained, and equipped for adaptability and leverage intuition, experience, and our joint and expeditionary mindset to accomplish the assigned mission.

Our pervasive knowledge capability forms the core of all other capabilities, for it provides the knowledge base from which decisions are made and actions taken. Our ability to see and understand first enables us to decide and act first. We translate that potential capability into actual, when we create a joint, interagency decision-making and action-taking methodology. Unity of purpose and coherency of action among military and interagency partners can only result from recognition of a common set of desired effects; a common approach to problem solving, deciding, and acting; and an extensive collaborative environment in which all think and work.

Rapid, decentralized decisions, based upon high-quality, near-real time understanding, and executed quickly and precisely—all contribute to the adversary's sense of futility and perception of impunity. When a coherent joint force and their interagency and multinational partners can see and understand with equal clarity, they increase the probability of taking away just those options the adversary seeks while retaining freedom of action for themselves. Such decisions and actions not only need a specific *kind* of culture, but also the right set of open-architecture, collaborative tools.

3.B.3 Develop Resourceful Leaders.

- Use training as a leader development venue.
- Develop operational art explicitly.
- Identify future joint and service leader competencies and design appropriate training and education programs.

Although centralization best accommodates some aspects of joint military activity, the reliance on decentralized decision-making, shared understanding throughout the force, and decentralized execution expands in importance. The need for decentralization

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demands that our leaders be developed to anticipate and to adapt. Understanding and operating within the commander's intent are central to leader development. Leader flexibility, creativity, and resourcefulness are rewarded. Building trust, confidence, shared identity and understanding is nurtured between and among leaders in all components and agencies: active and reserve, and at all levels of command and staff along with their interagency, contractor, and coalition counterparts.

Leaders are developed to not only master their own specialties, but also to have an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of joint, interagency and coalition partners. Future joint leaders must possess technical and tactical expertise and be able to think on the move, adapting to an ever-changing situation. Leaders at all levels are skilled at communicating, thinking flexibly, empowering others, and providing feedback during the ebb and flow of battle. If the future joint force had the luxury of working together as a team well in advance of a crisis, then leaders could learn command techniques and teamwork at their leisure. The challenge, however, is to practice effective command with quickly formed teams comprising sub-elements from throughout the joint force. The future force practices adaptive command and teamwork among soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who may have never met prior to battle. This team is able to wade into a complex, uncertain environment and prevail against a competent enemy.

3.B.4 Train Under the Right Conditions.

- Replicate operational level conditions in joint and Service exercises.
- Joint Task Force Headquarters **AND** subordinate elements—joint organize, train, and equip.
- Include Interagency and Multinational elements.

First battles and their consequences do matter. There may be no second chance for the US in major combat. The extension and melding of our Services' training competencies contribute to joint warfighting synergies. Joint training should strengthen joint, interagency, and multinational operations by preparing forces for new warfighting concepts. Force readiness improves by aligning joint education and training capabilities and

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resources with Combatant Command needs. Individuals and organizations are developed that intuitively *think* jointly. Individuals, staffs, and organizations improvise and adapt to crises. Unity of effort and coherency in action ensue from a diversity of means.

Achieving this level of joint training rests on joint knowledge development and distribution, joint national training, and joint assessment and enablers. Joint knowledge development and distribution prepare future leaders to respond innovatively to enemies through a global knowledge network providing immediate access to joint education and training resources.

Joint national training prepares forces by providing commands, staffs, and units with an integrated, live, virtual, and constructive training environment in a joint, interagency, and multinational context. This allows global training and mission rehearsal in support of specific operational needs. Joint assessment and enablers assist leaders in sensing the value of initiatives on individuals, organizations, and processes required to meet validated Combatant Command needs. This also yields support tools and processes that enhance both joint knowledge development and joint national training.

Creating training opportunities and effective operational relationships between the US military, members of the interagency community, multinational partners, and multilateral participants expands our leaders' knowledge and experience. Core competencies, capabilities, and processes are examined to determine utility in major combat. This regular exposure contributes to building trust, confidence, and shared understanding among the participants. This, in turn, contributes to more effective use of all instruments of government action as well as making well-informed decisions faster.

Training, education, and leader development must be geared to stimulating emergent qualities, notably synergy, adaptability, and opportunism. Training forces to accept willingly and to cope successfully with uncertainty, risk, change, friction, chaos, and the fog of war is critical to our emerging warfighting culture. Learning organizations emerge that adapt rapidly and willingly to war's uncertainties.

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3.B.5 Field Capabilities to Maintain Adaptive Force Dominance.

- Create proper active component reserve component force mix.
- Identify necessary standing joint organizations.
- Determine proper methods for routine "dynamic tasking."
- Maintain Service collective, unit competencies.

America's armed forces need to field capabilities designed with the inherent operational and tactical flexibility to defeat highly adaptive adversaries. As potential enemies strike out in new military directions, their employment options expand commensurately. Among the areas in which novel approaches are especially attractive and within the reach even of second and third tier militaries are distributed command and control, cooperative engagement from standoff, layered air defense, information operations, and the exploitation of commercial space–based communications and sensor systems. At the same time, the explosion in information technologies is a potent enabler of aspiring military forces, including transnational terrorist groups and criminal organizations such as drug cartels and Mafias. Unconstrained by legal or bureaucratic obstacles, such groups may have even greater freedom to experiment with emerging technologies than do most military organizations. Such an adversary may opt to use weapons of mass destruction to further his cause.

History has shown that any preconceived assumptions about the tactical and operational behavior of potential adversaries, especially smaller adversaries, are very likely to prove wrong in some degree—even where an adversary's prewar behavior can be observed. Moreover, it is likely to change significantly once battle is joined and the longer hostilities persist the more frequently it is likely to change. To cope with that challenge, future forces require adaptive dominance—the ability to rapidly, and without major reorganization, adapt to changing enemy patterns of operation faster than the enemy himself can exploit them. Meanwhile, our own operations must be so rapid and disorienting that an enemy's adaptation to them is belated and ineffective.

Adaptive force dominance is a product of military culture, fostered or inhibited by training, leadership, and other factors. It also presumes a versatile and robust force

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design that incorporates such qualities as rapid situational awareness, organizational modularity, ground and air mobility, close synchronization of fires with maneuver, and effective integration of deployment, employment, and sustainment. **A** rapidly deployable, immediately employable, lethal, versatile, and robust force that is capable of winning decisively in major combat serves not only to help dominate the adversary in conflict but also serves foremost as a deterrent to any potential aggressor.

3.B.6 Uphold the Values of American Democracy.

- Meet our moral obligation to uphold the US Constitution.
- Value human dignity.
- Use force with proportionality and discrimination.

In the employment of military power, the American warfighter has the moral obligation to uphold the Constitution and values upon which our country was founded and operates. **As** instruments of the people, the Armed Forces of the United States are accountable to those people through their duly elected and appointed civilian leaders.

Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of control that favors human freedom for every person in every society. We stand firmly for human dignity and its nonnegotiable demands: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.

The complex and often ambiguous nature of the 21st-century adversary complicates our ability to wage war in accordance with the law of armed conflict. Nevertheless, we vigorously adhere to the fundamental principles of humanity and discriminate use of force by distinguishing between civilians and combatants. We also avoid unnecessary harm to the adversary, civilians, civilian objects and the environment by weighing the potential military advantage realized against potential casualties and collateral damage in

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an attempt to limit the devastating effects of war. We maintain the moral high ground against our enemies, even when they resort to terrorism and other dubious tactics.

As professionals in arms, we embrace and defend those inalienable rights invoked in the Declaration of Independence, embodied in the Constitution, and cherished by the American people.

3.B.7 Conduct routine Operations to Gain and Maintain Operational Access.

- Establish a set of basing options (permanent and situational).
- Exploit interagency and coalition partnerships to guarantee basing and isolate the adversary diplomatically.
- Identify proper mix of CONUS based, forward deployed, prepositioned equipment, and rotational capabilities.
- Develop joint assured access capabilities to include expeditionary forcible entry[22].
- Develop lift capabilities that facilitate maneuver from strategic and operational distances.
- Create modular forces that require little or no reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

Assuring access through forcible entry and rapid force projection combine to expand our MCO options while limiting enemy options to inflict damage on US forces, coalition partners, and the civilian populace in harm's way. Because the US does not know when and where the next major fight may occur, our military needs a comprehensive basing strategy with a menu of options to assure global reach and access. Furthermore, most major combat operation cases will require a forcible entry operation or set of operations to set the right conditions for major combat. **A** complete description of forcible entry operations is contained in a separate concept, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

The US must have strategic and operational capabilities along with the flexibility and agility to counter anti-access threats and area denial strategies by various means to ensure

[22] See Joint Forcible **Entry** Operations Concept

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the use of needed lines of communication and infrastructure. Forward stationing and the forward-presence of **US** forces reassure friends and allies, and tend to dissuade potential adversaries. Also, these forward-deployed forces are potentially the first responders to counter anti-access and area denial strategies. Implementing a combination of flexible deterrent options potentially deters further aggressive acts by an adversary. Additionally, the proper mix of forces, the appropriate forcible entry as well as air and sea lift capabilities to maneuver from strategic distances and deliver forces where the adversary does not expect, reengineered mobilization processes, and the concept of modular force packaging requiring less reception, staging, onward movement, and integration—all enhance our strategic agility and deal with the anti-access challenges.

Different regions have different geo-political, ethnic and religious underpinnings that will influence chosen deterrent options. In some instances, the best course of action for the US will be to monitor from afar or covertly instead of maintaining an overt military presence.

US and coalition partners gain access into a joint operations area from all dimensions, including space and cyberspace. This access contributes to the Commander's freedom of action to seek positional advantage through rapid maneuver and engagement[23] in pursuit of his objectives. Key to providing access is the development of the requisite forcible entry capabilities combined with lift capabilities that facilitate maneuver from strategic and operational distances and delivers forces where the adversary does not expect. Additionally, creating modular forces that require little or no reception, staging, onward movement, and integration provides the foundation for conducting forcible entry operations when required. Further, the right mix of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities is employed to thwart the enemy's anti-access and area denial strategies. Coherent involvement of the interagency and coalition communities and other organizations creates powerful partnerships. This coherent application of all instruments of national and multinational power contributes to isolating the enemy diplomatically as

[23] Working definition: Engagement is the imposition of friendly combat power upon the enemy. Force application expands the view of how the enemy forces can be affected beyond the traditional use of lethal fires. Engagements on future battlefields must capitalize on the synergies of timely and effective use of kinetic and nonkinetic weapons to create lethal as well as nonlethal effects.

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well as convincing third parties to remain neutral and uninvolved or taking positions favorable to our interests.

3.C How the Joint Force Fights: Eleven Execution Principles. Every major combat fight will be different. The following principles, however, capture what will be common to every major combat operation. These principles are not intended to be prescriptive or to limit the individual commander in the way he wages war. The principles capture both continuity and change in that they adhere to classical principles of military art while melding these principles with those found in cutting edge military, complexity, chaos, and productivity theories. The following eleven Guiding Principles of Major Combat Operations provide a set of tools to help shape commander's thoughts, decision process, and actions. The principles are meant to guide commanders as they plan and prepare to conduct major combat operations and deploy, employ, and sustain the joint force during the conduct of major combat operations. The proposed principles for Operational Commanders to consider and implement are:

1. Start with the strategic purpose in mind.
2. Achieve decisive outcomes and conclusions.
3. Employ a knowledge-enhanced, effects-based approach.
4. Employ a joint, interagency and multinational force with collaborative processes.
5. Use mission orders throughout the chain of command.
6. Gain and maintain operational access.
7. Engage the adversary comprehensively.
8. Generate relentless pressure by deciding and acting distributively.
9. Achieve coherency of action.
10. Align deployment, employment, and sustainment activities.
11. Protect people, facilities, and equipment throughout the battlespace.

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3.C.1 Start with the Strategic Purpose in Mind.

- Derive intent from assigned strategic aims.
- Convey intent with clarity and simplicity to achieve unity of purpose and coherency of action.
- Disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy the enemy's combat capability as a means to achieve decisive conclusions in post-combat operations.
- Harmonize combat with other elements of government action.

Action begins with a vision of the desired outcome. A policy-maker envisions first a desired political outcome, then considers the ways and means necessary to achieve it, and finally sets about taking action according to that strategic purpose. At every subsequent military planning step, the strategic purpose must be the focus of effort. In linking the necessary actions (or tasks), necessary ways and means (effects and resources), and the desired end state, the principle of simplicity should always be observed. The simpler the plans and relationships are, the easier it will be to implement and maintain them.

The formation and conveyance of the overarching strategic purpose take place at every level of the chain of command, throughout the combined force. At each level, the intent of higher levels guides the formation of intent tailored to the level in question. This chain reaches from the Commander in Chief to the lowest ranking warfighter in the field. In this way, the appreciation of intent is embedded in all actions taken by the combined force, and is made universal throughout the battlespace.

The process of developing commander's intent begins with the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense envisioning the strategic purpose of the action, determining the means necessary to achieve it, and assigning the responsibility for those means, as a mission, to an appropriate Combatant Commander. Effects to achieve this desired political outcome would likely continue well past the conclusion of major combat operations. Achieving the political end state relies upon all relevant instruments of government action: diplomatic coercion, public diplomacy, information operations, military force, law enforcement, economic assistance, etc. The commander then develops his statement of intent in terms of a desired operational end state for the military

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campaign. This intent is translated into desired effects that are expected to satisfy the purpose. The commander's intent also incorporates supporting and supported relationships among all available elements of power. Subordinate commanders then use this process to develop their own "nested" intent, compatible with and supportive of higher-level intent. This process continues down to the lowest practical levels.

At every level, it must be understood that warfighting is but one instrument of national policy used in concert with others to achieve national aims. Achieving those aims decisively generally lies beyond the scope and duration of combat operations alone. Universal understanding of the desired political end and maintenance of focus on it at every level by both military and civilian officials are therefore the keys to achieving coherence throughout the entire operation.

3.C.2 Achieve Decisive Outcomes and Conclusions.[24]

- Achieve strategic aims: Win at the tactical level to set the conditions for winning at the operational level.
- Disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy the enemy fighting capabilities and will.
- Use decisive defeat of enemy combat forces as a means to achieve decisive conclusion to war.

All actions commanders take in the conduct of major combat operations must be focused on achieving a decisive conclusion to the war. Winning in combat does not necessarily equal winning the war. Successfully imposing our will on an adversary whose behavior brought us to engage him in combat operations may very well rest upon what we do after we have forcefully and successfully engaged an adversary's ability to resist. All of our actions must aim to decrease our adversary's will and increase our ability to exert our own will. Decisive conclusions result from the achievement of all the strategic objectives or goals—the desired strategic aim. The military, diplomatic,

[24] Working definition --Decisive conclusions in this context refer to the "achievement of the strategic purpose (desired political end) as rapidly as possible with the least cost of life and national treasure."

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information and economic elements of national and multinational power contribute to achieving our strategic objectives that create and maintain the desired end state.

While achieving military objectives alone will not necessarily lead to a decisive conclusion, it is a *sine qua non* of the desired end state. The strategic military objectives are achieved through operational and tactical level actions focused on achieving decisive outcomes and conclusions. These actions coherently apply all the capabilities of the joint, multinational and interagency forces, nuclear or conventional, lethal or nonlethal, to disintegrate, disorient, dislocate or destroy the opponent. Similarly, it is the combination, of combat and stability operations that ensures all required strategic objectives have been met. Tactical level actions in each of these type operations are undertaken with the purpose of directly contributing to operational or strategic objectives. The coherent application of military and nonmilitary capabilities, involving all instruments of national, multinational and nongovernmental power, combines to decisively conclude the war.

3.C.3 Employ a Knowledge-Enhanced, Effects-Based Approach.

- Achieve pervasive knowledge that translates into increased precision and decisiveness of action.
- Link tactical actions to operational and strategic aims.
- Avoid drawn out attrition-based campaigns and operations; focus on effects relative to enemy centers of gravity, decisive points, and other critical areas, organizations, and activities.
- Adapt: Change tasks when needed to achieve desired effects.

One of the main focuses for all operations concerns having the effects on the enemy that the commander desires. These effects, individually or collectively, result in the enemy's disintegration, disorientation, dislocation, or destruction. Effects can be lethal

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or nonlethal. Effects can be generated by military forces or nonmilitary organizations. They can be generated by kinetic or nonkinetic means.

The effects-based approach also enhances the effectiveness of warfighting organizations by highlighting the importance of commander's intent. Commanders and decision-makers at every level must determine how their organization, military and not, can best contribute to the realization of the overall intent at their level. **An** effects-based approach links specified tasks to necessary effects to desired end states, while preserving the fieedom of decision-makers to determine the best means of achieving the necessary effect, to include the freedom, within specified limits, to change tasking. An effects-based approach leverages mutual trust and confidence and high levels of dedication, initiative, training, and competence. It also leverages organizational and procedural structures that encourage autonomy and decentralized decision and action in support of unified purpose in order to realize the full creativity and energy resident throughout the chain of command.

The effects-based approach, by focusing on intent, relies on the initiative, will and creativity of decision-makers to improvise and change these assigned tasks as needed in order to achieve desired results. An effects-based approach requires a great deal of intrinsic motivation, personal character that permits decision-making, a high degree of training, and a high level of trust up, down, and across the chain of command.

The effects-based approach serves as the framework for campaign design and reflects an appreciation of the complex web of interdependent relationships within and between the adversary, the battlespace, and ourselves. The term effects-based approach describes a way of thinking about and solving military problems and incorporates effects-based thinking, processes, operations, and targeting. Whenever possible, the effects-based approach attempts to avoid a long drawn out attrition based campaign, but should such a campaign be required, the effects-based approach still applies. It is a method that starts with the identification of higher purpose, centers of gravity, and decisive points. The effects-based approach then works downward to identify subordinate purposes and the effects necessary to achieve them. The effects themselves are understood to be physical or behavioral outcomes that result fiom a friendly action or set of actions. The desired effects are conveyed downward through the chain of command to provide guidance and

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establish both unity of purpose and coherency of action. It may, at times, be advantageous to specify guiding tasks as means of achieving desired effects, but this must always be balanced by the commander with his perception of the need of subordinate units for autonomy in order to best realize his intent. The effects-based approach is a commander-centric method because it encourages commanders at every level to exercise initiative by constantly looking for ways to support higher-level intent by contributing to the achievement of specified effects. Lateral transmission to adjacent units, or to interagency or coalition forces may also be appropriate. At every level, the focus remains on the achievement of specified effects, rather than tasks.

3.C.4 Employ a Joint, Interagency and Multinational Force with Collaborative Processes.

- Include interagency and multinational partners in collaborative planning and execution processes.
- Create an appropriate information-sharing environment with all partners.

Collaboration strengthens the degree to which joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities can be applied in a coherent manner to bring about the desired conditions for successful operations.

Proper collaboration increases the thoroughness of decisions, precision of actions, and the speed of adaptation within a joint force. Proper collaboration also contributes to unity of purpose and coherency of action, especially if all partners in an operation—military as well as non military—participate in the collaboration.

Collaboration simply entails working together to formulate plans, develop and analyze alterations, decisions, direct actions, assess effectiveness of those actions, then adapt accordingly. Information age networked tools have begun to redefine "working together."

In a distributed network, time and space shrink. Many more activities can be executed "now" when they are networked. In a networked environment functions can occur simultaneously both vertically and horizontally among organizations. For example,

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collaborative planning for an operation can include senior and subordinate leaders and their staffs, as well as interagency leaders and staffs and coalition leaders and their staffs. Furthermore, this collaboration can take place simultaneously either as a whole or in parts, usually organized along functions.

"Physical space" also *shrinks* in a distributed network. "Reachback," as well as, "Forward and Rear" as concepts become irrelevant in a network environment. Simply put: everyone on the network is "here" for all practical purposes.

Certainly, operating in this kind of distributive, collaborative network takes some getting used to. Certainly such operations require extensive information sharing protocols, cultural change, and lots of practice. Equally certain, however, is this: the power of collaboration is undeniable.

3.C.5 Use Mission Orders Throughout the Chain of Command.

- Focus mission orders on effects to be achieved.
- Nest orders, disseminate them vertically and horizontally, and facilitate collaboration and decentralization.

The key to implementing an effects-based approach is commander's intent, conveyed through mission orders. Commander's intent is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the effects necessary to achieve it. It should always be crafted primarily with reference to the effect that it is intended to have on the adversary, which is a change fi-om current practices that focus on accomplishment of friendly tasks. It must be "nested"—incorporating and promoting the satisfaction of higher headquarters intent, be clear and compelling, and should be disseminated and understood vertically and horizontally, in order to foster maximum cooperation in every direction. The commander's desired effects must be clearly understood and should encourage autonomy and freedom of action of subordinates to collaborate, innovate, adapt, and exploit opportunities at all levels, across the combined force, within the bounds of his intent.

Mission orders are the means of conveying commander's intent. While mission orders have no set format; in general, a joint force commander's mission order contains:

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- His intent (defined in terms of the effect the commander wants to achieve relative to his enemy),
- Mission,
- Supporting and supported relationships and any constraints or limitations.

Desired end states, and the effects necessary to achieve them, tend to stay fixed; but supporting tasks are subject to dynamic change. It is the emphasis on intent that allows decision-makers to innovate and adapt to dynamic circumstances as prescriptive tasks are overtaken by events. The focus on intent fosters a shared frame of reference promoting a common understanding. The scope of this understanding, and collaboration based upon it, should encompass all participants, including U.S. civilian agencies and coalition partners.

Mission orders facilitate collaboration and decentralization through empowerment. Shared understanding and creativity mean little if the command system does not allow for the exercise of appropriate authority at every level. Such empowerment results in a proliferation of decision-makers, a compressed decision cycle, and greater self-optimization. This does not mean that commanders must employ only decentralized command and control; rather, a balanced approach, allowing for centralization or decentralization as required, is needed. The level of decision-making must adapt to the mission, the terrain, the information flow, and the enemy situation on a continuous basis. Decentralized command and control cannot succeed without empowerment of competent, trusted, and trusting subordinates. Mission orders are the means of doing that.

3.C.6 Gain and Maintain Operational Access.[25]

- Establish necessary control of air, sea, space and cyberspace required to gain operational access.
- Use forcible entry operations when required.
- Use speed to thwart enemy efforts to establish operational exclusion zones.
- Overwhelm the enemy through simultaneous and sequential employment of rapid maneuver and precision engagement capabilities.

[25] For additional detail refer to the Joint Forcible Entry Operations Integrating Concept.

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- Swiftly introduce fully capable and immediately employable forces to set the conditions for rapid transition to follow-on operations.
- Directly deliver tailored mission capability packages through a combination of strategic and intratheater lift, and self-deployment.

Both before conflict erupts and once it becomes apparent that external intervention is likely, an adversary's first objective will be to use all the means at his disposal to deny intervening forces easy access to the theater. Where possible, he will seek to deter intervention altogether by means ranging from diplomacy to the threat of action against the U.S. and its allies, including threats to their respective homelands. At the same time, he will seek through a combination of persuasion, bribes, and other forms of intimidation to deprive the U.S. of regional allies, and thus of access to local territory, airspace, and port facilities.

A complete description of how the joint force sets the conditions for and conducts forcible entry, as well as how forcible entry forces support follow-on operations can be found in the joint forcible entry concept. That concept describes, in detail, how the joint force sets the initial conditions for, then uses speed, stealth, stand-off, and precision to force its way through the anti-access exclusion zone, defeat the adversary's area denial forces, and achieve the desired effects. The concept also describes the force packages that will normally accompany joint forces maneuvering from operational and strategic distances into areas lightly defended, or not defended at all. Operational access includes necessary control of air, sea, space and cyberspace required to deliver forcible entry and mission capability packages. Finally, the concept describes the continuous forcible entry operations required to sustain distributed operations and prevent our adversary from re-establishing their exclusion zones and area denial operations.

Adversaries employ anti-access and area denial capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, undersea minefields and salvoes of anti-ship missiles, unconventional forces, integrated air defense systems, strike aircraft, terrorism and weapons of mass effects. Conceivably, the anti-access threat facing **US** and coalition forces actually begins at our home stations and ports of embarkation. Area denial capabilities also include information warfare, to include deception, and space-based

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platform degradation. In conjunction with these efforts, the enemy may attempt to establish and enforce an operational exclusion zone encompassing areas within his reach. In this zone he may target our forces and their deployment entry points, lodgments, staging and air bases, logistical support systems, and maritime operating areas. Throughout, the enemy understands and applies the same synergy and simultaneity on which US operations are based, confronting the US with multiple and diverse threats, any one of which, if left unattended, potentially unhinges US and coalition operations.

To gain access in this kind of anti-access and area denial environment involves coordinating and executing difficult and complex sets of activities. The joint force commander must employ tailored capabilities-based forces to enter forcibly at multiple points of entry. The goal is to alter initial conditions and set future conditions as quickly as possible, through multiple avenues for rapid transition to follow-on operations. These entry forces are organized and employed to achieve their objectives within acceptable risk levels.[26] Direct delivery of these mission capability packages occurs by a combination of strategic and intratheater lift and self-deployment to gain and maintain access. In most cases, delivery of such mission capability packages will have to follow forcible entry operations, which set the conditions for successful combat operations. In either case, the enemy is subjected to and overwhelmed by the simultaneous employment of rapid maneuver and precision **engagement** capabilities.

While not a complete set of required capabilities, some examples include: special operations, predictive ISR, information operations to include deception, highly mobile air-mechanized assault forces, offshore naval fires, long-range precision bombing, and close air support. Additionally, dynamic, effects-based and knowledge-enhanced planning and execution contribute to quickly achieving assured access and force application as well as rapidly attaining the desired effects. A holistic force protection scheme must exist prior to, during, and following operations designed to gain and maintain access. There is less reliance on fixed airfields and seaports for initial entry operations. Forcible entry and initial follow-on forces require less reception, staging, onward movement, and integration activities. The entry force requires less of a logistics footprint since the units are self-sustaining for specified periods of time, and supported by

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[26] **A complete description of forcible entry operations can be found in a separate concept.**

a dynamic distribution network. The key aim is the swift introduction of fully capable and "immediately employable" forces into a battlespace in order to set the conditions for rapid transition to follow-on operations and quickly attain the desired effects.

Operations to gain and maintain access set all of the conditions required for forcible entry. To gain and maintain access, the joint force commander must establish early, sustained control of physical (air, land, sea, space) and information domains, optimize joint synergy, and focus combat power against those objectives that will have the most significant and enduring effect on the enemy's powers of resistance. Establishment of these conditions begins prior to the conduct of forcible entry operations. When the situation permits simultaneous operations, then the establishment of these conditions could begin at the same time, or just in advance of forcible entry operations. The neutralization of threats to access, such as ballistic missiles, sea mines, *SAMs*, and adversary air necessary to begin or continue forcible entry operations, will employ the components in a fully integrated joint operation. Furthermore, the joint force commander must sustain these conditions during the introduction of and in support of follow-on force packages. As described more fully in the Joint Forcible Entry Concept, gaining and maintaining access is not a "one time affair." Rather, in the robust anti-access exclusion zone that potential adversaries may construct, gaining and maintaining access is a continuous operation.

3.C.7 Engage the Adversary Comprehensively.

- Apply force along multiple axes simultaneously or sequentially, as appropriate, and decisively against critical objectives: enemy forces, Command and Control, Communications and Computer networks, as well as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets.
- Present asynchronous picture to the enemy without losing unity of purpose and coherency of action.

Operations should maneuver against and engage critical objectives, identified as centers of gravity and decisive points, throughout the enemy's area of operations along

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multiple separate air and ground axes. Such operations require early, multi–dimensional integration of precision fires, maneuver, and tactical assault to disrupt or destroy an enemy's ability to respond, fracture the operational integrity of enemy forces, sever enemy sensor–to–shooter links, deprive him of freedom of maneuver and mutual support, destroy selected forces and isolate the remainder from sustainment or reinforcement. Additionally, when quick decision is not achieved, the joint force must possess the durability to continue operations for as long as necessary. Forces committed must have the inherent ability to ramp up or down smoothly both in scale and intensity of operation.

The picture our operation should paint in the enemy's mind is an asynchronous one. While our operations must retain unity of purpose and coherency of action, our unity and coherency should not be recognizable from the enemy's perspective. To him, we should be "patternless," thus diminishing his ability to react effectively.

3.C.8 Generate Relentless Pressure by Deciding and Acting Distributively.

- Present adversary with multiple dilemmas and create a sense of futility.
- Go for the jugular and don't let up.
- Apply strength to create and exploit enemy weaknesses.
- Act distributively.

At the strategic, operational, and tactical level we seek a degree of relentlessness in the pace of our operations that yields no unintended pauses to our adversary. This degree of relentlessness can be achieved only through unity of purpose and coherency in action involving all instruments of government action, both military and nonmilitary, including actions taken by coalition partners. Whether our actions are taken simultaneously or sequentially or by some combination is situation dependent. The joint force initiates action on its own terms whenever possible to alter initial conditions and set conditions for future operations. The point is to create relentless pressure —strategic, operational, and tactical —as viewed and felt from the adversary's perspective. By deciding and acting distributively we generate constant pressure on the adversary's system and create multiple dilemmas for him. One of the results is an adversary who has a sense of "being

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overwhelmed." Friendly actions will be conducted sequentially and simultaneously, but to the adversary "everything is happening at once, from every direction, and in every dimension."

Rapid, decentralized decisions based upon high-quality, near-real-time understanding, and executed coherently, quickly, and precisely—all contribute to the adversary's sense of futility and perception of our impunity. When joint military forces and their interagency and multinational partners can see and understand with equal clarity, adversary centers of gravity and decisive points can be identified. Once identified, they provide the means to achieve unity of purpose and coherency in action that increase the probability of taking away those options the adversary seeks while retaining freedom of action for themselves. Such decisions and actions not only need a specific kind of culture, but also the right set of open-architecture, collaborative tools.

Distributed operations vary in time, space, and purpose, i.e., simultaneous and sequential, multiple theaters, multiple locations within each theater, and multiple types of operations seeking multiple effects. Joint operations occurring simultaneously within the battlespace against multiple points of vulnerability provide increasing pressure on the adversary. At certain times and places distributed operations are characterized as noncontiguous and operating simultaneously with other physically separated units and areas of operations. At other times and places units will operate contiguously, more along recognized lines of operation, with more sequenced phases. At times capabilities are generated from fixed bases in the United States or abroad and along fixed lines of operation.

The forces involved all share several major characteristics. They are coherently joint, focused on achieving desired effects that lead to strategic objectives, and aimed at creating relentless pressure on the adversary. This involves attacking from multiple directions and dimensions, and with all instruments of national and multinational power. Forces combine and recombine as the situation changes. Each combination is tailored to achieve the desired effects within its own subordinate battlespace. Enemies who witness combined force operations of the future will not perceive a pattern or deduce a template. Instead, combined force operations appear patternless—even incoherent, except in the minds of the combined force leaders. This force has a shared understanding of both the

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enemy and the current situation, thus contributing to the continual fight for information superiority. They are capable of rapidly adapting their plans, decisions, and actions to achieve the desired effects. Distributed operations encompass all of these characteristics; distributing the right power, in the right manner, at the right place and time throughout the battlespace.

The net effect of creating relentless pressure by deciding and acting distributively increases the likelihood that the joint force will create three results. First, achieve a degree of pressure greater than the sum of its parts. Second, create in the minds of our adversary the clear understanding that defeat is inevitable, thus continued action is futile. Third, convince adversary leaders and actors at every level that we can act with impunity. From the perspective of an adversary, regardless of weapon used, tactic employed, action taken, he is constantly at the disadvantage. He is constantly faced with the insurmountable.

3.C.9 Achieve Coherency of Action.

- Generate complementary and reinforcing kinetic and nonkinetic actions taken by military and nonmilitary organizations to achieve the desired lethal and nonlethal effects.
- Exploit extensive connectivity and collaboration among all partners.
- Take the broadest view of engagement.
- Achieve "true" economy of power—every action contributes.

The art of war at the operational level rests on the commander's ability to realize the full potential of the joint, interagency, and coalition force by recognizing and leveraging the synergies available from combining the competencies and capabilities resident in each of these entities. A first step in achieving this synergy is to broaden the current common understandings of maneuver and engagement. The most common understanding of maneuver entails the movement of forces and the most common understanding of engagement involves the delivery of kinetic,

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lethal munitions by military units. To meet the challenges of the future, these narrow understandings must be expanded and made mutually inclusive.

We must create the capability of moving both military and nonmilitary instruments of government action to a location of positional or temporal advantage, thus expanding our understanding of "forces" and "maneuver." "Nonmilitary forces" such as diplomatic, economic, and informational power, for example, must be maneuverable in time and place against the adversary just as are those of the military. The combination of all instruments of government action creates a coherency of action that presents the enemy with multiple dilemmas, not only in the physical domain, but the information and his own cognitive domains. Maneuvering various types of forces of all elements of power—including our technical and human means of achieving understanding as well as our collaborative tool set—isolates and inhibits an adversary, thus limiting or eliminating his options. If he chooses to maneuver in kind, he becomes vulnerable to our engagement. If he chooses to stay in place, he is equally vulnerable. The sense of his futility and our impunity grows.

Our understanding of the term engagement must also expand. Engagements are not limited to kinetic and lethal attacks; they can be nonkinetic and nonlethal. Coherent economic actions, computer network attacks, as well as actions in the public diplomacy and public information realms represent nonkinetic and nonlethal engagements that, when coupled with kinetic and lethal military strikes, optimize the commander's ability to generate effects in the battlespace.

When correctly combined, maneuver and engagement—whether kinetic or not, lethal or not, military or not—can generate complementary and reinforcing effects on the adversary. They are complementary in that the effects may be multiplicative rather than additive; reinforcing in that each adds to the weight, and ultimately the effect, of the other. Even if not used, that they exist, that they are or could be in a position to engage whenever we want, and that they are aimed precisely because of information from the understanding base, that they are coming from so many directions—all contribute to the sense of futility within the minds of our adversary..

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3.C.10 Align Deployment, Employment, and Sustainment Activities.

- Use a coherent mobilization and deployment sustainment system.
- Strategically deploy capabilities not commodities.
- Reduce, and when required eliminate, reception, staging, onward movement and integration requirements.
- Avoid strategic or operational pause, except to achieve effect.

A profound shift in our warfighting concepts occurs when the US aligns and synchronizes deployment, employment, and sustainment activities to conduct multiple, simultaneous, distributed, decentralized battles and campaigns. A coherent mobilization, deployment, and sustainment set of systems that are as flexible and responsive as employment systems increases the strategic agility of the entire joint force. For example, employment options expand, allowing operational maneuver from strategic distances as well as from the sea, and tactical vertical maneuver from operational distances. A flexible, joint maritime basing option together with rapidly constructed expeditionary airfields and fixed bases offer a set of opportunities to rapidly project operationally significant air and ground forces directly into locations our enemy does not expect, thereby precluding a lengthy, transitional build-up period ashore. These employment options contribute to momentum that allows the aggressor no opportunity to adjust his plans, reconfigure his forces, or reconstitute damaged assets. To a considerable extent, these employment options are dependent upon the adequacy of strategic and theater lift, both air and maritime. To proceed without pause and without loss of tempo, all Services are required to reengineer their mobilization process and increase combat power output per unit of deployment. The end result is the ability to achieve and maintain adaptive force dominance.

Setting the conditions to employ a US-led combined force is essential. Here, pre-crisis preparations within the mobilization and military industrial bases, Services, Combatant Commands, and other supporting agencies are crucial. A unifying deployment and sustainment structure promotes force adaptability, flexibility, agility, endurance, protection, and mobility. The required deployment and sustainment enablers,

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both materiel and nonmateriel, are sufficient enough to allow rapid force projection and world-class provisioning.

Our deployers and sustainers are imbued with a warrior ethos. In a noncontiguous battlespace, they must be capable of defending themselves and not over-reliant upon traditional combat formations for security. An adaptive, ubiquitous sustainment system, along with the requisite informational architecture, exists so that few of our agile maneuver forces ever outrun or lose their ability to request and receive responsive, time-definite, sustainment support.

Rapid and global employment, mobility, endurance, and worldwide sustainment are future force hallmarks. Fully capable and immediately employable forces must be projected swiftly fiom the sea, from the air, over land, or by a combination thereof into a joint operations area that may have no developed infrastructure. Mobility contributes to strategic and operational reach as well as to improved protection. Endurance equates to staying power and the ability to withstand the rigors of a campaign. Sustainment and its dynamic distribution network assure unrivaled provisioning even when lines of communication are not secure, and during forcible-entry operations.

3.C.11 Protect People, Facilities and Equipment Throughout the Battlespace.

- Preserve our combat power.
- Protect the force comprehensively fiom homeland to points of employment.
- Prevent interruption of space and information systems.

With increased emphasis on rapid global force projection, it is vital that comprehensive protection of the joint force centers of gravity and decisive points is assured from locations of origin to points of employment. Non-peer adversaries will likely resort to asymmetric attacks at accessible locations that have been assessed as the most vulnerable of the probable staging, transit and beddown locations for US and friendly forces. Action may well be taken against the force through attacks on military families and fiiends, other civilians, food and water supplies, contracted commercial

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support, host nation support or other indirect means, all of which must be included within the scope of full-dimension protection.

A significant potential for such attacks on or near US soil exists because of fixed home stations, the relatively limited number of origin-to-port of embarkation combinations available for movement, and the open nature of US society. Protection of forces while in homeland areas, including the littoral, is largely the province of the Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept (JOC) but is critical to preserving the ability to project the force for major combat. The enemy may also attempt to attack our centers of gravity or decisive points such as the joint forces distributed operating bases and the extended lines of communication supporting the joint forces distributed operations.

A key component of protection is defense against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) attack, not only for casualty avoidance, but to limit the effect on our force access and speed of operations. **A** focused defense should require that only those units affected by the hazard take protective measures. Large numbers should not have to assume a full protective posture as a precautionary measure against a general CBRNE threat. This aspect of protection is a principal concern of the Strategic Deterrence JOC, and includes defense against weapons of mass destruction.

In order to protect friendly centers of gravity such as forces, facilities, and noncombatants from the threat of theater ballistic missiles, the US requires rapidly deployable, persistent, and multilayered missile defense capabilities, employable both in the continental United States and in operations abroad.

Force survivability is linked to its inherently offensive orientation, as well as its speed, lethality and ability to apply force from standoff distances. While speed of operations affords some degree of protection by presenting the enemy with a "moving target," the agile conduct of operations requires force enhancements that improve survivability during the intended mission. Distributed forces, including logistic support assets, are not generally afforded the luxury of dedicated accompanying defensive platforms or large-scale security forces. Defensive capability must therefore be organic and integrated at the unit of action level.

In order to prevail in the cognitive and information domains and effectively execute operational decisions, we must assure the fullest use of our information capabilities in the

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face of enemy attacks. This includes not only defense of our computer networks and decision-making infrastructures, but extends to defense of our space-based systems (including their ground components) upon which we rely heavily for intelligence, early warning, communications, environmental monitoring, and positional data.

3.D Applying the Principles.

There is no single prescription or formula that operational commanders can call upon to effectively conduct major combat operations. Every conflict poses different challenges. Operational commanders must adapt to the conditions present and employ the force according to their judgment in order to achieve operational and strategic aims. The following three figures therefore, are illustrative of potential major combat operations, from long campaigns to discreet operations. The details of the application of the elements depicted will necessarily vary according to the circumstances.



Figure 2

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The extended campaign, illustrated in Figure 2 above, involves multiple operations conducted over time to decisively defeat a robust enemy. Escalation to this type of major combat will likely follow a failure of crisis response measures to deter aggression outright. **As** soon as it is clear that deterrence has failed, the priority shifts to joint forcible entry operations to defeat enemy anti-access capabilities, arrest enemy offensive operations and shape the theater for transition to follow-on operations. Such operations would involve a combination of basing and prepositioning options to include projecting power directly to objectives from strategic and operational distances. The breadth and duration of the campaign demand a comprehensive effort to: dismantle the enemy's anti-access systems, including their command and support; establish robust air and missile defenses and security forces able to protect indigenous forces and populations, coalition entry points, key bases and critical facilities; and gain control of air, land, sea and space approaches to the theater. Early establishment of multidimensional battlespace dominance, coupled with the uninterrupted flow of combat power into the joint area of operations, allows us to engage the enemy comprehensively, defeat his efforts to rapidly attain key objectives, deny him a protected posture, and set the conditions for reaching decisive conclusions as described in the execution principles. The endurance demands of such a campaign place a premium on initial and prepositioned sustainment as well as an ability to anticipate requirements and develop alternative sources of supply. The ability to successfully execute the extended campaign is critically dependent upon the successful alignment of deployment, employment and sustainment activities.

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

Figure 3

The approach to the limited campaign, illustrated in Figure **3,** is similar to that of the extended campaign but involves a single joint operating area. The application of the execution principles is the same in both campaign types; however, the scope in this particular example is more limited in duration and less demanding in terms of requisite endurance. Forcible entry with associated follow-on operations remains, but force reconstitution, relocation and reemployment are less prevalent than in the extended campaign. The use of joint seabasing or other methods for limiting the buildup ashore of command and control and logistics functions is typical of this type of campaign.

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

Figure 4

In a single operation such as is illustrated in Figure **4** the application of combat power for effects generation is less distributed and of shorter duration than in the previously described campaigns. The military objective is narrow in scope. Such an operation typically employs forward positioned forces and forces with global reach executing the forcible entry and follow-on operations and is characterized by reliance on speed and surprise. While access requirements are relatively limited, both in space and time, it is perhaps the most critical element of success for this type of operation. Logistics footprint is minimal as forces are organically sustained and directly deploy to (and redeploy from) the objective. Battle command for the single operation takes critical advantage of the competencies and readiness derived from adherence to the MCO foundations described in 3.B of this concept.

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3.E An Illustration of a MCO in 2015.

The following illustration describes a notional long duration campaign conducted in a single JOA. An illustration of a multiple JOA, extended campaign would demonstrate even more complexity. In this illustration the joint force is conducting a major combat operation that follows a set of unsuccessful deterrence efforts. Initial forcible and early entry operations have been completed and stability operations are conducted during and following major combat. This illustration focuses on major combat operations and demonstrates the linkage of major combat operations with joint forcible entry and stability operations. Such linkage is not universal, however. It would be a stretch to say, for example, that we "forced" our entry prior to Operation Just Cause.

This illustrative campaign also depicts the dueling nature of warfare against an adaptive adversary. The joint force commander and enemy leadership engage in a mental contest that is played out in operations. Adherence to the previously described execution principles enables the joint force to maintain the upper hand in this duel and win the conflict. The conduct of major combat operations requires the joint force to plan and prepare for the conduct of operations and then deploy, employ and sustain forces.[27] Each of these elements is addressed, in turn, below.

The illustration in Figure 5 below does not use the legacy, phased campaign construct: deter, shape and enter, decisive operations, and transition operations. Instead, we use the Joint Operations Concept framework as a "placeholder" until we conduct the broad, intellectual discussion with associated experimentation that will lead us to an adequate future campaign construct. That future construct will be inserted in version 2.0 of the Joint Operations Concepts.

3.E.1 Planning. To develop a campaign plan that is fully integrated and effectively harmonized with other instruments of government action, the joint force plans for major combat in a collaborative and inclusive manner. Trusted relationships with interagency and multinational partners, developed and practiced as part of the core foundations for

[27] The Joint Operations Concepts, JCS Version 1.0, 2003, p. 19, states Joint Operating Concepts will provide "A description of how a future Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ and sustain."

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major combat,[28] are brought to bear in dynamic plan formulation. Ongoing, distributive, collaborative planning is conducted. The pre-existing, collaborative information environment has been employed routinely for planning and training, allowing subordinate service operational headquarters to have previous relationships with the standing joint command and control elements. Multiple US agencies as well as multinational partners are part of the 2015 collaborative information environment and routinely use it to participate in campaign planning.

The presence of this in-place collaborative information environment provides one of the significant relevant differences in 2015 from today. In the fight to gain information superiority, information from immediately available ISR sources, to include human intelligence, and joint force status reporting systems is used to gain an early understanding of the situation. The information will never be perfect, but to gain information or decision superiority, the joint force's information needs only to be better than the adversary's. Based on specifics of the emerging situation, the joint force commander adjusts his plan collaboratively—that is, all those who will execute the plan, including interagency and multinational partners, help make the adjustments. This planning is supported by network structures and processes that: support synchronized collaborative planning; extend horizontally and vertically; and span the strategic to tactical levels.

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[28] See section **3.B** above for a detailed description of the core foundations.



Figure 5 – Planning and Preparing: Set conditions and Envision Campaign Endstate

The joint force commander, using an effects-based approach, derives his intent from the strategic aims and a vision of the required end state (Figure 5). The commander also takes into account the effects he must affect relative to enemy and friendly centers of gravity, decisive points, and other critical locations or activities. This effects-based intent describes desired lethal and nonlethal effects that then are used to develop initial tasks for the joint, multinational, and interagency force. Conceivably, initial tasks could be to set conditions for, then project an operationally significant combat force rapidly and directly into the adversary's capital city, defeat enemy forces in the urban area, remove the ruling regime, and set the conditions to return the city to a functioning posture. The effects-based approach serves as the framework for campaign design and helps create both unity of purpose and coherency of action. The effects-based intent is distributed in a nested fashion throughout the joint force through mission orders. These mission orders serve as a basis for the task organization and preparation of joint force packages. The joint force

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commander uses his best judgment to anticipate the actions of the enemy. Campaign planning of branches and sequels provides the organizational flexibility necessary to adjust to potential enemy responses and adaptation. Fully integrated joint deployment, employment and sustainment planning is continuous, adaptive, and responsive to changes. Likewise, multinational and interagency partners are available to support planning because they are part of the collaborative network.

3.E.2 Preparing. During the conduct of combat operations, preparations include a set of activities to: confirm and enhance the US-led coalition force's understanding of the operational environment; refine plans; tailor the US-led coalition force; and conduct initial operations including covert, clandestine, and overt activities.

Enhanced understanding and the adaptive nature of joint force packages change how forces will prepare in 2015. Commanders at all levels must continually fight for information superiority. To understand the complex environment comprehensively, the entire joint, interagency and multinational force operates with full knowledge of the commander's intent. The coherently joint force commits and exploits robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, including space-based platforms and HUMINT assets, in order to gain and maintain full-dimensional awareness. This overall net assessment of the operational environment also includes information gleaned from nongovernmental sources. This robust sensing and assessment capability reduces but does not eliminate uncertainty. It does, however, increase the probability of success by allowing leaders to make better decisions faster than the enemy—the meaning of "decision superiority." A common relevant operational picture emerges from this assessment. The collaborative information environment permits frequent updating and dissemination of this picture.

In 2015, deployment preparations are distinctively different in order to conduct coherently joint operations and generate effects rapidly. These preparation differences include a unifying and adaptive force projection and sustainment construct that enables early identification of requirements, joint capabilities-based force packaging, and use of joint rotational capabilities. The US-led force consists of capabilities-based, expeditionary, networked, modular, adaptive force packages. These forces are both

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CONUS-based and forward deployed. The collaborative information environment, when coupled with delivery means that permit deployment fi-om strategic and operational distances direct to areas the adversary does not expect, allow 2015 preparation to be much more distributed than it is today. Operational security and deception are enhanced by these preparatory methodologies. An air and sea bridge to the **JOA** is activated and pre-positioned equipment and sustainment are in use. Operational forces are postured to conduct rapid and decisive combat operations, or are in the force flow. Forces that are en route to the **JOA** possess command, control, mission planning, automated decision support, and rehearsal capabilities. **As** required, air, space, sea, and cyber-space dominance is achieved, or preparations to achieve such dominance are set into place.

With the MCO conditions set, the US-led force is trained and ready to conduct multiple, simultaneous and sequential, contiguous and noncontiguous, distributed operations, regardless of conditions, and for as long as necessary to achieve military objectives. Furthermore, these operations are coherently joint, interagency, and multinational—fi-om the start.

3.E.3 Joint Deployment, Employment and Sustainment. With the force having pervasive knowledge, as the situation permits, and relatively full understanding of the commander's intent, combat operations commence to achieve desired effects and military objectives. Forcible entry and follow-on combat operations may actually begin from multiple locations: CONUS, forward-based, and sea-based, for example. They might also use rapidly constructed expeditionary airfields as temporary launching pads and support bases. In 2015 deployment, employment, and sustainment activities are much more closely aligned. We developed this alignment in response to intelligent, adaptive, and committed enemies—nes that knew our reliance on fixed, improved air and seaports. The 2015 deployment, employment, and sustainment system projects a fully capable, immediately employable, and sustainable force anywhere in the world on short notice. This close alignment contributes to the commander's ability to combine, recombine, and employ capabilities to achieve the desired operational effects, and it is what differentiates the conduct of operations in 2015 from today. Provided the flexibility afforded by such an alignment, the joint force commander is able to respond to changes

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in the operational situation, whether brought about by the enemy's responses, physical environmental factors, third party actions, or other causes. The joint force is able to rapidly execute the campaign branches and sequels necessary to win the aforementioned duel.

Airlift and sealift assets are available, managed, and controlled in order to go where and when we want to go, and where the enemy does not suspect we will go. A holistic force protection scheme exists, i.e., from space-based platforms to strategic and theater bases and lines of communication to individual combatants. The protection scheme addresses, in particular, the myriad threats to coalition forces found in hostile urban areas.

Forcible entry operations —some robust and extensive, others less so —usually precede the direct delivery of potent and fully integrated military forces from strategic and operational distances and from the sea. The timing of forcible entry operations, their extent, and their duration all will depend upon the specific situation, the "thickness" of enemy exclusion zones, and the effects the joint force commander wants to have on the enemy. Follow-on forces are fully capable; some require no RSOI while others need very little. They are adaptive, modular, and highly mobile. Operational maneuver from strategic distances and from the sea, as well as vertical tactical maneuver from operational distances creates a degree of simultaneous pressure that our enemy will find hard to resist. Creating predictable patterns of movement is avoided. The force is not reliant upon fixed seaports and airfields as initial points of entry for either maneuver forces or their sustainment. The enemy is confronted with multiple, unrelenting, simultaneous and distributed operations at all critical points the command chooses to confront. Forcible entry operations are executed for however long necessary to establish a secure operational battlespace, ensure continued sustainment of follow-on operations, and prevent the enemy from re-establishing exclusion zones and area denial operations.

The US seeks to alter initial conditions to control the operational tempo. To do this, the US-led force continues to dismantle the enemy's residual anti-access systems to maintain access; establishes robust air and missile defenses and security forces; and achieves multi-dimensional battlespace dominance. Large-scale, simultaneous and distributed, multi-dimensional operations occur regardless of existing target area infrastructure and environmental conditions. The US-led force achieves operational

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momentum by moving with great speed and by engaging the adversary immediately with great discrimination. The force identifies and eliminates the enemy's asymmetric advantages, while securing and strengthening friendly asymmetric advantages. Kinetic and nonkinetic engagements are integrated with maneuver to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects (Figure **6).**



Figure 6 – Forcible entry and follow-on operations: Early Combat Efforts Synchronized in Physical and Information Domains

Initially, there is no significant logistics build-up ashore. Maneuver forces are self-sustaining for specified periods of time. If a logistics build-up is required ashore for a protracted campaign, then multiple, small agile operating bases are established. To cope with the ever-present unpredictable nature of combat, the deployment employment and sustainment strategy is to "sense early" and to "respond quickly" in order to satisfy requirements. **A** sense and respond joint deployment, employment, and sustainment framework focuses on speed and quality of effects. **A** responsive, ubiquitous, adaptable, and survivable distribution-based sustainment system supports rapid and distributed

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combat operations. Few maneuver units will outrun or lose their ability to request and receive time-definite sustainment support. Time-definite delivery standards are stringent, and customer wait time is measured in minutes and hours rather than days and weeks. In order to conduct relentless operations, the need for sustainment pauses is reduced to only those the commander directs.



Figure 7 – Continued forcible entry and follow-on operations: Combat Continuation – Some Endstate Conditions Attained, transition operations begin

Assessment of current actions is undertaken to determine their impact on either achieving desired effects or demonstrating potential to do so (Figure 7). Where directed actions no longer appear to achieve the desired effects, subordinate commanders use their initiative to change tasks or new ones are assigned. Execution in a collaborative information environment allows much more decentralized decisions and actions than in the past—without loss of unity of purpose or coherency of action. Similarly, the joint force commander must assess whether political aims and his supporting military endstate

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remain valid. When appropriate, the desired effects are modified if the military endstate has changed (Figure **8** below).



Figure 8 – Actual Campaign Endstate

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Section 4 - CAPABILITIES

Sections **4.A** through **4.E** below are essential major combat operations capabilities, categorized by functional area (Command and Control, Battlespace Awareness, Force Application, Focused Logistics, and Protection). To execute future major combat operations against a regional nation state, the Joint Force Commander and his force require the ability to:

4.A Command and Control Capabilities.

4.A.1 Clearly express a compelling and nested intent of what needs to be accomplished, using common frames of reference among military, interagency and coalition partners.
4.A.2 Define desired effects discretely enough to focus planning and determine requisite actions at all levels, and communicate desired end state(s) and effects to the lowest level required in order to execute the actions that lead to desired effects, assess the results of those actions, and adapt as necessary to achieve those effects.
4.A.3 Express commander's intent that will achieve the overall strategic purpose, or the eventual political end state, while in a dynamic environment, without undue focus on specified tasks; and assure understanding of the commander's intent at the lowest, actionable, relevant level.
4.A.4 Facilitate both centralized and decentralized decision-making as appropriate, exploiting decision support tools to make well-informed decisions faster than the opponent.
4.A.5 Provide effective leadership (based on selection, training, education, and experience of leaders) in a combined, adaptive, collaborative environment.
4.A.6 Maintain a robust, joint network that (1) avoids single points of failure, (2) enables graceful degradation, **(3)** is based on uniform standards at the data and information level to allow warfighters throughout the force to use applications without compromising interoperability, and **(4)** promotes the ability of commanders at all levels to decide and act with greater assurance and speed.

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4.A.7 Field and employ coherently joint, trained, and practiced headquarters elements that integrate a standing joint command and control capability with Service operational headquarters without disruption to or degradation of command and control functions.

4.B Battlespace Awareness Capabilities.

4.B.1 Maintain persistent situational awareness and achieve shared understanding through a collaborative environment among joint, interagency, and multinational partners in order to know the full dimensions of the operational environment, our adversaries, others, and ourselves.

4.B.2 Conduct planning in a collaborative environment that is flexible, robust, supported by automated decision tools (including a common relevant operational picture [CROP]), and extends beyond the bounds of MCO in order to facilitate stability operations.

4.B.3 Deploy a robust, pervasive, dynamically tailored, and high-fidelity intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system, to include human intelligence (HUMINT) and space platforms.

4.B.4 Comprehensively, expertly, and robustly analyze intelligence, using in-depth knowledge of area studies, local cultures, and languages; and the ability to perform effects-assessment (including non-quantifiable effects), all incorporating a thorough appreciation of friendly, adversary, and other actors in the battlespace.

4.B.5 Establish a secure, broadly accessible, tailorable, and user-friendly common relevant operational picture (CROP), based on an Operational Net Assessment (ONA)-like system that is authoritative and updated frequently.

4.C Force Application Capabilities.

4.C.1 Develop processes, procedures, and automated support systems to fully integrate fires and maneuver, using enhanced kinetic and nonkinetic weapons, to increase lethality.

4.C.2 Provide offensive capability to counter enemy anti-access systems including:

- Rapidly detecting, neutralizing or destroying mines at standoff ranges and in-stride.

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- Using fixed and deployable detection and tracking sensors at strategic port approaches and chokepoints to complement persistent anti-submarine warfare.
- Rapidly defeating improved enemy air defense systems.
- Countering enemy theater and tactical missiles with highly deployable systems that provide warning, intent, location, launch, and destruction (pre-launch, cruise and terminal phase, and over-the-horizon).

4.C.3 Rapidly project force directly to the objective from strategic and operational distances.

4.C.4 Rapidly deploy, employ, and sustain adaptive, modular, mission capability forces and packages to and throughout the battlespace, without creating predictable patterns.

4.C.5 Fully integrate joint, interagency, and coalition (combined) capabilities, from the strategic level down to the lowest practical level, to be able to employ all useful means and avenues of influence among all relevant actors, throughout the battlespace.

4.C.6 Empower commanders to conduct flexible and responsive operations at every useful level, to include Information Operations (IO) and maneuver and precision **engagement** operations that are supported by enhanced integrated combined fires and compressed sensor-to-shooter-to-impact engagement capabilities.

4.C.7 Streamline deployment processes to satisfy Combatant Command needs, positioning friendly forces within operational reach of critical targets, while denying adversary forces access to key fi-iendly targets.

4.C.8 Conduct large-scale, simultaneous and distributed, multidimensional combat operations (including unconventional and forcible-entry operations) regardless of existing target area infrastructure and environmental conditions; isolate the battlespace fiom unwanted influences; **engage** with great discrimination; move with great speed; and identify and eliminate or neutralize an opponent's asymmetric advantages, while securing and strengthening friendly asymmetric advantages.

4.C.9 Integrate Deployment, Employment, and Sustainment (DES) of the force in order to eliminate unnecessary redundancies, reduce friction, stimulate synergy, and enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operations.

4.C.10 Provide multidimensional precision **engagement,** including close fire support by exploiting high-endurance manned and unmanned launch platforms which combine ISR

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and engagement capabilities, deep-reach precise fire support including sea-based and long-range aerospace components to support forcible-entry operations, lethal and nonlethal (nuclear and conventional) fires, fires capable of type-target discrimination, time-sensitive targeting, and in-flight re-targeting of smart weapons.

4.D Focused Logistics Capabilities.

4.D.1 Establish and operate an adaptive, elastic, and ubiquitous distribution-based sustainment system, along with the requisite informational architecture, so that agile and dispersed forces do not outrun or lose their ability to request and receive time-definite support, with customer wait time measured in minutes and hours, not days and weeks.

4.D.2 Establish a joint sustainment force that is rapidly deployable, fully capable, immediately employable, flexible, highly mobile, modular, tailored, networked, survivable, and responsive to supported forces.

4.D.3 Maintain persistent deployment, employment, and sustainment situational awareness, and achieve shared understanding at multiple echelons (to include coalition partners), enabled by a coherently joint logistics common relevant operational picture, a reliable information and communications network, and automated decision tools in order to anticipate, predict, plan collaboratively, synchronize, and satisfy deployment and sustainment requirements that occur throughout a campaign.

4.D.4 Project and sustain forces when the adversary is competent and determined, strategic and theater lines of communication are not secure, access through fixed seaports and airfields in the battlespace is denied, and supported forces are widely dispersed in the battlespace.

4.D.5 Reduce the need for sustainment pauses, enabled by improved commonality, reliability, maintainability, sustainability, and survivability in order to conduct relentless operations.

4.E Protection Capabilities.

4.E.1 Provide security for our forces, systems and processes (to include critical infrastructure, information and space capabilities) from origin to final objective positions within the Joint Operations Area.

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4.E.2 Rapidly sense, detect, identify from standoff range, defend against, and recover the force fi-om chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced-explosives attack.

4.E.3 Employ combat vehicles and support vehicles (and platforms) designed with survivability features such as improved speed, low observable and low signature stealth, protective construction (e.g., blast mitigation coatings, fragmentation resistant materials, shock resistance, reactive armor), and organic automated defense against smart weapons.

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4.F Major Combat Operations Capability Mapping to Joint Operations Concepts Core Capabilities. Table 1 maps the capabilities identified in paragraphs **4.A** through 4.E to the eight common core capabilities in the Joint Operations Concepts.

Table 1 - MCO Capabilities Mapping to JOpsC Core Capabilities

	Para	MCO Capability	Common Understanding	Decision Superiority	Adaptive	Rapid Employment	Continuous Pressure	Disrupt the Adversary	Distributed DES	Coordinate with IA & MN
Command & Control	4.A.1	Clear vision	X	X						X
	4.A.2	Define desired effects	X	X					X	X
	4.A.3	Express Commander's intent	X	X						
	4.A.4	Facilitate collaborative decision and action		X					X	
	4.A.5	Effective leadership		X						X
	4.A.6	Robust joint network		X					X	X
	4.A.7	Coherently joint HQ		X						X
Battlespace Awareness	4.B.1	Persistent situational understanding	X						X	X
	4.B.2	Collaborative planning & decision tools		X					X	
	4.B.3	Robust ISR systems	X	X						
	4.B.4	Comprehensive intelligence analysis	X							
	4.B.5	Timely, accessible intelligence dissemination	X	X					X	
Force Application	4.C.1	Fully integrated fires and maneuver					X	X		
	4.C.2	Counter anti-access offensive systems				X	X	X		
	4.C.3	Project force directly to objective				X	X	X	X	
	4.C.4	Rapid mobility of forces			X	X	X		X	
	4.C.5	Integrated employment of forces			X	X	X			X
	4.C.6	Empower Commanders			X	X			X	
	4.C.7	Enhanced force projection						X	X	
	4.C.8	Multidimensional force employment			X	X	X	X	X	
	4.C.9	Integrated DES							X	
	4.C.10	Multidimensional precision engagement					X	X		
Focused Logistics	4.D.1	Adaptive distribution-based sustainment			X				X	
	4.D.2	Joint sustainment force packages			X	X			X	
	4.D.3	Persistent DES situational understanding	X	X					X	
	4.D.4	Project & sustain without infrastructure				X			X	
	4.D.5	Continuous deployment & sustainment					X		X	
Protection	4.E.1	Full-dimension protection				X			X	
	4.E.2	CBRNE protection	X	X				X	X	
	4.E.3	Self-protection assets					X		X	

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CONCLUSION

"Improvement will require not only technological solutions, but also cultural change—a willingness to challenge standard practices, and question current organizational patterns and command practices."
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Today, we have a historic opportunity to transform our military as we shift from an industrial age to an information age. Our military capabilities are rapidly evolving. The power of information age technology has vastly improved our ability to achieve our objectives through the application of military power. We can move further, faster, and fight better than ever before and the future promises that these capabilities will only continue to improve. Simultaneously, we are changing the way we work together as a military and the way we work with our interagency and multinational partners. Figure 9 below depicts this evolution to a more coherent joint force.



Figure 9

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In the past, we could segregate military forces based on their primary battlespace – air, land, and sea. The overlap between battle spaces was relatively small – limited to weapons ranges and line of sight. Over the last 50 years, managing that overlap has become increasingly difficult, as it has grown in size and complexity. Today, each Service has the capability to reach hundreds, even thousands of miles, into the battlespace. That's good because it increases our capability, but it also requires a greater degree of integration. Other trends include changes in the need for dispersion, greater weapons lethality, higher volumes and increased precision of fires, evolving ideas on the employment of mass and effects, integrative technologies, changes in invisibility and detectability, and merging of deployment, employment and sustainment activities. We're moving toward a coherent joint force with full spectrum capabilities. Increased capability through greater degrees of coherence is multiplicative, not additive. But we're not there yet. What remains key to the transformation of our military is our culture.

Our warfighting culture must change if we are going to successfully conduct major combat operations in tomorrow's global battlespace. While much of our culture is a continuing source of strength, some of it can actually stand in the way of progress. Warfighting culture is a constantly evolving construct, influenced by our ideals, history, and shared experiences. Warfighting culture provides the animating force behind decision-making, education, doctrine, organization, training, and all other aspects of warfighting. **A** nation's warfighting culture can be a force for dynamic change, or it can be a brake to progress through unflagging conservatism. The trick is to draw strength from the past, while ushering in needed change.

What, then, must change about our warfighting culture? **As** we create new ways to combine joint forces for maximum effect, we must be ready, able, and willing to transcend old ideas of how to fight, how to organize, and how to command. Everything must be subject to question; so that we can clear the path for breakthrough ideas that will save American lives in the future. Each soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine must be willing to change his most treasured ideas on how to fight. In this way, we clear the decks for American ingenuity to find the right answers for tomorrow.

One of the most important cultural changes that must occur is the elimination of "Service and functional stovepipes." Each Service has core competencies, and we must

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continue to cultivate them. Further, the Services are the touchstone of recruitment and training: our soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines learn their basic and advanced skills fiom Service training facilities. But it is the unproductive stovepipes that must go. This is a daunting task, and it's been tried before. From the regulatory requirements of Title 10, US Code to the existing organizational layout of the Services, there is a lot of natural friction against close integration of joint forces. But we must overcome the challenges if we are to realize the full potential of future joint operations. Materiel systems must be "born joint", rather than retrofitted later. Joint task optimization must replace Service-centric ideas of self-sufficiency. Rather than insisting upon ownership of organic assets, future commanders must become adept at achieving strategic and operational goals with shared joint assets and capabilities. Trust must replace ownership.

In a similar manner, we must become more adept at interagency and multinational operations. The systemic view of the enemy and friendly force leads to a greater appreciation for the integration of the efforts of the various agencies of the US government as well as our multinational partners. When joint force commanders transcend a strictly military view of the campaign and instead understand how all the instruments of national and multinational power—indeed, how all the diverse entities in the battlespace—relate and can benefit each other, they will multiply their strategic effectiveness. Interagency and multinational operations in the future will not be an anomalous or exceptional circumstance, but rather routine and integral to American strategy and the backdrop for effective combined force operations.

Finally, many who contemplate the nature of current and future operations have noted that military operations often result in something less than traditional military victory. In the 19th and 20th centuries, some theorists called for the utter destruction of the enemy as the logical goal of military operations. The strategic realities of tomorrow will require joint forces to combine successful engagement of the enemy's armed forces with the need to control terrain or population, assist in peace operations, or provide stability and support to struggling nations. Clausewitz was correct when he wrote, "The whole of military activity, the end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained...is simply that he should fight at the right place and at the right time." However, while the ultimate test of any military is its ability to fight and win, future commanders must also

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have the savvy and resources to fulfill a wide array of other strategic missions to help win the confrontation. This is a cultural issue, because traditional American warfighting culture has deified military victory and eschewed any other activities deemed to be a distraction from it. In the words of General Douglas MacArthur: "There is no substitute for victory." The reality of tomorrow insists that we understand victory for what it is: strategic success—attainment of the set of political aims through the effects-based and coherent application of all elements of national and multinational power.

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APPENDIX A -- TIME HORIZON, ASSUMPTIONS, AND RISKS

This concept is focused on the time horizon just beyond the Future Years' Defense Plan (FYDP), roughly 2015 and rests upon the following assumptions:

Assumption 1: War continues to be an important component of confrontation strategies and remains a fundamentally human endeavor. Our approach to warfighting in the information age must strike a balance between its technological and human elements.

Assumption 2: While the nature of war remains relatively fixed, the conduct of war has changed, is changing and will continue to change. Adversaries will include both state and non-state actors, including transnational organizations, terrorist groups, criminal elements and economic entities. We will often face enemies who operate outside the rule of law and are difficult to distinguish from noncombatants. These new adversary sets require us to develop new approaches to deterrence measures, warfighting and winning confrontations.

Assumption 3: Potential regional adversaries in the 2015[29] timeframe will be well-equipped, well-led, motivated to win, highly adaptive, with global reach in selected capabilities, and possess the will to employ those capabilities in opposition to or in a manner threatening to U.S. national security. They will also likely possess weapons of mass destruction[30] [31] and significant anti-access capabilities. They will observe our warfighting capabilities and methods and adjust their strategies and tactics intelligently in an attempt to counter our advantages. These adversaries will seek to exploit technological breakthroughs in novel ways.

Assumption 4: Technological advances[32] will continue at least at the current pace. Commercially available dual-use technology will continue to proliferate, extending

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[29] GLOBAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES: THE DECADES AHEAD Statement for the House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. (Paragraphs 1, 3, and 10).

[30] Implies ability to possess and globally export WMD effects through terrorist cells, special operations forces, intermediate range missiles, and, in some cases, intercontinental range missiles.

[31] A Primer on the FUTURE THREAT: The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 2, Global Change, Para 6; Chapter 3, Transnational Issues -- WMD Proliferation.

[32] GLOBAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES: THE DECADES AHEAD Statement for the House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Future Warfare Trends.

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sophisticated niche capabilities, some approaching near peer, to even the least sophisticated and minimally funded adversaries.

Assumption 5: Service competencies remain the foundation of joint capabilities. The Services provide the cultural identities, domain expertise and core warfighting resources that are vital to implementing this concept.

Assumption **6:** The concept outlines three cases of major combat operations. Of the two likely cases, Case One, the high-end regional competitor, has the greatest impact on our total capability requirements and is accordingly the focus of Version 1.0. Case Two, major irregular combat is the other likely case in the 2015 time frame and will be the next case developed in future versions of the concept. Case Three, the peer competitor, while the most dangerous, is not anticipated within the time frame of focus and will be the last of the three developed.

Risks are hypothetical events that could render this concept invalid. They help frame the context in which this JOC applies.

Risk: A new generation of warfare could emerge that employs concepts and technologies that have not been envisioned—and whose consequences have not been considered. Developments could occur that compromise or negate today's critical force structure investments and thereby offset or eliminate projected US advantages in such areas as low observability (stealth), precision targeting and information operations. Conceivably, we could witness the convergence of information technologies, biological sciences, and advanced manufacturing techniques with significant military implications. There is potential that advances in energy-based weapons, immersive technologies, biology-based or psychotronic weapons, and other capabilities designed to alter the ability of the human body to process stimuli may have a profound effect on warfare in the information age.

Risk Mitigation: Risk posed by the uncertainties inherent in future science and technology advances can be mitigated by the continued investment in national and cooperative science and technology programs. Adequate funding will enable continued

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development of maturing technology and development of methods to counter its exploitation by the competition.

APPENDIX B --PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN A NETWORKED AGE

Under development for inclusion in MCO JOC Version 2.0

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

TRANSFORMATION PLANNING GUIDANCE

APRIL 2003

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Implementing the Four Pillars

Pillar One: Strengthening Joint Operations

Joint Concepts and Architectures

The key to the Department's transformation strategy is future joint operating concepts. They should be specific enough to permit identification and prioritization of transformation requirements inside the defense program. In order to avoid becoming a new orthodoxy that forecloses debate on promising new approaches to warfighting, the concepts will be updated as required by ongoing experimentation results and operational lessons learned. The CJCS will be responsible for oversight of production and annual validation of authoritative joint concepts in three timeframes:

- Near-tern (2-3 years out) Joint Operations: Combatant Commander war plans, operational and training lessons learned, and joint doctrine, all designed to achieve new strategy goals and updated in accordance with the CPG, will promote transformation through enhanced jointness and planning modifications. Combatant Commanders will devise war plans taking into account mid-term joint operating concepts, lessons learned from ongoing operations, joint training and exercises, advanced concept technology demonstrations and experiments. Current war plans and joint doctrine will be the authoritative baseline against which joint training and experimental results will be measured to assess their transformational value.

- Mid-term (Just Beyond the FYDP) Joint Concepts: Future joint concepts will depict how the joint force of the future is to fight. They will address specific military operations across the range of military operations. They will be designed to meet the six operational goals established in the 2001 QDR. The CJCS, in coordination with Commander, JFCOM, will initially develop one overarching joint concept and direct the development of four subordinate joint operating concepts (JOC): homeland security, stability operations, strategic deterrence, and major combat operations (see tasking, appendix one). More guidance on the development of these concepts is provided in appendix four. The JOCs will evolve over time to reflect insights gained from experimentation. The transformation roadmaps will identify the desired operational capabilities needed to implement the JOCs and the preferred means of obtaining those capabilities. The Department will measure progress toward building these capabilities in the program/budget review.

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Appendix One: Transformation Roles/Responsibilities

Transformation Task	Page	Approval Authority	Lead	Coordination	Mechanism	Timeline
Shaping Transformation Policy						
Establish Transformation Objectives	-	SECDEF	USD (Policy)	D(OFT), CJCS, JFCOM	Guidance: Transformation Planning Guidance	As necessary
Set Transformation Policy	-	SECDEF	USD (Policy)	D(OFT), CJCS, JFCOM	***Guidance:*** Transformation Planning Guidance	As necessary
Coordination of Interagency Transformation Efforts	-	DEP SECDEF	USD (Policy)	D(OFT), CJCS, JFCOM, ASD(C3I)	As appropriate	Ongoing
Develop Multinational Transformation Recommendations	8	SECDEF	USD (Policy)	D(OFT), CJCS, JFCOM, Services, USD(AT&L), ASD(C3I)	***Document:*** Develop recommendations for inclusion into the Security Cooperation Guidance to govern bilateral and multilateral cooperation on transformation consistent with the new defense strategy and the six QDR goals.	May 30, 2003
Transform Strategic Analysis	8	DEP SECDEF	USD (Policy)	D(PA&E) and CJCS	*Briefing:* Provide new approach to analysis of current and future requirements synchronized with PPBS and QDR. Will include an alternative to DPG IPS, a broader set of analytic tools, and a joint scenario data management approach.	May 1, 2003
Oversee and Allocate Resources	-	SECDEF/ DEP SECDEF	SECDEF	SEC, DRB, D(PA&E)	Program/Budget Review	Aug-Nov annually
Concept Development and Experimentation						
Publish Joint Operations Concepts	15	SECDEF	CJCS	Combatant Commands, Services, D(OFT)	***Document:*** Develop one overarching Joint Operations Concepts that describes joint warfighting just outside of the FYDP.	May 1, 2003. Biennially thereafter.
Develop Joint Operating Concepts	15	SECDEF	CJCS	Services and Combatant Commands, with comment from D(OFT)	*Briefings/Documents:* Develop four cornerstone JOCs to be updated annually. Will also keep transformation roadmap developers in the Services, Defense Agencies, and JFCOM informed during JOC development.	June 1, 2003. Sept. 1 thereafter

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TAB C

COORDINATION

USA	MG Dayton	6 Aug 04
USN	ADM Natham	10 Sep 04
USAF	Gen Jumper	16 Aug 04
USMC	Gen Hagee	15 Sep 04

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Hold

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef ——
USDP approved 12/14/04
I-04/013053 & I-04/013056
ES-1725

381

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Major Combat Ops and Stability Ops Joint Operating Concepts DEC 16 2004)

The Chairman is asking you to approve Joint Operating Concepts (JOC's) for Major Combat Operations and Stability Operations. Despite having some specific concerns, we recommend approval. A draft endorsement is attached next under.

Policy's review indicates that:

- Progress is slow, but noteworthy. Future JOC's should focus on a specific problem and the development of a joint force solution, not merely long term goals.

- Concept development does not meet Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) guidelines. The JOC's look more like doctrinal theory than a discussion of *how* to conduct operations.

Short summaries of the Major Combat Operations and Stability Operations JOC's are attached at Tabs A and B.

You may want to consider sending the draft snowflake at Tab C that tasks Policy to work with the Joint Staff to add a competitive aspect to the JOC development process. Competition may generate innovation and engage a wider audience.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum next under which approves "interim" joint operating concepts.

COORDINATION: Tab F

Attachments: **As** stated

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Prepared by Jim Thomas, **DASD** Resources and Plans, 697-0209

OSD 14834-04

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Joint Operating Concepts

The Major Combat Operations and Stability Operations Joint Operating Concepts (JOC's) are approved as interim concepts.

It's clear that you have made significant progress. I believe, however, that these JOC's do not yet realize the vision you and I have discussed and as codified in the Transformation Planning Guidance.

In the future, you may want to consider being more specific about how we will operate as a coherent joint force including with inter-agency and multi-national partners, and emphasize stability operations in experimentation and wargames.

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Major Combat Operations (MCO) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Summary

- The MCO JOC:
  - Defines MCO as large-scale operations conducted against a nation state that possesses significant regional military capability, with global reach in selected capabilities, and the will to employ that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to U.S. National Security.
  - States there are three cases of MCO that will be developed separately: MCO against a high-end regional competitor, irregular MCO, and MCO against a peer competitor. The focus of Version 1 is the high-end regional competitor.
- The central idea of this concept is to achieve decisive conclusions to combat and set the conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation by:
  (1) Using a joint, interdependent force that swiftly applies overmatching power simultaneously and sequentially, in a set of contiguous and noncontiguous operations,
  (2) Employing joint power at all points of action necessary, and
  (3) Creating in the mind of our enemy an asynchronous perception of our actions — all to compel the enemy to accede to our will.
- The key conceptual shifts outlined in the MCO JOC are:
  (1) Overwhelming power vice overmatching force,
  (2) Coherent actions vice deconflicting actions
  (3) Simultaneous operations vice sequential operations
  (4) Noncontiguous operations vice contiguous operations
  (5) Pro-acting vice reacting
  (6) Jointness at the point of action vice jointness only at the operational level
  (7) Creating aligned and synchronized deployment, employment, and sustainment activities to conduct multiple, simultaneous, distributed, decentralized battles and campaigns
- The core building blocks for US success in future major combat operations are:
  (1) Fight with a warrior's ethos.
  (2) Use a coherent joint force that decides and acts based upon pervasive knowledge.
  (3) Develop resourceful leaders.
  (4) Train under the right conditions.
  (5) Field capabilities to maintain adaptive force dominance.
  (6) Uphold the values of American democracy.
  (7) Conduct routine Operations to Gain and Maintain Operational Access.

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- The MCO JOC describes 11 execution principles for how the joint force fights:
  (1) Start with the strategic purpose in mind.
  (2) Achieve decisive outcomes and conclusions.
  (3) Employ a knowledge-enhanced, effects-based approach.
  (4) Employ a joint, interagency and multinational force with collaborative processes.
  (5) Use mission orders throughout the chain of command.
  (6) Gain and maintain operational access.
  (7) Engage the adversary comprehensively.
  (8) Generate relentless pressure by deciding and acting distributively.
  (9) Achieve coherency of action.
  (10) Align deployment, employment, and sustainment activities.
  (11) Protect people, facilities, and equipment throughout the battlespace.
- MCO JOC Version 1 provides a placeholder campaign construct (Planning, Preparing, Deployment, Employment and Sustainment) to replace the legacy phased construct (deter, shape and enter, decisive operations, and transition operations.) The placeholder will be used in experimentation and updated in MCO JOC Version 2.
- The MCO JOC lists 30 essential functional capabilities needed for success against a high-end regional competitor.

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Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Summary

- This Joint Operating Concept (JOC):
  - Defines Stability Operations as "multi-agency operations that involve all instruments of national and multinational action that seek to establish security; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish a political, social, and economic architecture; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance."
  - States that the Joint Force will conduct stability operations in all phases of major combat operations: pre-crisis, during combat, and post-war, where each period requires different focus and capabilities.
  - Describes four cases of Stability Operations. Version 1 of the JOC will focus on stability before, during, and after a major combat operation. Future versions will focus on stability during interventions against transnational actors, stability for nations or regions that become ungovernable, and requests for stability assistance from an allied or fi-iendly nation-state.
- Stability operations are a core mission of the military services and military agencies. Just as the military trains, organizes, and equips its forces for conventional combat, it must similarly prepare for stability operations.
- There are 10 principles to guide a joint force commander's thought when conducting stability operations.
  (1) Organize military and civilian agencies to achieve unity of purpose and coherency of action.
  (2) Incorporate information operations into every action, tactical and operational.
  (3) Impose security by adopting an assertive posture.
  (4) Defeat those violently opposed to stability.
  (5) Neutralize, co-opt, or induce others who threaten stability.
  (6) Act with precision quickly: Balance restraint and overmatching power.
  (7) Act from a position of legitimacy.
  (8) Pursue interim conditions for "next state" in the transition process.
  (9) Operate within the law.
  (10) Develop reliable local intelligence.
- All stability operations require a combination of detailed situational understanding; a coercive posture against obstructionists; unified direction from legitimate civil authority; integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action; sophisticated media operations; organizational endurance; and sufficient popular support over time in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance and reduce the likelihood of destabilizing elements.
- The Stability Operations JOC lists 25 essential functional capabilities needed for success.

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December xx, 2004

TO: Ryan Henry

c c : Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Competition in Joint Concepts

I would like you to explore with Gen Myers how we c n insert intelle tual competition into the joint concept development process. I believe competition opens the aperture to engage a wider audience for creative ideas and will generate innovation within the entire process. How can we make this happen?

Thanks.

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

2004 SEP 28 PM 3:52

ACTION MEMO

CM-2089-04
28 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS 9/28

SUBJECT: Major Combat Operations (MCO) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)

- The enclosed MCO JOC (TAB A) is forwarded for your approval in response to Transformation Planning Guidance requirements (TAB B).
- The concept, authored by USJFCOM and approved by the Joint Chiefs, is the culmination of a lengthy development and refinement effort. USJFCOM collaborated with the Services, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff and Defense agencies to produce the inaugural document that will be updated according to the Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan. My staff provided copies of this paper to the Office for Force Transformation for review. This JOC is key to the continued Joint Force transformation and improvement of joint warfighting capabilities.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the JOC.

Approve _____ Disapprove_____ Other_____

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Maj Gen Jack Catton, USAF; Director, J-7; (703) 697-9031

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO CM-2090-04
28 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS 9/28

SUBJECT: Stability Operations (SO) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)

- The enclosed SO JOC (TAB A) is forwarded for your approval in response to Transformation Planning Guidance requirements (TAB B).
- The concept, authored by USJFCOM and approved by the Joint Chiefs, is the culmination of a lengthy development and refinement effort. USJFCOM collaborated with the Services, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff and Defense agencies to produce the inaugural document that will be updated according to the Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan. My staff provided copies of this paper to the Office for Force Transformation for review. This JOC is key to the continued Joint Force transformation and improvement of joint warfighting capabilities.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the JOC.

Approve _____ Disapprove_____ Other_____

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Maj Gen Jack Catton, USAF; Director, J-7; (703) 697-9031

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Stability Operations
Joint Operating Concept

September 2004

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APPROVAL

As the lead author, US Joint Forces Command matured this concept through the use of joint and Service operational lessons learned and experimentation: numerous co-sponsored joint wargames, seminars, workshops and other concept development venues. Throughout, this process was guided by direct input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During the development of this concept each Service, combatant command, selected members of the Joint and OSD staffs, as well as multinational partners and selected non-DoD agencies made significant contributions. Also included throughout were a host of active and retired flag and junior officers, academics, and professional strategic thinkers.

US Joint Forces Command will continue to use experimentation and lessons learned to refine this concept. Version 2.0 is expected to be staffed in the 3rd quarter 05 timeframe.

E.P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, US Navy

APPROVED

_____

RICHARD B. MYERS
General, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

APPROVED

_____

DONALD H. RUMSFELD
Secretary of Defense

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Winning in war consists of securing the desired political aims. To achieve these aims requires both winning in conventional combat operations as well as stability operations: imposing the security required to facilitate the transition to and reconstruction of a "new" normal once major conventional combat operations cease. The joint force will conduct stability operations in all phases of major conventional combat operations: pre-crisis, during major conventional combat operations, and postwar.' The overall purpose of these operations is to achieve the strategic national, or coalition, goals.

The joint force, as part of a multinational and integrated, multiagency operation, will provide security, initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance. These kinds of stability operations will be conducted simultaneously, distributed throughout the theater of war. ***All will require a combination of detailed situational understanding; a coerciveposture against obstructionists; unified directionfrom legitimate civil authority; integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action; sophisticated media operations; organizational endurance; and sufficientpopular support over time in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance and reduce the likelihood of destabilizing elements.***

In the pre-conflict period, the joint force commander's focus is preventive, seeking resolution of conflict by conducting operations to secure the United States' (US) objectives and prevent the crisis from crossing the threshold of conflict. During periods of conflict, the joint force commander conducts stability operations for two purposes. The first purpose is to ensure the uninterrupted continuation of combat operations. The second is to create conditions favorable for the long-term success of the US and coalition post-conflict reconstruction program. In the post-conflict period, stability operations include both security operations and civil-military operations in support of civilian agencies and organizations to complete the achievement of wartime political objectives. During conflict the joint force is the "supported" agency. In prevention and

---

1 For brevity's sake, "joint" in the context of this concept refers to a joint, multiagency, and multinational force and includes the integration and appropriate balance of conventional and special operations forces.

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reconstruction operations, the joint force is the "supporting" agency. The transitions from supported to supporting and back again are a critical component of both unity of purpose and coherency of action.

Stability operations associated with major combat are among the most complicated missions assigned to the United States military and require a focused approach to ensure that they are successful in obtaining strategic aims. To help provide this required focus, the stability operations concept proposes 10 principles that should guide a joint force commander's thoughts on the conduct of operations pre, during, and post- conflict. These principles are:

1. Organize military and civilian agencies to achieve unity of purpose and coherency of action.
2. Incorporate information operations into every action, tactical and operational.
3. Impose security by adopting an assertive posture.
4. Defeat those violently opposed to stability.
5. Neutralize, co-opt, or induce others who threaten stability.
6. Act with precision quickly: Balance restraint and overmatching power.
7. Act fiom a position of legitimacy.
8. Pursue interim conditions for "next state" in the transition process.
9. Operate within the law.
10. Develop reliable local intelligence.

The military organizes, trains, and equips its forces for conventional combat; it must prepare similarly for stability operations, which will usually involve fighting to establish a secure environment. Military organizations must have the capability to organize, train, equip, and execute long-term stability operations simultaneously with major conventional combat operations. Preventive actions, particularly special operations, information operations, and intelligence activities, properly planned, resourced, and conducted, might even obviate the need for subsequent conventional combat operations by preventing the situation from crossing the threshold of war. If war is thrust upon us, stability operations are essential to the ultimate achievement of strategic aims. Stability operations are a core mission of the military services and civil agencies.

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Joint and Service doctrines identify many different types of stability type operations including peace operations, humanitarian assistance, arms control, and shows of force. Version 1.0 of this concept describes a stability operations concept that focuses on operations that precede, occur during, and follow major conventional combat operations in order to achieve a "new normal" environment. The scope of this version of the operational concept is particularly tailored to situations which involve a hostile nation-state acting in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the United States and its allies, or employ a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior.

This concept is focused on the time horizon just beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), roughly 2015 and is predicated on the following assumptions:

Assumption 1: The US government will conduct stability operations.

Assumption 2: The US will play a decisive role in stability operations.

Assumption 3: The military and interagency community will achieve synergy in planning and execution.

Assumption 4: The stability operations concept outlines four cases in which the US would intervene to impose security, stabilize the situation, and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance. In essence, Case 2—major combat operations—is the most dangerous and Case 4—transnational actors—is the most likely to occur. Development in future versions of the concept will be: Cases 4, then 3 and 1. The cases are described in detail in Section 1 (Introduction and Scope) of this concept document.

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Section 1 - INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

l.A Introduction.

This initial version of the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept articulates how a future joint force commander plans, prepares, deploys, employs, and sustains a joint force conducting stability operations that precede, occur during, and follow conventional combat operations.

This concept describes the challenges the United States and its coalition partners will face and proposes solutions to these challenges while identifying the capabilities required to implement the proposed solutions. Additionally, this concept explicates 10 principles to guide a joint force commander's thought process in developing a coherent strategy for conducting stability operations associated with major conventional combat.

The iterative process of developing the joint operating concept provides a product reflective of historical analysis, operational lessons learned, and past experimental findings as well as forming the foundation for future experimentation. Finally, this concept contributes to further development of subordinate joint functional and enabling concepts that feed Joint and Service transformation plans.

l.B Scope.

The scope of a complete stability operations concept must address at least the following four cases:

Case 1 – *An* allied or friendly nation-state requests US or multinational assistance in protecting itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Case **2 –** US and its allies conduct major combat operations to defeat a hostile nation-state that acts in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the US and its allies or employs a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior.

Case 3 – US and its allies intervene in a nation, or region that becomes ungovernable, collapses economically and disintegrates into sub national units under the control of warlords and their militias or worse, complete anarchy.

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Case **4** – US and its allies conduct operations to defeat a transnational, non-state organization, whose ideology involves significant degradation of human rights that places at risk large segments of a population and acts in ways that destabilize legitimate governments, threatens whole regions, and exceeds the accepted norms of international behavior.

Success in each of these cases requires integrated, multiagency and frequently multinational operations—one of which will be military. Armed military operations are often necessary but rarely, if ever, sufficient to achieve the overall strategic aim. The success of stability operations does not rely solely on killing insurgent combatants or destroying an enemy's will to fight. Attainment of political objectives requires the application of all elements of government action in a coherent campaign supported by a sophisticated strategic communications campaign. In stability operations, a nation-state can be defeated by militarily weaker state or non-state adversaries if the stronger power is ignorant of the enemy, fails to formulate clear goals, and, perhaps worst of all, pursues military goals that detract from attaining the conflict's political objective.

Stability can be a misleading word. In the four cases described in this concept, "stability," understood as "status quo antebellum,'' will not often be our strategic goal. Rather, the United States (and its coalition partners) will seek a new, better status quo—a status quo in which citizens are better off than they were before conflict erupted in their country or region. "Better off' can have many connotations. "Better off' may mean more freedom, increased potential for economic prosperity, improved health and safety conditions, or some combination of the aforementioned. Thus, the stability operations described in this concept will rarely, if ever, merely reestablish the kind of order that had existed prior to friendly action. In fact transitioning to a new and better status quo will often involve instability.

The Joint Operations Concepts describes stability operations as "military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or re-establish order and promote stability."[2] This definition does not capture the essence of the issue at hand. This concept, therefore, describes stability operations as

[2] Joint Staff, "Joint Operations Concepts," published November 3,2003, in Washington, D.C., **p.** 18.

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multiagency operations that involve all instruments of national and multinational action, including the international humanitarian and reconstruction community to support major conventional combat operations if necessary; establish security; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish the political, social, and economic architecture; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance.

Stability operations establish a safe and secure environment; provide essential social services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate, local civil governance. The objective is clearly to establish governance that enables a country or regime to provide for its own security, rule of law, social services, and economic activity and eliminate as many of the root causes of the crisis as feasible to reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of another crisis.[3]

Finally, in almost every specific situation covered by the four cases described earlier, operations will entail a long-term commitment of multiple US agencies as well as coalition partners. Often in stability operations, we will be opposed by enemies seeking to employ a strategy of protraction. "Endurance" is required, therefore, to achieve success. Commitment by US civilian political leadership must endure long enough to see strategic objectives materialize. Organizations, military and non-military alike, must have a sufficiently robust structure to conduct sustained operations for lengths of time that may extend several months to several years.

This document is deliberately limited to Case **2,** namely the stability operations that precede, are concurrent with, and follow major conventional combat operations.[4] It addresses the response by the US government and its coalition partners when war is thrust upon us, and under circumstances in which war includes a change in the political arrangement of an opponent's government. Case **2** involves complex and dangerous stability operations, often including counterinsurgency operations that the joint force will have to conduct against determined adversaries. Later versions of this concept will focus upon the other forms of stability operations.

---

[3] See figure 1, page 9.

[4] Henry, Ryan, principal deputy undersecretary of Defense (Policy), "Development of Joint Operating Concepts," undated letter, p. 1, sent from Washington, D.C. This letter describes the necessity to limit the scope of the Stability Operating Concept.

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Section 2 - DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE 2 MILITARY PROBLEM

2.A The Strategic Setting.

The next two decades will contain a perplexing and complex array of security challenges for the United States. Many of those challenges will be brought to a state of unavoidable conflict by influences external to the location of the conflict itself. National, transnational, and non-state actors will challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, conventional definitions of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare. Local conflicts and wars are more likely than in the past to escalate into broader conflicts.[5]

Ideological conflicts have not ended. Deeply seated differences in societal, cultural, and religious values remain even in this post-Cold War world. Sometimes these differences will turn violent. Societies, whether nation-state or not, will still confront one another. Major conventional combat operations, with their associated stability operations, will remain a constant potential for the foreseeable future.

Future military operations will be joint campaigns that will include multiagency, multinational, and multilateral partners to achieve mission success. Stability operations are no exception. Truly integrated, multiagency planning, preparation, and execution are hallmarks of future stability operations. The challenges that the United States and our allies and friends face in the future in conducting stability operations involve a complex mix of global dangers, problematic nation-states, and illegal transnational organizations. These challenges threaten the national interests of many nations, not just the United States, and are more complex than any one nation can solve. Solutions require the contributions of multiple nations and agencies—military and non-military, governmental and non-governmental. The requirement is clear: develop the ability to plan, coordinate, and execute multiagency actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

2.B The Operational Environment.

The operating environment in which stability operations will be conducted is dynamic and uncertain. Uncertainty and complexity will prevail at the strategic level before the crisis and extend to the operational and tactical levels during and after the major combat

---

[5] United States Joint Forces Command, "The Joint Operational Environment: Into the Future," published October 2003, p. ***62;*** see also classified sources that are available upon request by appropriate agencies.

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operation. Rapid and unexpected changes in the geopolitical landscape will pervade many dimensions—who or what will be the destabilizing factor; who will be our partners; and what will be the military capabilities, intentions, and modes of both our partners and enemies. The "battlefield" of Case **2** on which a major combat operation and its associated stability operation will seek to achieve mission success will likely include some combination of the following operating conditions:

- Disintegration of the hostile regime and collapse of government authority.
- Tribal or clan leaders, warlords, religious groups, and organized crime bosses with various allegiances contending for power and who may be operating transnationally.
- Uncertain disposition of weapons of mass destruction.
- Numerous armed groups including residual military forces; opposing armed, paramilitary groups; insurgent forces; organized criminal gangs; terrorist cells; and networks of common criminals.
- Lack of discipline and control within armed groups.
- Links to global terrorist networks worldwide.
- Easy access to arms, weapons, and explosives.
- Weak, ineffective or tenuous cease-fires.
- Ruthless chaos with no local police or justice institutions to impose law and order.
- Collapse of public services, power distribution, and heath services.
- Widespread starvation and disease.
- Massive numbers of refugees and displaced persons.
- Violence and abuses against civilians.
- Intense media coverage of operations.
- No, or shaky, foundation for civil society and democratization.
- Powerful illegal economic incentives for continued conflict.

These challenging factors suggest the need for effective partnerships, both US as well as coalition, with military and civilian leaders in the stability operation and highlight the requirement for adaptability among those military and civilian organizations executing these same operations. These challenges further suggest that successful resolution of

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stability operations may require years, not weeks or months, of effort. The environment is further complicated by the transnational nature of some of the opposing forces. The joint force commander must ***think*** outside the traditional area of operations. The joint force's battlespace expands beyond the country or region in which they operate and extends through transnational borders and global dimensions. The joint force commander must think locally but be able to act globally.

The joint force will be in a supporting role conducting preventive actions in an attempt to prevent, even up to the last minute, crossing the threshold of war.[6] Preventive actions, if possible, also set conditions for combat should that threshold be crossed. The joint force will be preparing to conduct stability operations in Case **2,** in close partnership with US and coalition civilian officials, intelligence officials, cultural experts, police officials, demilitarization experts, relief experts, weapons of mass destruction investigators, and other national and coalition partners. These preparations are essential to effective stability operations in the initial phases of deployment.

Prior to combat operations, the joint force begins activities to create favorable conditions to support combat operations and create favorable conditions for transition to local governance. Activities include not only efforts to influence adversaries, but also those to influence the physical environment and noncombatants. Actions to influence noncombatants need to extend beyond simply preventing interference with military operations and should include actions aimed at assisting successful realization of long-term goals. These actions are taken to encourage the local population's support for and participation in the post-conflict rebuilding of the country's infrastructure.

During major conventional combat operations, the joint force becomes the supported agency; the main focus will be on achieving military victory. The joint force deploys elements of its forces in close support of the major conventional combat operation and begins to impose security in areas of immediate concern. Stability operations are performed in support of the major combat operation with the main focus on achieving military victory. The emphasis at this point is on imposing security in the wake of conflict so that errant armed groups are brought under control and basic humanitarian relief activities can begin. The imposition of security is one of the first and most

[6] See Figure 2, **page** 10.

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important steps toward advancing transition and reconstruction. Imposing security will likely involve armed violence and intense enforcement operations against rogue military and paramilitary elements. Hence, the joint force must execute stability operations even while the fighting continues in the major combat operation. In addition, stability operations conducted during combat operations sets conditions for the restoration operations, which follow.

Post-combat, the joint force again assumes a supporting role. This is the most decisive phase of the stability operation because the joint force has to deal with a range of urgent security challenges, often without the assistance of local partners or police forces. At this decisive phase, the joint force expands its imposition of security throughout the countryside to shape favorable conditions so that civilian-led activities can begin creating the "new and better" conditions from which the "new normal" grows and reduces the likelihood of the reemergence of the root causes of the crisis.[7]



Figurel: Breaking the Cycle of Crisis

[7] See Figure 1, **page 9.**

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Intense media coverage is the environment in which all stability operations take place whether prior to combat, during combat, or post-combat. Throughout each phase, strategic communications are key. Strategic communications require a comprehensive, integrated strategy from the inception of preventive actions through restorative operations and attainment of the desired end-state. Strategic communications must provide command information and assist maintaining the coalition while shaping the battlespace. Additionally strategic communications prevent the adversary from gaining an advantage, by anticipating adversary information operations actions and taking proactive measures to discredit adversary themes.[8]



Figure 2: Case 2 – Stability Operations

A permissive security environment may exist after a major combat operation in a Case **2** scenario. Much more probable, however, the joint force will conduct stability operations in a hostile or uncertain environment. A permissive environment is one in which military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist the major combat operation. *An* uncertain environment is one in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to the major combat

[8] Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart Johnson, ed., "Transforming for stabilization and reconstruction operations," assessment published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, November 12,2003.

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operation, do not have effective control of the territory and populations in the intended operational area. In the most likely scenario of a hostile environment, forces must be prepared to overcome local military, paramilitary, insurgents, terrorists, and crudely-organized armed gangs trying to disrupt the mission of **US** and allied military forces. **A** hostile environment is the operational environment in which a number of hostile forces have some control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose the operations of the joint force. Efforts to impose security are likely to be met with hostile action. Counterinsurgency operations may be required to secure a semi-protected working environment in order to eventually impose security in the face of these threats.

Military stability operations during and immediately following a major combat operation must be able to shape the local security environment so that urgent human needs are met and the critical post-war political process can begin. To shape the local security environment, the commander will have to take local actions; he may even have to create global effects inside and outside his area of operations in collaboration with his peers. None of the efforts to grow a "new normal" in Case 2 can begin in an unsafe and insecure environment.

The joint force must set favorable security conditions to capitalize rapidly on a combat victory. **As** major conventional combat operations come to completion, the military focus will shift to imposing a secure environment that successfully promotes law and order. The joint force must be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations, unconventional warfare, and counter-terrorist activities as well as limited conventional operations in order to impose a level of security that can eventually be enforced by civilian police forces.

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

Figure 3: The Central Idea–Actions

US Armed Forces advance national security by applying military power as directed to help shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises, while also preparing now for an uncertain future. Our national military objectives are to promote peace and security and, when necessary, to defeat adversaries. Successful stability operations are an essential means of by which we achieve these objectives. Our record of success, however, is mixed. Stability operations must be exercised and rehearsed, among military, interagency, and multinational organizations during wargames and exercises in advance of a major conventional combat operation.

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2.C Obstacles to Stability

2.C.1. Deliberate threats to Stability: Spoilers.

Nearly all societies include an element of instability. Many societies have factions and individuals that resist legitimate institutions designed to maintain stability, law and civil order. Furthermore, resistance often comes from external sources who ignore traditional boundaries. While the majority of a population may remain docile even during difficult times, some internal and external elements seek to create or enhance conditions of insecurity and violence for their own ends. These "spoilers" to a peace process or "resistance" to an occupation, whether internal or external, are agents, organizations, or factions that threaten the success of stability efforts. Sometimes working in tandem, sometimes independently, these "spoilers" willfully obstruct US and multinational strategic or operational objectives.[9] These agents or groups might seek to fill their own pockets with treasure or power. Criminal gangs and terrorist cells that cannot operate effectively once rule of law is secure, seek to disrupt functional government. There are a myriad of factors that can affect the success of a stability operation; however, deliberate acts of "spoilers" constitute a direct challenge to operational success. The requisite force to deal with "spoilers" is an inherent part of every stability operation.

Dealing with resistance requires a multifaceted approach. Some types can be influenced by political, economic, or informational means without resorting to military action; others must be defeated by military means.

The likelihood of success in stability operations increases significantly when the joint force commander has an anticipatory understanding of who will act contrary to stability efforts. Augmenting classic military intelligence with a cultural understanding of key players and their demands helps the joint force anticipate problems and preempt or respond appropriately.

A joint force commander must understand that there is always internal and external opposition to foreign military presence. Every occupation brings with it dynamics of collaboration and resistance. The joint force will encounter numerous armed groups

[9] Stephen Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in the Peace Process," ***International Security,*** Fall 1997 Vol22 No. 2, pp. 5-53

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ranging from residual military forces, opposing paramilitary groups, insurgent forces, organized criminal gangs, to terrorist cells. External spoilers supporting these armed groups can be systemic, regional actors, or third parties acting as guarantors of internal destabilizing elements bent on preventing the creation of security for their own benefit whether political power or economic gain. For example, a major threat to security in the Balkans comes from those who want to impede the movement of the Balkans towards Europe. This opposition caused by small groups of extreme nationalists, often residing outside of national borders, are opposed to European standards of democracy and rule of law.

Resistance strategies often include violence against civilians and conduct attacks on the military and civilian members of the coalition. Resistance to stability operations may be passive or active. Passive measures may include demonstrations, strikes, or boycotts. Active measures could range from blocking delivery of humanitarian aid to terrorist activities such as assassinations, bombings, and suicide attacks or military operations such as raids and ambushes.

Insurgent, transnational terrorists, criminal groups, and others will have access to small arms, grenade launchers and mortars, conventional and improvised explosives, and maybe even weapons of mass destruction. Spoilers will have the capability to organize and conduct their own information operations campaign as well as conduct computer network attacks. The joint force commander must take action to control the various spoilers before they increase the complexity of the task at hand. Success in imposing the security necessary for stability operations is directly related to the ability to identify spoilers. Spoilers generally fit into three categories and will be present in various numbers.

There are three broad categories of spoilers, whether internal or external: Total spoilers, limited spoilers, and greedy spoilers. Spoilers can be individuals, organizations, or governments. Each type of spoiler requires a different strategy to eliminate, contain, or satisfy them. **A** "one-size fits all" approach is likely to encourage additional spoilers and demands. Regardless of the approach, the joint force commander" must identify and

[10] Reminder: "Joint" in the context of this concept includes multiagency, and multinational force and the integration and appropriate balance of conventional and special operations forces.

understand the underlying issues motivating each spoiler. This understanding helps shape the strategy for dealing with spoilers and associated issues.

Total spoilers are those who have no stake in reestablishing civil society; some are professional revolutionaries. Total spoilers are irreconcilably opposed to the **US** and multinational position. There is little or no ability to negotiate with them; they are unlikely to respond favorably to any inducement or socialization programs. Total spoilers are unrelenting in their quest to thwart the **US** and the coalition mission. There is no hope of changing total spoilers. The joint force must isolate and defeat them.

Total spoilers are often members of a deposed regime, especially politicians and soldiers, who, for a variety of reasons, cannot be or do not want to be assimilated into the restoration phase society. Other total spoilers may be ideologues that, for political, cultural, religious, or other social reasons, violently oppose assimilation into any society that does not accord primacy to their ideology. Still others are external to the battlespace, and may be individuals, organizations, or countries acting as guarantors of internal destabilizing elements. In developing countries, the joint force may encounter total spoilers who were recruited as children. This last category of total spoilers will continue to fight as long as their masters—usually older, more politically savvy total spoilers—can coerce them into action or provide acceptable rewards for their action.

Limited spoilers are often mid- or low-level members of a deposed regime or defeated military. They may oppose assimilation into society out of fear of their former superiors or out of concern for a loss of prestige and income. Limited spoilers could also be factional or tribal leaders. These leaders seek to preserve advantages their group enjoyed under the previous regime, or to gain advantage over other groups by filling a power vacuum. Finally, an external limited spoiler may be an individual, organization, or government.

Limited spoilers have limited objectives, usually associated with identity, group perceptions of superiority, or endangerment. This group seeks a settlement through the establishment of governance on their terms. While limited spoilers may perceive that their goal is legitimate, the settlement they seek may not be in accord with the peace agreement or mandate that the joint force is working to uphold. Limited spoilers are usually satisfied once their basic goals are met; they can conceivably be included in the

processes of political transformation through appropriate inducements. **A** limited spoiler may want recognition to gain legitimacy or a role in the restoration phase society, or may demand some sort of remuneration—monetary or material—to advance his personal status or the status of his group. Yielding to seemingly insignificant demands can, counterproductively, elevate the status of individuals obstructing transformation. Regardless of the demand, limited spoilers are normally satisfied once their limited goals are met.

Greedy spoilers act to satisfy selfish, usually economic, interests. They try to manipulate the post conflict instability for personal gain. Greedy spoilers keep pushing the envelope with increasing demands. This spoiler may begin making demands for some type of concession. He may demand payments in cash, fuel, or equipment. The demands will continue to increase. The greedy spoiler may eventually push to control some entity, such as fuel distribution rights, or piece of territory. The joint force commander must understand with whom he is dealing during negotiations. Greedy spoilers can be accommodated in the stability processes, however, only if their usefulness to the process is greater than the cost of their demands. Greedy spoilers seek to take advantage of the chaos associated with political instability to further their interests. Greedy spoilers may surface as criminals or black marketeers seeking a monopoly on scarce goods and services. Sometimes the spoilers are extortionists, selling security for a price to a traumatized population. Greedy spoilers could also be ordinary citizens, or informal leaders of marginalized groups, who are simply trying to gain a material advantage—by what most western observers would consider unfair methods—in a desperate situation. If these spoilers cannot be co-opted, they can be dealt with by standard police methods.

A key consideration is that limited and greedy spoilers often have legitimate interests and that these interests must be addressed before resorting to coercion if the joint force is to avoid losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the people and creates even more spoilers.

Cultural intelligence will assist with identifying leaders and members of each group with the desire and ability to disrupt stability operations. Once the joint force commander identifies the motivations and operating patterns of each group he can devise specific plans to defeat, neutralize, co-opt, or induce as appropriate. In effect, the

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stability operation campaign can be understood as a focused set of actions taken simultaneously or sequentially, in and out of theater, to coerce, induce, or socialize spoilers even as security, aid and incentives for cooperation are made available to the population at large. Coercion is the use of force or the threat of force. Coercion defeats total spoilers and contains limited and greedy ones. Since stability operations are not limited to the area of operation, particularly when addressing spoilers, the joint force must coordinate with interagencies—and across national and regional boundaries—to deal with internal spoilers and resolve problems caused by external spoilers.

Inducements, especially those that address legitimate desires, satisfy the needs of limited and greedy spoilers. Inducements may take the form of political recognition, employment opportunities, or other types of material gain. The needs of the population as a whole cannot be sacrificed in order to appease spoilers. Stability operations must remove the mechanisms by which insurgents manipulate and intimidate civilian populations. Civic assistance programs providing security, restoration of infrastructure, or economic opportunities are the best inducements for the general population for whom establishment of good order is in obvious self-interest.

Socialization is designed to prevent the return or development of future spoilers. It influences the local populace and key leaders to cooperate with the joint force in attaining the strategic goals of the operation. Socialization is a long-term process designed to assimilate the spoilers through cooperative programs. This process begins with actions the joint force initiates to legitimize its actions; public information and psychological operations; reestablishment of education, and support to civil administration. Socialization seeks to show that the spoiler has more to gain as part of the solution vice part of the problem.

A stability campaign requires coordinated command presence throughout the community and a public information plan. The public information plan must link security operations, information operations, psychological operations, humanitarian assistance, public affairs, public works, and all other actions of the joint force into a coherent whole—all of which are aimed at eliminating spoilers, increasing security, and enabling restorative operations.

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2.C.2. Stability Operations Friction Points

In addition to overcoming obstacles to establishing security, the joint force may encounter unintentional areas of friction due to the diverse participants that are involved in stability operations — international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), US government and other foreign government agencies, and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). These diverse organizations have different purposes and mandates, yet collectively they are extremely necessary and important to the achievement of long-term transition to security and reconstruction. The joint force commander must be aware of the mandates and limitations each organization brings to the process in order to leverage their capabilities while reducing the friction associated with coordinating among these diverse organizations. Therefore, one of the joint force commander's objectives is to create an environment that allows coordination with these groups in order to work towards a common goal.

Multinational participation may also be a source of friction due to diversity of guidance from their respective governments. The joint force commander must create a shared vision among coalition partners to build unity of purpose and coherency of action and preventing them from unintentionally working at cross purposes. The ability to share information in this multinational environment enables the joint force commander to identify purposes, capabilities, and limitations of all, and apply that knowledge to achieve the desired security effects while supporting the objectives of these organizations as well.

Yet another source of potential friction in stability operations, one often overlooked, is the population of the affected nation-state. The population itself is adjusting to a "new normal", and in most instances, there is a civilian leadership vacuum when conventional combat operations end. Furthermore, a nation's population is rarely homogeneous in ethnic composition, political or religious outlook, or desired goals. Thus, the population's transition can be complicated. The post-combat environment may experience radical societal shifts brought on by the forces of ethnic, tribal, and religious discord, all of which require periods of adjustment to bring back to the "new normal". Assisting the population in this adjustment is part of the joint force commander's tasking during stability operations. Without the joint force commander's intervention, these societal forces — ethnic, tribal or religious discord — converge, and may allow the root

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causes of conflict yet another opportunity to reemerge and disrupt ongoing stability operations.

2.D Case 2 Operational Environment

2.D.1. In Case 2, the US and its allies intervene to defeat a hostile nation-state acting in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the US and its allies or employs a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior. The hostile nation is a non-peer, regional power with a functional government, a standing military force, and special internal police forces that keep control of rival ethnic communities and other oppositionist groups.

The US, as part of an integrated joint, multiagency, and coalition force plans for combat and stability operations in concert with other actions to modify the behavior of this nation-state's government, or remove it fiom power. The hostile government will not allow access to its territory or population and will actively oppose all diplomatic, informational, military, and economic measures to alter its behavior. The Case 2 hostile power will most likely fight if its leaders perceive that a military intervention by the US and its coalition partners is imminent.

The intelligence needs of the commander conducting stability operations will be more complex than those of a commander conducting conventional combat operations. Effective intelligence support during stability operations builds upon continuous peacetime information collection and intelligence production. Increased reliance on human intelligence sources is, however, necessary to collect detailed information on the motives and methods of any potential adversaries as well as on the root causes of insecurity within the society. Combining both military and non-military means is the most effective method for achieving cultural understanding. Often information fiom regional coalition partners will form the essence of the joint force's understanding of the environment in which it must succeed.

Early action in the collection effort is necessary. It must begin well before the situation becomes urgent. Intelligence collection assets are limited, and it takes time to refocus resources on an area in crisis. Perhaps more important, the crisis situation may

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cause critical sources of information to disappear or "be disappeared" during the course of war. **As** conflict erupts and the affected nation-state is overcome by turmoil, embassy reporting, bilateral contacts, and private sector assessments tend to erode or dry up completely. In extreme cases, most international organizations and embassies withdraw their staff personnel, leaving behind little to gather information on the developing situation.

Among the multiple agencies and coalition partners executing a Case **2** stability operation, there must be a complete and common understanding of each other, the opposition, and the situation. The potential for success increases significantly when all participating agencies develop an effective and reciprocal information sharing process will the joint force be able to effectively address the security and humanitarian needs of the population, streamline field reporting, and integrate real-time information into mission planning. **A** joint operations intelligence support element, or other specially organized intelligence organization, may be needed to integrate military and non-military intelligence with coalition information gathering and analysis capabilities to create the kind of understanding sufficient for the joint force commander to decide and act.

2.D.2. Preventive actions must achieve one of three cumulative effects. They help prevent the situation from crossing the threshold of war or, if that threshold is crossed, set the conditions for successful combat. Finally, they help set the conditions for restorative stability operations. Military preventive actions support diplomatic, informational, and economic actions. The joint force must present a credible threat in the eyes of the hostile leadership in order to demonstrate the nation's resolve. This can be achieved by creating the perception of relentless pressure at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—in the adversary's mind.

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

Figure 4: Case 2–Levels of Force in Stability Operations

Preventive actions operations, conducted by all instruments of government action, including conventional and unconventional military forces, increase the pressure felt by the adversary. Preventive actions can be overt, covert, clandestine, or most probably, some combination of each. Factions whose interests coincide with the US and coalition strategic objectives could be recruited, trained, equipped, and employed to conduct unconventional or guerrilla warfare, as well as subversion and sabotage. The purpose of these kinds of actions is to strip away the regimes legitimacy and control, degrade his military capability, and thwart his military strategies. Preventive diplomatic actions may include the negotiated removal of a subject regime as done prior to the Haiti intervention.

Other actions are indirect—for example, security cooperation activities such as security assistance to regional allies to make them less vulnerable to threats or attacks by the hostile state or its proxies. Show of force and freedom of navigation operations can demonstrate resolve, reassure regional allies, encourage neutral parties to maintain their neutrality, dampen the aggressive impulses of adversaries and pre-position intervention forces should they become necessary. When directed to do so by the appropriate civilian authority, the joint force commander could also assist in identifying and supporting

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selected persons or organizations inside the hostile state. Unconventional forces in covert or clandestine operations could directly engage elements of the Case **2** hostile power's unconventional threat, such as transnational terrorists or other total spoilers.

In some cases, preventive actions may involve years of diplomatic, economic, and military activities. In other cases, prevention may take the form of several weeks or months of intense action. In all cases, the need for detailed intelligence comes to the fore.

The principal difference between the intelligence requirement for conventional operations and stability operations is the focus and degree of detail required to support the commander's decision-making process. New information categories emerge that expand the area of interest to include political parties, military and paramilitary forces, as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations that may interact with the joint force.

Intelligence in the pre-crisis phase must provide a thorough understanding of the situation. This understanding will focus on what are usually considered non-military topics, such as politics, economics, criminal activity, and demographics. The joint force commander must consider the political organization and style of the state in which he may operate. The expanded information requirements generate an enormous demand for information that includes demography, topography, land use, food availability, refugees, displaced civilians, and migrations, political boundaries, ethnic conflict, environmental and health condition, transportation networks and conditions. The joint force must develop and update key warning indicators in coordination with all partner agencies involved in the operation. The stability intelligence process must provide the commander with extensive reach into the best data sources available. Analysts must have the connectivity to work closely with all sources of information, identify specific requirements, and then determine which sources —military and government civilian, international organizations, the scientific community, or private industry —an provide it. Analysts must be capable of using the latest in Geographic Information System, geospatial and temporal analysis, and modeling and simulation tools to integrate, verify, and synthesize material fiom US Government as well as non-US sources. The joint force must be able to disseminate information, such as analytical reports and visualization aids,

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to expand the situational awareness. Information sharing among all partners, military and non-military, enhances the common operating picture, and strengthens the crisis response capability of the coalition.

2.D.3. During Combat,[11] US and coalition diplomatic deterrence efforts have failed and the situation has crossed the threshold of conflict. The joint force commander is directed to conduct conventional and unconventional combat operations in order to defeat the hostile power's military forces. The joint force is now the lead instrument of national policy with regard to the crisis, and the joint force commander becomes the supported agent. During the combat phase, the aim of stability operations is twofold: first, to facilitate the forward momentum of combat operations and second, impose security to set the conditions from which long-term stability and reconstruction can grow, and the country can transition to legitimate, civil governance.

Combat operations are the main effort during this phase. The joint force commander is supported by the appropriate elements of interagency and coalition power. The commander must design military effects that not only generate immediate victory in combat but long-term success as well. Achievement of the strategic aims in war also consists of winning the confrontations that always follow even successful combat. The joint force must be organized, trained, and equipped to impose security even while the fighting of major conventional combat operations continues.

The adversary's military forces that sought to match US and coalition strength will have been destroyed in combat, but the fate of the members of that force is an important factor in the future direction of the post conflict transition. Other hostile forces may avoid direct combat and attack asymmetrically by operating in predominantly civilian areas, employing capabilities on the seams between illegal and legal activities, and seeking to hide by blurring the distinction between combatant and noncombatant.

Stability operations facilitate the forward momentum of combat operations by conducting security operations in areas in which conventional fighting has stopped, or have been bypassed by combat troops. The type of forces that stability operations will face and the extent of the opposition those forces exhibit is a direct result of how the joint

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[11] See Figure **3, page** 11.

force fights during major conventional combat operations, Joint forces conducting stability operations collect information through direct contact with the civilian populace. They also minimize civilian interference with military operations by controlling civilian movement in the battlespace. The joint force coordinates for local resources to support to joint combat force requirements.

The portion of the joint force that is conducting stability operations in support of combat must be composed of task forces or teams with the following elements: a command element, a security element with sufficient combat capability to deal with residual hostile forces, a support element, and a civic assistance element. These elements must have sufficient mobility, survivability, and sustainability to immediately follow and support combat forces. The joint force security element must be organized, trained, and equipped specifically for offensive and defensive operations in an unconventional environment.

The joint force locates total spoilers during the combat phase and begins defeating them. The joint force may employ security elements directly against the spoilers, or use local or other surrogate forces to indirectly engage spoilers beyond the operational reach of conventional forces. Joint special operations forces may conduct other direct, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations to identify, dislocate, destroy or defeat total spoilers. Joint force civic actions contribute to combat operations in specific ways. For example, they minimize civilian interference with joint force operations by recommending routes, assembly areas, and logistical sites, to avoid densely populated areas. Additionally, the joint force staff plans evacuation routes for displaced civilians and disseminates that information to the populace in order to keep avenues of advance and lines of communication clear. Finally, the joint force staff plans for the management of civilian detainees and prisoners of war.

During the combat phase, limited and greedy spoilers will be difficult to identify and locate within the hostile nation because the lethality of the environment will curtail their activities to a large degree. Limited and greedy spoilers are common among the expatriates of the hostile nation returning home after the war. They may be exiled politicians, religious leaders, soldiers, businessmen, or transnational criminals. All types of spoilers may attempt to misrepresent the situation, their power, or the level of their

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influence and legitimacy, in order to manipulate the process for their own benefit, or that of their constituency. The goals of limited, and greedy, spoilers include: eliminating rivals, obtaining a favorable political position, or securing an economic monopoly. The joint force engages potential spoilers through direct or indirect negotiations. The joint force commander must act quickly to limit spoiler demands and induce them to support stability objectives by making reasonable concessions. Coercion, if necessary, could be applied to isolate uncooperative spoilers politically, economically, and socially. The joint force must take legal action against criminal spoilers to enhance the stability process.

Stability operations in the combat phase also set the conditions for follow-on success in the post-combat phase. Such operations are conducted by US and coalition forces, and as soon as it is practical, local security and assistance organizations. Initially, activities focus on winning support by enhancing the positive image of US and coalition combat operations. Joint forces executing stability operations protect cultural landmarks, hospitals, schools, religious sites, and museums. They also protect key assets such as, power facilities, hospitals, water systems, food production and distribution centers, weapons storage areas, and other high interest areas. This helps the joint force commander meet his obligations under international law; it also enhances the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of international and local observers. Stability operations dislocate total spoilers by isolating them physically and psychologically. The joint force must also cut spoilers off fkom material support by rationing critical items, limiting the issue of travel and work permits as well as by implementing curfews, checkpoints, and other measures as appropriate.

When it moves into an area during major conventional combat operations, a joint force assigned stability tasks imposes public safety and establishes law and order. Forces engaged in stability operations, especially civil affairs and military police elements, screen the populace to separate potential terrorists or enemy special operations forces from civilians groups. Stability operations contribute to situational awareness by providing information on the political, cultural, and economic situation. This enables the commander to decide when and where to perform government functions that the regime, or local agencies, are unwilling or no longer able to provide. Local leaders and local security forces assist in providing for public safety as soon as it is practicable. Assistance

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from neighboring countries resulting from capabilities developed by peacetime security cooperation activities can provide key support.

The intelligence activities during combat are very complex. They must focus primarily on enemy combat forces but begin to expand collection and analysis to include information necessary for post combat stability operations. The capabilities needed are similar to those in the preventive operations. Ongoing human intelligence efforts identify potential cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, political, or economic attitudes that could jeopardize the post hostility stability operation. The intelligence capabilities begin to focus on the unconventional threat posed by total spoilers, to include terrorist threats both inside and outside of the operational area. Human intelligence also focuses on the identity, motivation, and intentions of limited and greedy spoilers. The military intelligence capabilities of the joint force must begin to refocus on information sharing with coalition partners' military and non-military information systems. The intelligence collection and analysis effort will expand to include the status of the infrastructure and its ability to meet the needs of the local population. While combat operations are being conducted, governmental and non-governmental relief agencies will not have access to the battlespace. The intelligence produced by the joint force, however, must be shared with these agencies to enable them to plan and prepare for post-combat relief and development programs. The joint force can facilitate the efforts of its civilian partners by collecting and sharing information on local agencies that could aid relief efforts, identifying and locating key local leaders, assessing humanitarian needs, and restoring essential public works and services.

2.D.4. When major conventional combat operations end,[12] the fighting is not over. Security and a new stability do not emerge naturally, *sui generis.* Some confrontations continue. The number, type, and extent of confrontations will depend upon how the joint force conducted major conventional combat operations. Internal or external factions will vie for control and attempt to take advantage of the situation. Spoilers of peace emerge; some may have been identified previously, others may not have been. The power

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12 *See* Figure 4, **page** 22.

vacuum left by combat provides opportunities to limited and greedy spoilers. The same vacuum presents the total spoilers with a favorable environment in which to act.

The degree to which the spoilers can be coerced, or induced, into socialization depends on two notions —their individual situation and finding the right tangible or intangible action and inducement. Total spoilers who severely oppressed the population, especially those total spoilers guilty of crimes against humanity, will not be re-assimilated by society. Individuals, who support the defeated regime because their identity is inextricably intertwined with a deep sense of group superiority, or endangerment, are likely to be irreconcilable after defeat in combat. Young men who were recruited as children, often from the dispossessed underclass tend to be violent and are easy for the older total spoilers to manipulate. If these "child-soldiers" are young enough to reenter the education process and have not become irrevocably habituated to violence, they may be successfully socialized if society can provide appropriate inducements. In any case, total spoilers must be separated fkom society if they cannot be re-assimilated. Given that most insurgencies begin with the actions of a small fraction of the population, any assembly of spoilers can spark strife and undermine stability[13].

Somewhat older males, who have had some education and socialization prior to becoming spoilers, may be able to be re-assimilated back into society. Socialization will be more difficult, however, the longer these spoilers have been operating outside of societal norms. Limited spoilers of strong belief in either religious, ethnic, or national superiority or endangerment may be induced into the stability process if their needs concerning group identity are satisfied in political or economic terms.

Greedy spoilers will try to obtain more than their fair share of political or material aid from the joint force. They can be useful to the transition effort if they can be influenced to act in a positive manner and their demands are scaled back to reasonable levels. The joint force commander must exercise extreme caution in dealing with greedy spoilers to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Any appearance of legitimacy for greedy spoiler may discredit the stability operation in the eyes of the local population.

During reconstruction operations, the primacy of effort shifts back to the civilian authority and the joint force commander resumes the supporting role. The transition from

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[13] Peters, **Ralph,** "The New Warrior Class," ***Parameters,*** Volume 24, Number 2, Summer 1994, **p.16.**

combat to a "new normal" and subsequent stability is a long process. Security is a ***sine qua non***, but it alone cannot produce the transition to a new and stable environment. Self-sustaining stability cannot be imposed: it grows from the right social, economic, and political conditions. These conditions are very complex and reveal why success results only from integrated multiagency stability operations conducted over time and sustained with enduring political will. Military actions contribute to, and are subordinate to, the diplomatic peacemaking process. The presence and activities of US, and coalition forces, help create the conditions for a peaceful resolution of disputes. The situation may require the joint force to assist in sensitive, and potentially volatile, peace building efforts such as conducting elections and demobilizing former belligerents.

The initial focus of those joint forces conducting stability operation is on restoring law and order, protecting noncombatants and key facilities, restoring emergency services, and providing humanitarian relief. Although post conflict activities are primarily diplomatic, military and other civilian involvement is normally required to restore civil authority, rebuild the infrastructure, and reestablish commerce, education, and public utilities. Offensive and defensive operations, conducted by conventional and special operations forces, will likely be necessary to defeat or dislocate the total spoilers who oppose transition to a secure and a "new normal" and cannot be induced or socialized into cooperation.

Intelligence requirements in the post-combat phase will be similar to those of the previous phases. **A** civilian constabulary force may be embedded in the latter part of the combat phase. **A** constabulary will allow the initial shift to civilian-run security. The constabulary will also begin the shift in requirements toward forensic or criminal intelligence. A cadre of civil-military experts with considerable experience in law enforcement and forensic intelligence collection and analysis augments the joint force commander's situational and cultural awareness. Direct, positive, and continuous interaction with the local leaders and population by all elements of the joint force also enhances the commander's situational and cultural awareness. Such augmentation during the combat phase of stability operations smoothes the movement to civilian control and contributes to long-term success.

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The joint force commander's civic-assistance elements will begin to address restoration of essential basic services as law and order is restored. Empowered with a discretionary funds system, the commander employs the local population, directly or through contracts, and begins restoring essential services such as, food and water distribution, waste removal, power production, and basic medical services. The fund enables the commander to employ an idle population, restore services, positively affect the local economy, and foster goodwill and hope among the people.

The civic-assistance element may be required to conduct initial government functions including law enforcement and restoration of public works and services. The civic assistance element may also conduct civil affairs operations, performs economic functions and social services, implements educational programs, provides increased medical care, and satisfies immediate vertical and horizontal construction needs. Social and educational program enables identification and remediation of grievances before the problems become overwhelming. These efforts continue shaping and improving the post-combat landscape. **As** quickly as possible, the actions of a military civic assistance element must be replaced by long-term, civilian organizations and agencies. These organizations and agencies identified in the planning of any major combat operation and practiced as an integrated multiagency force during routine training **and** exercises, form the backbone of a long-term, successful stability operation.

2.E Operational Art for Stability Operations.

Operational art, according to Joint Publication 3-0, describes "the employment of military forces to attain strategic or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating activities of all levels of war." This definition is insufficient for the purposes of the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept. Our understanding of operational art must expand to include both military and non-military instruments of govemment action. Stability operations are inherently integrated, multiagency activities. In stability operations decisions and actions taken at the tactical level can have immediate strategic effects. Likewise, the actions of non-

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military participants can also result in strategic effects. These decisions must be guided by operational art and understanding that winning the conflict is only the first step in winning the confrontation.

Operational art begins in the mind and character of the commander. **A** joint force commander cannot achieve what he cannot conceive. Providing a secure environment can best be accomplished through military means, but the other instruments of government action (diplomatic, information and economic) are required to create the conditions from which "new normal" can grow. The commander must envision a plan that coherently applies all available instruments of government action to ensure that the proper conditions for long-term security are created. He must also adapt as the situation warrants proffering either the "velvet glove" to persuade or the "mailed fist" to compel compliance.

The decentralized nature of stability operations also requires the commander to exercise a **high** degree of trust and confidence in his subordinates and non-military partners. He must build trust and confidence among the set of peer-leaders, military and non-military, who are responsible for the attainment of US and coalition political aims. The joint force commander's role will shift as he supports, then is supported, and returns to a support role. His role as a leader, however, remains constant. The joint force commander maintains relationships across cultural lines throughout all of the military and civilian agencies involved in the stability operation.

While integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action begin in the mind of the joint force commander, they are executed by the US military and non-military, and coalition organizations simultaneously across complex physical, informational, and cognitive domains. Defeating spoilers who may be insurgents, militant extremist or terrorists requires the conduct of counterinsurgency operations throughout the area of responsibility all while under the ever-watchful eye of the international media, the people back home, and the local population. Supporting strategic communication actions are required in all dimensions of the information domain—broadcast and print media and person-to-person discussion—to establish the legitimacy of coalition actions and preempt spoiler attempts to enlist the general populace in their cause.

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In stability operations, the battlespace extends beyond that normally associated with purely military operations. Interagency, coalition government, and non-governmental agencies will require access to the battlespace if they are to act coherently with the joint force. These agencies will require not only terrain but also access to air and seaport facilities, transportation networks, the local work force, and portions of the electromagnetic spectrum—particularly bandwidth—in which to operate. The commander must consider these requirements not only in space but also in time; priority of allocation will shift with operational phases as the lead shifts from civilian primacy to military primacy and back.

The battlespace in the cognitive domain concerns the "minds" of those who oppose transition. The domain also includes the cultural, social, and religious, as well as the political and economic perceptions of everyone concerned with the operation. Spoilers must be convinced of not only of the futility of their actions but also the failure of their attempts to gamer popular support. Noncombatants must be convinced of the legitimacy of coalition actions and the benefit to remaining neutral. Likewise, external actors, both nation-states and transnational actors, must be convinced it is not in their interest to intervene.

Operational art in stability operations requires a coherent civil-military organizational construct. The organization and the process it adapts must result in both horizontal and vertical synergy. This synergy will help to achieve and sustain unity of purpose and coherency in action across organizational and cultural lines. Spoilers will attack using multiple asymmetric means, which the joint force must oppose by coordinated action. The joint force commander must apply all available military and non-military power coherently to destroy, disrupt, or defeat spoilers. The joint force commander must be ready to implement innovative partnerships with the interagency, international organizations, non-governmental organizations as well as with academic groups and the international business community.

Perhaps the most important aspect of operational art is the ability to "fit" these elements together—in harmony. Any plan that a joint force commander constructs must satisfy political leadership, attain the political aims assigned, and be constructed collaboratively with his peer-leaders who are co-responsible for attaining those aims.

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Further, the joint force commander's plan must be executable by the forces he has available in the physical and information domains, and within the organization he has on hand or creates. If one of these elements is out of balance, the joint force commander must adjust the others—and continually rebalance as his operations unfold. In stability operations, the joint force commander must balance resource allocations among offensive and defensive operations, as well as, civic assistance and non-military applications of power. How and when are matters of his judgment, a matter of his *art*.

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Section 3 – Case 2 STABILITY OPERATIONS – THE CONCEPT

3.A. Synopsis of the Central Idea.

Successful Case 2 stability operations are inextricably linked to planning and executing war. If combat is required, stability operations will form an essential part of pre-combat activities, combat operations, and post-combat actions. The joint force, as part of a multinational and integrated, multiagency operation, still provides security as well as initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance — until the security environment permits civilian agencies to perform these functions. These kinds of stability operations will be conducted simultaneously, distributed throughout the theater of war. ***All will require a combination of detailed situational understanding; a coercive posture against obstructionists; unified direction from legitimate civil authority; integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action; sophisticated media operations; organizational endurance; and sufficient popular support over time in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance and reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of destabilizing elements.***

Pervasive knowledge in stability operations requires thorough familiarity with the all of the dynamics at work within the joint area of operations: political, economic, social, cultural, religious. The joint force commander must have an understanding of who will oppose transition efforts and what motivates them to do so.[14] He must understand the nature of the conflict, the enemy, the battlefield, and the nature of local population and culture. Augmenting traditional military intelligence with what is commonly understood as "criminal intelligence," "economic intelligence," and "political intelligence," and "fiscal or financial intelligence" in the civilian sector and with cultural understanding enables the joint force commander to anticipate developments and take appropriate preventive or reactive measures. All forms of intelligence, to include human, must be collated into common accessible databases. This collation of types of intelligence — when coupled with consistent, positive interaction with local leaders and citizens — provides the

[14] Reminder: "Joint" in the context of this concept refers to a joint, interagency, and multinational force.

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joint force commander and civilian leadership the basis for the detailed situational understanding required to be successful.

A coercive posture against obstructionists is achieved by the aggressive pursuit of all who oppose security and the creation of conditions from which a long-term new "normal" grows. Military commanders should seek to defeat or bring violent spoilers to justice using the executive law enforcement powers of the mission's civilian authorities. Joint force commanders conducting Case **2** stability operations must mount counterinsurgency style operations, in close collaboration with civilian police and other security forces that develop local intelligence to locate spoiler threats, limit their freedom of action and, when directed, defeat them before these threats can do harm or slow the stability process. The explicit elements of these coercive operations, drawn from the counterinsurgency paradigm, include:

- Find by developing, and employing, the necessary local intelligence to support offensive operations.
- Fix by denying violent spoilers freedom of action or movement while at the same time protecting essential friendly groups and facilities.
- Strike militant spoilers with the intent to bring them under arrest, disrupt their activities, or defeat them in battle through a combination of military, police, psychological, and legal actions.

The way to deal with spoilers in the long term is to establish the legitimacy of the operation in the minds of the local people. The people, once they have an effective government, will then eliminate most of the spoilers leaving the military to focus on those that are most difficult and dangerous. Dealing with spoilers requires a multifaceted approach. Some types of spoilers can be influenced by political, economic, or informational means without resorting to military action; others must be defeated by military means.

One of the conditions required for long-term results form several aspects of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a product of fact and perception. By acting under the direction of legitimate civil authority the joint force ensures legal and moral legitimacy for both the

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force and the operation. In stability operations, only an appropriately mandated civil authority can direct coercive operations against spoilers. Authorized under proper authority, the civilian leader of the mission is normally vested with executive powers to enforce compliance with the law. The perception of legitimacy is sustained with the international community, regional, and domestic populace, when operations are conducted with scrupulous regard for international norms on the use of force and regard for humanitarian principles.

Legitimacy is essential to create long-term success. Stability operations are usually characterized by an effort to seek a broader legal legitimacy through a mandate from the international community and to establish "new" legitimacy locally. In many cases, restorative stability operations can be characterized as a fight over legitimacy—old versus new.

Integrated, multiagency unity purpose, though very difficult achieve, begins with a shared, common end-state. This common understanding of the strategic objectives and operational end-state is articulated through the mutual intent of the joint force commander and the lead civilian leader. This intent must be stated in unambiguous terms so that civil and military subordinate organizations and peers understand what is expected from them. In stability operations, actions taken at the tactical level can have immediate strategic implications. For this reason, the strategic context of the operation must be articulated and understood by all participants—military and civilian—at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Integrated and collaborative planning with US government agencies and multinational partners is a prerequisite to achieving unity of purpose. The civil-military plans for stability operations must be nested in all operational planning then refined and rehearsed in pre-operational wargames and exercises. Planning and rehearsal—with all elements expected to execute the operations, military as well as multiagency—form the foundation of success in execution.

Integrated, multiagency coherency of action results when all available civil and military means work toward achieving the common purpose. Just as the joint force commander and the lead civilian leader ensure unity of purpose by clearly nesting intent within that set by their military and political leaders, coherency of action is achieved at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels by integrated, multiagency actions. When he

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is the lead agent, the joint force commander must be able to set the pace and direction of the stability operation. **As** the supporting agent, the joint force commander must be able to respond to changes of pace and direction in the operation in sync with civilian agencies. Integrated, multiagency actions are not limited to military operations that are kinetic and lethal; they may also be military or civilian operations that are non-kinetic and non-lethal. Coherent economic actions, computer network attacks, and actions in public diplomacy represent non-kinetic, non-lethal operations that, when coupled with kinetic and lethal military strikes optimize the commander's ability to generate coherent effects in the battlespace.

A civil-military "Joint Planning Structure," established by the military and leading civilian agency, is the joint force's nexus for civil-military preparation, organization, and action. Furthermore, it is the structure that maintains both unity of purpose and coherency of action. The Joint Planning Structure ensures a common understanding of near term "next state" composite civil-military objectives for the mission and facilitates integrated planning and coherency of action on specific matters that require intense and close civil-military collaboration and management over time. Coherency of action is enhanced when all components of the mission operate in a network-centric environment with extensive collaborative planning and execution. Such an environment enables simultaneous, distributed operations with other stability activities or combat operations without loss of coherency.

A sophisticated media operation is required to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Media operations must address the local populace, regional neighbors, coalition partners, domestic audiences, our own forces, our opponents, and others.

National-level policy guidance provides the framework for information operations planning and execution across all activities. Operational and tactical information operations are traditionally identified as: psychological operations, electronic warfare, computer network operations, operational security, deception, and other information operations. Other information operations are defined by some as: information needed by the joint force commander to make decisions and take actions. Others define it as computer network attack and computer network defense, and actions taken to degrade an

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opponent's decision making capability. This concept does not discuss these definitions, but rather focuses on media operations associated with public affairs and public diplomacy.

Stability operations focus on public affairs and public diplomacy—not as an element of strategic communications, but as informational instruments of national strategy. Each is a separate function with a unique mission. Public diplomacy is an interagency governmental effort to communicate prepared messages and themes to an international audience.[15] In contrast, public affairs operations focus is on public actions. They provide a timely flow of accurate information to internal and external publics.[16] While public affairs and public diplomacy reinforce each other, and involve close cooperation and coordination they must be separate and distinct. Each function requires distinct efforts to plan, resource, and execute as part of the joint force commander's larger stability operations plan. It is critically important that public affairs and public diplomacy efforts are mutually supportive in order to maintain credibility with their respective audiences.

The organizational construct for stability operations must support operations of long duration. Organizational endurance will be paramount to overcoming the duration and complexity of stability operations. While the end-state may be well defined, the nature of the operations is complicated by the time required to solve problems at multiple levels and create the conditions from which long-term success can develop. Stability operations are psychologically intense. Leadership must be able to continually balance restraint with overmatching power. The individual must be psychologically prepared to engage in the operations over an undetermined amount of time. The individual must be able to have an offensive mindset and peacemaker heart. Civilian and military organizations must have the capability to organize, train, equip, and execute long-term stability operations simultaneously with conventional combat operations.

Long endurance operations also require patience. The same tactical patience that applies on the battlefield applies in stability operations. It takes time to create long-term success. Opposing forces will utilize time as their ally for they will seek to employ a strategy of protraction, which only reinforces the need for patience. The joint force

[15] Joint Publication 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Staff, 14 May 1997, p III-18
[16] Ibid, section II

commander and the lead civilian must view stability operations as a marathon. The successful transition marathon requires intensive planning, training, and purposeful execution. Stability operations are a test of will, nerves, and endurance.

Joint force logisticians must be able to know what type and amount of support is needed throughout the battlespace, near real-time. The logistics organization must also be able to rapidly obtain and distribute the necessary materiel and services to the organizations that need them in time to support both military and civilian stability operations. The integrated civil-military logistics organization must integrate deployment, employment, and sustainment of the joint force in order to eliminate redundancies, stimulate synergy, and synchronize the movement and sustainability of forces conducting stability operations over a long duration. The in-country or regional footprint should be reduced to the minimum possible. The organization must seamlessly transition through deployment, employment, and sustainment and from supporting preventive stability operations to major conventional combat operations, and then post-combat support for stability operations.

Maintaining popular support over time, internationally, domestically, and locally, is key to mission success. Maintaining popular support requires managing expectations and perceptions of all who are involved in a transition operation—especially those of the population that the joint force is attempting to stabilize. The population at large must perceive consistency in the policies, actions, and processes of the joint force throughout the operation in all times and places. This is especially critical in the movement from combat to post-combat operations or when rotating forces during the long-duration restorative phase of stability operations. The actions and processes must not change radically when commanders and units change unless there is a clearly articulated reason for making such a change. Consistency is also crucial as the joint force transfers authority for the operation from military to civilian control. Civilian authorities must know which policies the military put in place and understand the ramifications of altering them. Equally important, the joint force commander should, if at all possible, coordinate policy decisions with civilian authorities before he makes them. Integrated, multiagency operations—from start to finish—are an essential hallmark of stability operations.

3.B The Principles of Case 2 Stability Operations.

Commanders from the operational to the tactical level draw from their own wealth of knowledge and experience. The depth.of knowledge and experience varies with each commander. Case *2* stability operations will occur in various locations, at different times, over a long duration, and as a result of varying circumstances. Each commander charged with conducting a specific stability operation will face a unique set of conditions affecting their conduct of the operation. The following principles offer commanders a set of tools to help shape their thoughts, decision process, and actions. The principles are meant to guide commanders as they plan, prepare, execute, and sustain the operation that matches their specific circumstances. **As** a set, these principles represent the duality inherent in all stability operations—the "velvet glove" and "mailed fist".

3.B.1. Organize the efforts of military and civilian agencies to achieve integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action.

- Begin with a practiced plan; adjust from it.
- Reinforce the need for a joint civil-military structure for operational planning and execution.
- Publish a political-military plan that establishes tasking authorities.
- Integrate military, special police, and civilian police operations from beginning to end.
- Bring to bear all instruments of government action.
- Ensure that activities of each element link to the common strategic end-state.
- Establish a pervasive knowledge environment and technical architecture.

A political-military plan is essential to provide the strategic guidance required to develop an effects-based plan. Integrated, multiagency operations begin well before any crisis emerges. Civilian counterparts must participate in developing stability operation plans prior to crises, as well as in exercises and wargames that rehearse those plans. **A** political-military plan facilitates unity of purpose and coherency of action, for it is this plan that constitutes the foundation for the interagency strategy in stability operations. Nongovernmental actors are normally very knowledgeable of an area of operation and its

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people. They can assist the joint force commander to refine approaches requiring military attention. Understanding the interests of all actors involved in the conduct of conflict and post-conflict operations is the truest validation of objectives that define what a nation or coalition of nations is attempting to do.[17] Integrated, multiagency operations begin well before any crisis emerges. Civilian counterparts must participate in developing stability operation plans prior to crises and be involved in the exercises and wargames of these plans.

The political-military plan establishes shared understanding of the mission and is a common point of departure for the joint force. However, nothing goes according to plan. **A** key for success in stability operations is the joint force commander's ability to gain understanding, recognize needed changes, adapt and convey the intent of these changes to the joint force, multinational forces, the interagency, and others. The ability to convey the required changes to the plan allows the joint force commander to seize the initiative and adapt to an ever-changing operational environment. This adaptability requires augmenting and staffing both military and civil command structures with the expertise and capabilities required to develop pervasive knowledge and share that knowledge.

Exercises and wargames provide venues to practice making coordinated civil-military decisions and taking coherent action. These venues also help create organizational agility and synergy by teaching the civil-military team to adapt to changing situations and organizational demands. Commanders and civilian leaders can be trained and empowered to conduct flexible and responsive operations without a loss of unity of purpose that focuses on common strategic aims. Military commanders and civilian leaders, if they plan and prepare together and operate in proper organizational construct, can conduct integrated, multiagency operations that use the full range of government and coalition partner actions.

Transition to legitimate civil authority, not actions on the military objective, should be the point from which to initiate backward planning. Before the initiation of combat, the consequences of military action on post-hostility recovery must be considered. Backward planning looks beyond combat operations to encompass consolidation and transition considerations. Combat operations are subordinate to, and are a subset of, a

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[17] Binnendijk, ed., Ibid.

strategic shaping campaign that addresses the nation's, or coalition's, ultimate strategic objectives.

3.B.2. Incorporate strategic communications into every action, tactical and operational.

- Do the right thing, in the right way, at the right time, then ensure it is seen and understood by those you must influence.
- Consider strategic communications and include information operations with war planning efforts.
- Create a civilian-military media operations center.
- Attack adversary's information networks and limit his ability to affect coalition information operations.

Civilian-military media operations must convey the US and multinational objectives of the stability operation to the local, regional, and international populations. Media operations must tie theater operations to national strategic themes. Media actions and other supporting activities must be an inherent part of every operation and war-gamed to ensure its ability to support operations. Every actor—from private to general on the military side and from individual to senior civilian leader among the multiple agencies involved—has two basic responsibilities. First, each must execute his of her actions efficiently and effectively consistent with achieving common strategic aims. Second, each is an "information warrior" responsible to promulgate command information themes.

Sophisticated media operations require a comprehensive and integrated strategy from the inception of planning for combat operations through stability and nation-building to the desired end-state. Strategic communications supported by Public Affairs and other capabilities can help to establish legitimacy for the operation, win the hearts and minds of the local population, gain regional and international support, and influence an adversary's decisions. Communication with the local population is key for managing expectations, allaying fears and suspicions, explaining legitimacy, and generating support for the operation, thus minimizing public unrest and possible interference with the operation.

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One of the crucial themes of stability operations is transparency. Transparency means that the joint force, consistent with the requirements of operational security, communicates its intentions and capabilities to all audiences inside and outside of the area of operations. The joint force must make all segments of the population aware of its operational mandate, mission intentions, and techniques used to ensure security and transition to a "new normal." Failure to communicate effectively will foster suspicion and may erode the development of the trust and confidence on which the long-term success of the operations depends. Integrated and synchronized information operations, with protocols to maximize information sharing among multiagency partners and the local population, are necessary to facilitate transparency.

Information operations additionally enhance stability operations by providing reliable communications support facilitating decision superiority, enhancing theater ballistic missile early warning, enabling red and blue force tracking, and providing spectral imagery products. Other core capabilities include: electronic warfare, operations security, military deception, computer network operations, and psychological operations.

3.B.3. Impose security by adopting both an assertive and engaging posture.

- Maintain a visible presence-execute combat, reconnaissance, and other patrols.
- Extend security to non-military agencies and individuals as the situation dictates.
- Know the local people and leaders; engage them daily.
- Ensure the actions of all parties support policies and programs.
- Implement an effective strategic communications campaign to formulate the message and broadcast it to the population.
- Collect, document, and destroy unauthorized weapons when directed.

The commander achieves an assertive posture by anticipating potential trouble as well as disrupting the spoilers' overall cohesion and capacity to obstruct stability. The commander must adopt a proactive approach that turns chaos and disorder into an advantage by taking the initiative and placing violent spoilers at risk throughout the battlespace. The joint force will rapidly employ tactical forces capable of surviving while traversing complex terrain, especially urban areas, and employing precise firepower.

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Proper force protection when engaging and working with the local population mitigates risk, so does an expansive involvement with local leaders and citizens. In stability operations, force protection is more than physical security. The perceived legitimacy and impartiality of the joint force, the mutual respect between the force and the population, and the force's military credibility enhance force protection. Security and force protection must extend beyond the military elements to international and local government agencies as well as to non-governmental organizations. The joint force will require the ability to track blue forces, red forces, and civilian partners in order to respond to, or avoid confrontations. The mission may require that the joint force extend security to the local population when local security and police forces do not exist or are ineffective.

The joint force must be able to rapidly sense, detect, identify from standoff range, defend against, and recover the force from chemical, biological, radiological, and enhanced-explosives attack. It must also implement a system to account for, contain, distribute or destroy military spoils: weapons, ammunition, and equipment including enhanced explosive ordnance, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear materials. Improvements in improvised explosive device or mine detection and neutralization are essential to maintain freedom of action.

3.B.4. Defeat those who violently oppose security and the creation of a "new normal."

- Take the initiative in dealing with the root causes of spoiler-driven violence; spoilers act strategically, the joint force cannot afford to react just tactically.
- Isolate total spoilers from sources of power and popular support: find, fix, and strike.
- Apply overmatching military power in a precise and timely manner to eliminate violent opposition

Spoilers operate at the strategic level. Even minor tactical actions are aimed at achieving their political aims. By responding tactically to spoiler attacks, the joint force only addresses part of the security problem. The key metric for the joint force commander is not how many spoilers he is able to kill or capture. The true measure of

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success is the number of adversaries the joint force converts into allies. The military instrument is only one element of national power. All elements of national power must be engaged in the transition of society to a "new normal."

Stability operations are not limited to kinetic, lethal attacks; non-kinetic, non-lethal methods of engagement are often both appropriate and preferred. Such methods include not only information and psychological operations, but also could take the form of political and economic initiatives by civilian authorities. Even when kinetic, lethal means are necessary, these actions should be accompanied by actions taken by other instruments of government or coalition action.

Some violent opposition factions won't emerge until their leaders judge the conditions for success are ripe. The commander mounts counterinsurgency operations, in close collaboration with civilian police forces that locate spoilers, limit their freedom of action and, when directed, defeat spoilers before they can do harm or slow the transition process. If spoilers can "wait out" the intervening force or sense that conditions favorable for their faction's success are likely to emerge, they will appear to comply only to rise later. "Playing possum" is a tactic as well as a strategy.

3.B.5. Neutralize, co-opt, or induce others who threaten security and the creation of a "new normal".

- Socialize limited spoilers through cooperative arrangements.
- Induce cooperation of greedy spoilers.

Some of the demands made by limited as well as greedy spoilers reflect legitimate needs. When meeting these needs supports the overall aim of the operation, the commander and the civilian leader may decide to do so within their capability. The commander and the civil leader must take care to avoid inadvertently legitimizing individuals, factions, or organizations inappropriately. Limited spoilers need time to see that their objectives will actually be met. Greedy spoilers adapt, so commanders and leaders must constantly re-evaluate their decisions and actions relative to greedy spoilers.

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3.B.6. Act with precision quickly. Balance restraint and overmatching power.

- Move quickly and decisively to neutralize threats to stability once threats are identified; preclude or preempt when possible.
- Apply appropriate levels of power to meet strategic aims.
- Minimize collateral damage to civilians or the infrastructure.

Freedom of movement is necessary to maintain the initiative and is necessary for the stability operation to progress. The fundamental right of the joint force's freedom of movement must be stated and enforced. The joint force must have the capability to maneuver rapidly and safely throughout the battlespace, quickly negotiate obstacles to include minefields, improvised explosive devices, and contaminated areas, particularly in complex terrain and urban areas.

Commanders must carefully apply force in stability operations. A misuse of force could negatively affect the perception of legitimacy of the operation and reduce the level of consent on the part of the local population and international community. On the other hand, the appropriate use of force to prevent spoilers from disrupting the transition to a better future could increase the level of consent. The joint force commander must base the decision on how and when to use force on his situational understanding, using force to achieve the overall political objective and not as an end in itself.

Future operational level headquarters will need to maintain network connectivity to plan and act on the move. This connectivity must include the civilian leadership structure, even before it deploys into theater. Commanders will require the flexibility to deploy into the operational area and conduct stability activities at considerable distances from static bases. Mission-type orders will be critical to maintaining flexibility and initiative, especially in highly dynamic and fluid joint deployments to conduct decentralized stability operations.

Commanders must execute flexible responses rapidly, precisely, and independently at every level. Efficient application of resources enhances ability to operate over a longer period of time. By avoiding unnecessary harm to the adversary, civilians, civilian property, and the environment, the commander retains the moral high ground and sustains the legitimacy of the operations. The joint force controls the situation by applying

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overmatching power. Control allows the joint force commander to frame the environment.

To maintain the initiative, the joint force will have to re-supply on the move often at a considerable distance from logistical centers. The joint force commander will need to know exactly what his force needs to sustain operations and be able to provide the right mix of supplies and services rapidly using an austere logistical architecture.

3.B.7. Act from a position of legitimacy.

- Develop a legal and policy framework to provide a position of legitimacy if no legitimate civil authority is established.
- Build support among the population for the policies and programs of the legitimate authority.
- Ensure that all activities are consistent with the political mandate under which the force operates.

The joint force commander focuses his civil-military operations on supporting civilian agencies and organizations to assume full authority for implementing the civil portion of the stability operation. Legitimacy is a social, psychological, and political phenomenon not given to swiftness, as is the case in military operations. The military often achieves its objectives quickly, but the completion of the mission depends on progress in the civil arena. As the operation progresses, civilian agencies will assume increased responsibility for civil functions and require less military assistance. The relationships established in the initial stages of the operation, coupled with accurate assessments of the progress of civil-military implementation are crucial to the transfer of authority and ultimate extraction of the joint force. The joint force commander must use his assets sparingly when civilian assets are more appropriate in promoting the overall objective of the mission. The joint force must be prepared for the measured, sustained application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Commanders must assess their actions against their contribution to long-term strategic stability objectives.

3.B.8. Pursue interim conditions for "next state" in the stability process.

- Set practical, common near-term priorities for civil-military efforts.

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- Foster hope. Ensure that some progress is made each day in both security and the wider set of conditions that are necessary to grow long-term success, and that everyone from the local to the international level is aware.
- Restore and sustain services as quickly as the security environment allows.
- Involve the local population and leadership in both planning and execution as soon as such involvement is practical.

As daily lives improve, so too will the perception of the course of stability operations. Restoration of basic services indicates the creation of a "new normalcy." The "new" refers to improved and different conditions from those that described the "normal" before the intervention. Local leaders and population will need both time and help understanding and adapting to a "new normal" state of civic life. The "new normalcy" enhances the perception of the stability operation in the eyes of the affected population. This in tun will increase cooperation with stability programs and policies, enhance the security of the joint force, and relieve human suffering. It will help to dislocate those spoilers who oppose stability by reducing public support for their anti-security activities

3.B.9. Operate within the law.

- Establish legitimacy for stability operations and maintain it.
- Act within the political mandate and ensure that all activities are consistent with that mandate.
- Set an example to the rising local political-military leaders.
- Retain the moral high ground: act in accordance with democratic values and respect for life and property.
- Conduct an active strategic communications campaign to maintain legitimacy at home and abroad.

Establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of the stability operation is one of the essential goals of the joint force in enabling the attainment of the political end-state. The perception of legitimacy promotes consensus with operational goals and objective in the minds of the local population, the American public, and the international community. Although legitimacy is initially derived from the mandate of the political body authorizing the operation, it can only be sustained if the joint force conducts the operation

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with scrupulous regard for national and international norms on the use of force as well as regard for humanitarian principles. Commanders must ensure that all members of the organization understand the implications of their actions on legitimacy and operate accordingly.

3.B.10. Develop reliable local intelligence.

- Achieve and retain detailed and sophisticated understanding of the situation.
- Know and understand the underlying causes of the conflict.
- Understand the political, social, cultural, and economic factors at work as well as key actors and working relationships.
- Anticipate effects of actions to avoid unintended consequences.

The joint force commander must recognize an absolute requirement to develop local intelligence in order to prosecute security operations successfully. Gathering intelligence amongst local citizens, military, and police enables the commander to anticipate danger. Other sources of information may seem "non-traditional," for they include open sources such as travel agencies, commercial ventures, international and non-governmental organizations that are likely to have been engaged in the area prior to the arrival of the joint force. Ideally, the US government would have fostered local intelligence sources well before the situation reached a crisis and the joint force could exploit them through multi-agency channels. The ability to exploit these sources will be enhanced if there is mutual trust among US and coalition military and multi agency intelligence organizations, especially those operating at the regional and local level. Using intelligence-led operations, the joint force commander increases the likelihood of finding potential spoilers and preventing them from disrupting security and interrupting the creation of conditions that lead to long-term success. The joint force must be able to evaluate data and information using expertise and technology to determine significant entities, trends and relationships in the area of operation. Intelligence cells must develop a method to collect then synthesize political, criminal, economic, demographic, psychological, and other relevant information regarding the conditions and forces that influence the society. The joint force must have the means to expeditiously disseminate

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relevant **and** coherent information to all levels of the organization, ***and its civilian and*** multinational partners, from national level policy makers to operational commanders to tactical leaders in the field.

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Section 4 – CAPABILITIES

Transforming the way joint stability operations will be conducted requires changes in joint force capabilities. The sections below are essential stability operations capabilities, categorized by functional area: Command and Control, Battlespace Awareness, Force Application, Focused Logistics, and Protection. To execute future stability operations as described in this concept, the joint force commander and his force require these capabilities.

4.A Command and Control Capabilities

4.A.1. The ability to create integrated, multiagency unity of purpose vertically and horizontally throughout civil-military organizations by clearly articulating desired a shared vision of effects.

4.A.2. The ability to ensure that stability planning is nested with war planning.

4.A.3. The ability to conduct collaborative, planning, execution, and information sharing among US civil-military agencies and coalition partners from the operational to tactical levels.

4.A.4. The ability to achieve multiagency coherency of action during planning, coordination, and execution by creating a joint, and combined when necessary, multiagency planning and execution organization empowered to facilitate integrated civil-military operations.

4.A.4.a. The ability to enhance rapid information sharing with coalition members, multiagency players, and non-governmental organizations through information sharing technologies and policies.

4.A.4.b. The ability to field a command and control system with reach back capability and connectivity to facilitate other agency participation.

4.A.5. The ability to augment a standing joint force headquarters with a cadre element that is trained organized, and equipped to plan and conduct stability operations. Must possess the capability to command and control, as well as, plan operations on the move. Must be capable of producing mission-type orders that allow subordinate commanders to exercise initiative in the decehtralized execution of stability operations.

4.A.6. The ability to integrate stability operations training with combat training.

4.A.7. The ability to develop and execute a political-military plan to achieve desired effects, to include civil-military media operations.

4.B Battlespace Awareness Capabilities

4.B.1. The ability to achieve a persistent situational awareness and shared understanding in a joint, multiagency, and multinational context in order to know the operational environment and the interrelationship among ourselves, our adversaries, and the local population.

4.B.2. The ability to use an operational net assessment to support stability operations and to reflect that information in the integrated civil-military common relevant operating picture.

4.B.3. The ability to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that integrates all intelligence capabilities, including human intelligence assets, into the overall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture.

4.B.4. The ability to identify and exploit key sources of information and expertise best suited to meet the knowledge requirements of the joint force.

4.B.5. The ability to evaluate data and information using domain expertise and proven technologies to determine significant entities, trends and relationships, then disseminate relevant and coherent analysis to all levels of the integrated civil-military organization, from national level policy makers to operational commanders to tactical leaders in the field.

4.C Force Application Capabilities

4.C.1. The ability to impose security throughout the battlespace to ensure unhindered combat operations and set the stage for long-term success.

4.C.1.a. The ability to train operational headquarters to execute stability and major conventional combat operations simultaneously and integrate those operations with a civilian multiagency organization.

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4.C.1.b. The ability to disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy direct threats to stability with a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons as well as military and non-military means in urban and other complex terrain.

4.C.2. The ability to rapidly organize, train, and equip forces to conduct integrated, multiagency stability operations as task forces or teams consisting of command, security, support, and civic assistance elements.

4.C.2.a. Command element must be able to plan, organize, and execute integrated, multiagency stability operations in a distributed environment in conjunction with combat forces or independently and implement a stand-alone public information campaign.

4.C.2.b. The security element must be able to specifically conduct offensive and defensive stability operations in an unconventional environment that imposes and maintains full security in objective areas.

4.C.2.c. The support element must be able to provide materiel and services to support civic assistance as well as to sustain the force. Includes enhanced, multifunctional engineer assets with self-protection capabilities to conduct construction, power generation, debris removal, and other required engineer functions.

4.C.2.d. The civic assistance element must be able to support civil administration, coordinate humanitarian relief, restore basic services, maintain law and order, begin reconstruction efforts, and implement the public information campaign. The civic assistance elements must be capable of conducting its actions completely integrated with those of the multiple agencies that will have responsibility for creating the long-term conditions necessary for stability to grow.

4.C.2.e. Non-combat elements (e.g., Combat Support, Combat Service Support, and when applicable selected civilian organizations) must have sufficient mobility, survivability, connectivity, and sustainability to immediately follow and support the combat task forces or teams.

4.C.3. The ability to integrate deployment, employment, and sustainment of the force, thus eliminating redundancies, stimulating synergy, and coordinating the movement and sustainment of forces conducting stability operations, and reducing in-country and regional footprint.

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4.C.4. The ability to seamlessly transition joint deployment, employment, and sustainment from supporting preventive transition actions, to being supported during major conventional combat operations, and then supporting post-combat operations.
4.C.5. The ability for commanders to use fund actions to employ local personnel and affect local economies early by supporting reconstruction and development. Sustain this funding through transition to post-combat stability operations and turnover to full civil control.
4.C. 6. The ability to plan and execute nested and coherent strategic communications at every level within the integrated, multiagency organization.

4.D Focused Logistics Capabilities

4.D.1. The ability to maintain persistent deployment, employment, and sustainment situational awareness throughout the integrated, multiagency organization. Support restoration of basic services by identifying those needs during planning and throughout the execution phase.
4.D.2. The ability to develop a coherently joint logistics common relevant operational picture, a reliable, dedicated information and communications network, and automated decision tools in order to anticipate, predict, plan collaboratively, synchronize, and satisfy integrated, multiagency stability operations requirements for deployment, employment, as well as sustainment of these forces.
4.D.3. The ability to account for, contain, distribute or destroy military spoils: weapons, ammunition, and equipment and to conduct sensitive weapon site preservation.
4.D.4. The ability to rapidly provide essential civil assistance, humanitarian, and reconstruction materiel in a combat or other hostile environment.

4.E Protection Capabilities

4.E.1. The ability to track selected Blue forces to the individual level, near real time, in the battlespace to provide a properly filtered common operating picture, minimize fratricide, and enhance agility and synchronization. Must also be able to employ enhanced Red and Civilian Partner Force tracker capabilities, a real-time threat warnings

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broadcast system, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive protection, and automated diagnostic medical capabilities.

4.E.2. The ability to operate in a weapons of mass effect environment. Must be able to rapidly sense, detect, identify fi-om standoff range, defend against, and recover the force from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced-explosives attack.

4.E.3. Improve personnel protection.

4.E.3.a. The ability to rapidly employ tactical forces capable of surviving while traversing complex terrain and employing precise firepower.

4.E.3.b. The ability to issue improved body armor to all deployed personnel, military and civilian.

4.E.3.c. The ability to employ improved counter-mine protection through remote detection and elimination, to includejamming and pre-emptive command detonation.

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4.F Stability Operations Mapping to Joint Operations Concepts

	Para	Stability Operations Required Capability	Common Understanding	Decision Superiority	Adaptive	Rapid Employment	Continuous Pressure	Disrupt the Adversary	Distributed DES	Coordinated MN and IA
			Joint Operations Concepts Attributes							
Command and Control	4.A.1	Unity of purpose--shared vision	X	X						X
	4.A.2	Nested SO planning	X	X		X				
	4.A.3	Collaborative plan and execute	X	X	X					
	4.A.4	Coherency of action	X	X		X	X	X		X
	4.A.5	SO planning element	X	X						
	4.A.6	Integrated training			X	X				X
	4.A.7	Political-Military planning	X	X	X	X	X			X
Battlespace Awarness	4.B.1	Persistent awareness	X						X	X
	4.B.2	Operational Net Assessment	X	X						
	4.B.3	Robust Intelligence	X	X				X		
	4.B.4	Information exploitation	X	X	X		X	X		X
	4.B.5	Intelligence dissemination	X	X		X				
Force Application	4.C.1	Impose security				X	X	X		X
	4.C.2	Organize, train for stab ops			X	X				X
	4.C.3	Integrate DES							X	
	4.C.4	Operational transitions					X		X	
	4.C.5	JFC special funds			X	X		X		
	4.C.6	Information operations			X		X	X		X
Focused Logistics	4.D.1	Persistent DES awareness	X	X					X	
	4.D.2	Logistics CROP	X	X	X				X	
	4.D.4	Spoils containment			X			X		X
	4.D.5	Civil Assistance and Materiel			X	X				
Protection	4.E.1	Red/Blue/CivilianPartner Tracking	X					X		
	4.E.2	WME protection			X	X		X		
	4.E.3	Improve personnel protection			X	X	X	X		

Legend
X = Correlation of capability to function

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CONCLUSION

The next two decades will contain a perplexing, complex array of security challenges for the United States. Expanding webs of the economic and information architectures will afford opportunity for some regional powers to compete on a broader scale and emerge on the global landscape with considerable influence. In addition, regional power structures are likely to alter as regional conflicts, civil wars, and transnational actors reshape existing norms.

Nations, transnational actors, and non-state entities, operating internally and externally, will challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare. Local conflicts and wars are quite likely and will carry the **risk** of escalation into broader conflicts. Major conventional combat operations, with its associated stability operations, will remain a constant potential for the foreseeable future.

Future military operations will be joint campaigns that will include multiagency, multinational, and multilateral partners to achieve mission success. Stability operations are no exception. **A** political-military plan supported by truly integrated, multiagency planning, preparation, and execution are a hallmark of stability operations. The challenges that the United States and its allies and fiiends face in the future while conducting stability operations involve a complex mix of global dangers, problematic nation-states, and illegal transnational organizations. These challenges threaten the national interests of many nations, not just the United States, and are more complex than any one nation can solve. Successful solutions to stability operations require the contributions of multiple nations and agencies —military and non-military, governmental and non-govemmental.

Successful stability operations must be inextricably linked to planning, preparing and executing war. Security is the common thread that binds the joint force's operating environment before, during, and after combat operations. If combat is required, stability operations will form an essential part of combat operations and post-combat actions. The joint force, as part of a multinational and integrated, multiagency operation, will still provide security as well as initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration

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of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance—until the security environment permits civilian agencies to perform these functions. These kinds of stability operations will be conducted simultaneously, distributed throughout the theater of war. Successful stability operations require a combination of detailed situational understanding; a coercive posture against obstructionists; unified direction from legitimate civil authority; and integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action; sophisticated media operations; organizational endurance; and sufficient popular support over time in order to facilitate transition to local governance and reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of the crisis.

Just as military organizations organize, train, and equip their forces for combat; so must they prepare similarly for stability operations, which often involve combat activities. Military organizations must have the capability to organize, train, and equip for the execution of long-term operations simultaneously with major conventional combat operations. Preventive actions, properly planned, resourced, and conducted, might even obviate the need for subsequent combat operations by preventing the situation from crossing the threshold of war. If war is thrust upon us, stability operations are essential to the ultimate achievement of strategic aims. Stability operations must be a core mission of the military services and civil agencies.

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APPENDIX A – TIMEFRAME, ASSUMPTIONS, AND RISKS

Timeframe

This concept addresses the time period around 2015.

Assumptions

General assumptions for the stability operations joint operating concept are:

1. The US government will conduct stability operations.
2. The US will play a decisive role in stability operations.
3. The military and interagency community will achieve synergy in planning and execution.
4. The concept outlines four cases in which the US would intervene to impose security, stabilize the situation, and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance. Case 2 is the most dangerous and case 4 is the most likely to occur.[18]

Risks

1. Civil-military collaboration, coordination, and information sharing remains problematic and lacking common goals and objectives.
2. Stability operations not embraced as a core civil-military mission. Forces normally designed and dedicated for combat roles will increasingly provide "non-traditional" roles and subsequently not prepared for stability operations.
3. Rules of engagement may be confusing and conflicting when conducting stability operations in conjunction with combat.
4. Combat operations do not coordinate plans or account for concurrent stability operations.

[18] Order of concept development will be Case 2, then 4, 3, and 1.

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APPENDIX B – GLOSSARY OF OPERATIONAL TERMS

Arms Control: (DOD) A concept that connotes: a. any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the Armed Forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); and b. on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment.

Arms Control Activities: Actions conducted in compliance with or in support of arms control treaties, agreements, obligations, or ongoing negotiations. (New definition derived from CJCSM 3113.01A, page A-14, GL-2)

Counterinsurgency (COIN): Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain; disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. See also foreign assistance. (JP 1-02)

Foreign Internal Defense (Figure 3): Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and

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protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called **FID.** (JP 1-02)



Figure 3.

Freedom of Navigation Operations: Operations conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate air and sea routes, or in space. (Modified version of existing ***JP*** 1-02).

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit-training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. See also Humanitarian Assistance. (JP 1-02)

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Line Of Communications: A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. See also base of operations; route. (DOD)

Military Contacts: Visits by military and defense personnel, delegations, and units to foreign countries for the purpose of security cooperation. Military contacts include senior defense official and senior officer visits, counterpart visits, ship port visits, participation in defense shows and demonstrations, bilateral and multilateral staff talks, defense cooperation working groups, regional conferences, State Partnership for Peace Program activities, attaché activities and personnel and unit exchange programs. (new definition derived *from* CJCSM **31**13.01A, page GL-6)

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. **(JP** 1-02)

Peace Enforcement (Figure 4): Application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 1-02)

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

Figure 4.

Peacekeeping Operations (Figure 5): Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (existing JP 1-02 definition)

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

Figure 5.

Security Assistance: (DOD) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called **SA.**

Show of Force: An operation designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. (JP 1-02)

Support to Counterinsurgency (Figure 6): Support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)

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

Figure *6*.

Insurgency: (DOD, **NATO)** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

Sanction Enforcement And Maritime Intercept Operations: (DOD) Operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.

Unconventional Warfare: (DOD) **A** broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by local or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW.

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APPENDIX C – COERCION, INDUCEMENTS, AND SOCIALIZATION

Countering direct threats to long-term security and success caused by a spoiler may be in itself a full-time mission. But until the spoilers[19] are managed, as evidenced in Iraq, less than effective progress may be made in other areas. In order to control the spoilers the joint force may use a mix of capabilities for coercion, inducements, and socialization of the population and leadership in the target area. The focus concentrates efforts on formal as well as informal leadership, their followers, or both.

Each type of spoiler requires a different strategy that the joint force must use in order to dislocate, contain, or satisfy them. **A** singular approach is likely to encourage additional spoilers and demands. The joint force must identify the type spoilers and underlying causes in order to manage spoilers through a focused system of coercion, inducements, and socialization.

Coercion: Coercion attempts to eliminate total spoilers and to contain or intimidate greedy spoilers. Coercion will generally be negative reinforcement; it will be application of force, or denial of desired goods and services. Coercion ranges from total isolation of the spoiler, freezing or eliminating sources of economic or other aid to counter-terrorism type operations.

Total spoilers are restrained by dominance of force. It is through force or the threat of force the joint force commander seeks to compel compliance. Coercion is used to physically and psychologically isolate spoilers from the population. Spoilers are physically isolated by offensive and defensive military operations to defeat them or restrict their movement and limit their access to designated areas. Offensive operations include overt, covert, *or* clandestine operations. Defensive operations protect key personnel, facilities, and equipment from attack by spoilers. Psychological operations seek to eliminate popular support.

Inducements: Inducements take the form of political, financial, or other concessions or payments to mollify and convert the limited spoilers (those who have political aims

[19] Total spoilers: those who are totally apposed to the stability mission Greedy spoilers: those who seek to gain power or money, or both, in the uncertain situation of the moment. Limited: those that seek limited objectives for personal gain or group advantage.

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different from ours but who can be accommodated). Unlike coercion, inducements can be characterized as positive reinforcement of the actions of the targeted group.

Inducements satisfy the needs of limited spoilers and the population as a whole in basic needs and security. Inducements are political, financial, or other concessions or payments made to mollify and convert limited—or in some cases greedy —spoilers. Inducements can be characterized as positive reinforcement for the actions of the targeted group when such actions are consistent with joint stability objectives.

Socialization: Socialization is a long-term process designed to prevent the development of new spoilers through education, psychological operations, and any other means. The aim of the process is to develop the mindset among the leaders and population that they will progress to a peaceful and prosperous condition by following the suggestions of the US and coalition partners.

Socialization is designed to prevent the return or development of future spoilers through engagement with the local populace and key leaders. This requires a coordinated command presence and information plan with links to information operations, psychological operations, public affairs, and the interagency community. Socialization is the change in attitude throughout all levels of a society that makes its members amenable to the objectives of the joint stability operation. This means the willing acceptance of capitalism and democracy, as well as religious, racial, and ethnic tolerance. Socialization also requires society to allow equal opportunity, freedom of speech and the press; protection of human rights; access to markets; and peaceful coexistence with the world community.

All societies and regions require some level of coercion to maintain stability. The level of coercion required is dependent on crime and the presence of criminal organizations, basic needs being met, outside influences and support to insurgency and violence, and the peoples' consent to being governed. Indigenous government and law enforcement are sufficient to maintain stability through low levels of coercion in normally stable societies and regions. Where crime, the effects of war, and insurgency ovenvhelm local and national governments, higher levels of coercion are required to maintain stability. This higher level of coercion consists of introduced (usually military) coercion alongside indigenous coercion.

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Where all or most societal functions have collapsed, the introduced military coercion will provide all or most of the required coercion in an environment where basic needs are in jeopardy and the potential for insurgency is high. While establishing an initial period of security through the use or threat of use of military coercion is vital, lowering the overall level of coercion required is more critical and requires a three-part approach.

First, efforts must be made to replace the introduced coercion with indigenous coercion on a one-for-one basis, such as military and law enforcement. Second, inducements to meet basic needs and enhance the function of civil government must be efficiently applied to restore an initial semblance of normal society. Initially, the military force provides inducements. This is because the initial security environment usually will not permit or encourage non-government organizations or contractors to provide these type services. Third, a process of socialization that runs concurrently with inducements is conducted through effective information operations against spoilers, public information programs with the aim of building consent to government, and education programs designed at bettering the society's self-sufficiency. Socialization must work towards long-term stability in the region and the society concerned. With all of these approaches, patience and commitment to a long-term view is required. In most cases, instability was years in the making and it will be years in the rebuilding.

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Office of Primary Responsibility:

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115 Lakeview Pkwy Ste B
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5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

INTELLIGENCE

28 OCT 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P) ODASD(R&P) (Attn: Beth Cordray)

SUBJECT: Comments on Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept

Thank you for the opportunity to review JFCOM's draft Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept. This concept paper correctly identifies the important role information will play in stability operations and highlights "Information Operations" as a key component throughout all operational phases. As written, however, this concept paper does not accurately reflect current and emerging DoD policy regarding the information domain.

In the past year, DoD has refined terminology to more narrowly describe IO in the context of military operations. Additionally, the emerging concept of Defense Support to Public Diplomacy will ensure the Department sends a coherent and compelling message in concert with other United States Government entities. These two activities are governed by distinct policy and legal considerations and must be differentiated. This document merges both concepts under IO.

We would like the opportunity to work with JFCOM to revise the information component in the draft Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept prior to forwarding to the SecDef.

The point of contact for this action in ODUSD(IWS)/IO is Ms. Sarah Eddy, 703-697-3243 x115.

John O'Dwyer
CAPT USN
Director, Information Operations

Attachment

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ACTION MEMO

FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESOURCES AND PLANS

FROM: Dr. Jeb Nadaner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations JMN 12-2-06

SUBJECT: Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept Version **1.07**

My office has reviewed this document. We have no objections to it, insofar as it goes. We find that it does an excellent job of describing the "Case 2" environment, as well as the mindset and planning capabilities required of joint commanders and staff officers in the conduct of stability operations.

- We believe the utility of the document could be enhanced if it were to address doctrine for stability operations in more detail – recommended structures, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

- In addition, we recognize that this concept was developed prior to the establishment of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This new office is responsible for planning and coordinating civil reconstruction and stabilization activities. The document should be updated to reflect the proposed new role of S/CRS.

- We also find that the graphs in appendix B are difficult to follow. Recommend they be simplified.

- We welcome the emphasis on stability operations represented by this document, and look forward to helping develop the concept and its implementation.

Prepared by: David Des Roches, OASD SO/LIC Stability Operations, 697-3915

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FORCE TRANSFORMATION OFFICE

December 2, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: Major Combat Operations and Stability Operations (SO) Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs)

The *Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG)* tasks the Director, Force Transformation to comment on the JOCs. Acting for the Director, I recommend approval of these concepts, but only as interim documents. My comments and recommendations are the following:

- To be more useful *to* Joint Force Commanders, future versions of the JOCS must provide more detailed descriptions of "how" the joint force will conduct operations.
- It is not clear that stability operations should be considered distinct and separate from combat operations on the future contemporary battlefield.
- Both JOCs should address explicitly how to integrate multi-national and interagency partners in future joint force operations.
- The Joint Staff has developed a plan for more competitive concept development, and this plan should be applied to future versions of these two JOCS.
- Slability operations should receive more emphasis in experimentation and wargames to inform the next version of the SO JOC.

T. J. Pudas
Deputy Director

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 28 PM 3:52

ACTION MEMO

CM-2089-04
28 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Major Combat Operations (MCO) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)

- The enclosed MCO JOC (TAB A) is forwarded for your approval in response to Transformation Planning Guidance requirements
- The concept, authored by USJFCOM and approved by the Joint Chiefs, is the culmination of a lengthy development and refinement effort. USJFCOM collaborated with the Services, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff and Defense agencies to produce the inaugural document that will be updated according to the Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan. My staff provided copies of this paper to the Office for Force Transformation for review. This JOC is key to the continued Joint Force transformation and improvement of joint warfighting capabilities.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the JOC.

Approve _____ Disapprove_____ Other_____

JAN 11 2005

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Maj Gen Jack Catton, USAF; Director, J-7; (703) 697-9031

OSD 14834-04

Major Combat Operations

Joint Operating Concept

September 2004

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As the lead author, US Joint Forces Command matured this concept through the use of joint and Service operational lessons learned and experimentation: numerous co-sponsored joint wargames, seminars, workshops and other concept development venues. Throughout, this process was guided by direct input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During the development of this concept each Service, combatant command, selected members of the Joint and **OSD** staffs, as well as multinational partners and selected non-DoD agencies made significant contributions. Also included throughout were a host of active and retired flag and junior officers, academics, and professional strategic thinkers.

US Joint Forces Command will continue to use experimentation and lessons learned to refine this concept. Version **2.0** is expected to be staffed in the 3rd quarter 05 timeframe.

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, US Navy

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"War is a continuation of politics with the introduction of different means". "…War is a clash between major interests that is resolved by bloodshed -- that is the only way it differs from other conflicts…" ***Carl Von Clausewitz***

Wars embody political conflicts turned violent. They are fought to achieve political aims. Rare will be the case that combat alone will resolve the political confrontation and achieve political aims. To achieve our political aims we need a coherent application of force in both combat and post-combat operations. War is a continuation of politics and it must also, despite its violence, anticipate the continuation of politics during hostilities and upon their conclusion. The following concept concerns one portion of confrontation resolution – that of major combat operations – and addresses the fundamental need for unity of purpose with the political aims and coherency of action involving all instruments of national power to achieve those aims.

The Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept (MCO JOC) is a pillar of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs new family of Joint Operations Concepts. It recognizes the complexity and uncertainty of tomorrow's combat environment and the adaptive nature of our potential adversaries. It establishes a framework for the armed forces to transition from the industrial age to the information age in order to better harness our human and organizational capabilities, better target *our* adversaries' critical nodes, and to place us in greater harmony with the realities of the modern battlespace. It addresses the challenges of conducting large-scale military actions in a distributed, collaborative environment against a militarily capable regional nation state with significant anti-access capabilities and weapons of mass destruction. The central theme of the MCO JOC is to **achieve decisive conclusions to combat and set the conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation; use a joint, interdependent force that swiftly applies overmatching power simultaneously and sequentially, in a set of contiguous and noncontiguous operations; employ joint power at all points of action necessary; and create in the mind of our enemy an asynchronous' perception of our actions—all to compel the**

[I] Asynchronous, in this context, refers to our desire to create an indiscernible pattern in time and space in the mind of our enemy. Our operations, however, must retain unity of purpose and coherency of action.

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enemy to accede to our will. Joint power in the context of this paper includes the integration and appropriate balance of conventional and special operations forces.

To address the future challenges we face in conducting major combat operations, this concept proposes a coherent, effects-based approach used throughout the deployment-employment-sustainment of the combined force. This concept emphasizes the need to incorporate joint, interagency, and coalition power to achieve desired outcomes rather than to simply accomplish discrete tasks. Further, this concept proposes seven core building blocks that form the foundations for US success in future major combat operations as well as eleven principles to help guide the decisions and actions of Operational Commanders in conducting major combat operations. They are:

- Foundations for Major Combat Operations
  1. Fight with a warrior's ethos.
  2. Use a coherent joint force that decides and acts based upon pervasive knowledge.
  3. Develop resourceful leaders.
  4. Train under the right conditions.
  5. Field capabilities to maintain adaptive force dominance.
  6. Uphold the values of American democracy.
  7. Conduct routine operations to gain and maintain operational access?

- How the Joint Force Fights
  1. Start with the strategic purpose in mind.
  2. Achieve decisive outcomes and conclusions.
  3. Employ a knowledge-enhanced, effects-based approach.
  4. Employ a joint, interagency and multinational force with collaborative processes.
  5. Use mission orders throughout the chain of command.
  6. Gain and maintain operational access?
  7. Engage the adversary comprehensively.
  8. Generate relentless pressure by deciding and acting distributively.
  9. Achieve coherency of action.

---

[3] **See also Joint Forcible** Entry **Operations Concept**
[4] **Ibid.**

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10. Align deployment, employment, and sustainment activities.

11. Protect people, facilities, and equipment throughout the battlespace.

The objective is not merely to destroy the adversary militarily, but to continuously shape the battlespace to effectively engulf him in every dimension. As combined forces are brought to bear from strategic and operational distances with unpredictability, relentlessness, speed, and seeming omnipresence combined to maximize shock, the battlespace as a whole is made increasingly hostile to the adversary, rendering resistance impossible or futile. This concept recognizes that the achievement of desired strategic outcomes relies on the coherent application of all relevant national and multinational means, not just military. It incorporates a superior appreciation of the adversary, the battlespace, and ourselves; and provides better means of shaping these. This concept also requires a degree of interdependence among service forces that had always been desired but had never been achievable. Interdependence relies upon technical connectivity to be sure, but even more important it relies upon breaking down long-developed cultural positions and barriers, eliminating unnecessary redundancies, and better integrating joint force employment. As we work to solve technical problems surrounding an interdependent force, we must also use our training and leader development venues to create a new, coherently joint culture.

In so doing, this concept describes a profound transformation in the way we think about and conduct major combat operations.

This concept is focused on the time horizon just beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), roughly 2015 and rests upon the following assumptions:

Assumption 1: War continues to be an important component of confrontation strategies and remains a fundamentally human endeavor. Our approach to warfighting in the information age must strike a balance between its technological and human elements.

Assumption 2: While the nature of war remains relatively fixed, the conduct of war has changed, is changing and will continue to change. Adversaries will include both state and non-state actors, including transnational organizations, terrorist groups, criminal elements and economic entities. We will often face enemies who operate outside the rule of law

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and are difficult to distinguish from noncombatants. These new adversary sets require us to develop new approaches to deterrence measures, warfighting and winning confrontations.

Assumption 3: Potential regional adversaries in the 2015 timeframe[4] will be well-equipped, well-led, motivated to win, highly adaptive, with global reach in selected capabilities, and possess the will to employ those capabilities in opposition to or in a manner threatening to U.S. national security. They will also likely possess weapons of mass destruction[6] and significant anti-access capabilities. They will observe our warfighting capabilities and methods and adjust their strategies and tactics intelligently in an attempt to counter our advantages. These adversaries will seek to exploit technological breakthroughs in novel ways.

Assumption 4: Technological advances will continue at least at the current pace. Commercially available dual-use technology will continue to proliferate, extending some near-peer like capabilities in selected niches to even the least sophisticated and minimally funded adversaries.

Assumption 5: Service competencies remain the foundation of joint capabilities. The Services provide the cultural identities, domain expertise and core warfighting resources that are vital to implementing this concept.

Assumption 6: The concept outlines three cases of major combat operations. Of the two likely cases, Case One, the high-end regional competitor, has the greatest impact on our total capability requirements and is accordingly the focus of Version 1.0. Case Two, major irregular combat is the other likely case in the 2015 time frame and will be the next case developed in future versions of the concept. Case Three, the peer competitor, while the most dangerous, is not anticipated within the time frame of focus and will be the last of the three developed.

---

[4] GLOBAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES: THE DECADES AHEAD Statement for the House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. (Paragraphs 1, 3, and 10).

[5] A Primer on the FUTURE THREAT: The Decades Ahead 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 2, Global Change, Para 6; Chapter 3, Transnational Issues -- WMD Proliferation.

[6] Implies ability to possess and globally export WMD effects through terrorist cells, special operations forces, intermediate range missiles, and, in some cases, intercontinental range missiles.

[7] GLOBAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES: THE DECADES AHEAD Statement For The House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Future Warfare Trends.

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Section 1 -- INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

"We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the US armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight."

SecDef Rumsfeld's Remarks to National Defense University, 31 Jan 02

1.A Introduction.

The Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for Major Combat Operations (MCO) serves as a means for generating and capturing thought and discussion on the methods for conducting major combat operations in the next decade. Additionally, this concept will provide the foundation for further development and integration of other joint operating, functional, and integrating concepts, as well as influencing Joint and Service transformation. This concept seeks to combine emerging technologies and operational concepts with timeless and enduring principles of military affairs. It departs from current doctrine where it no longer serves, but not simply to satisfy a desire for something new.

The MCO JOC addresses the challenges discussed within the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) paper. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities. *Major combat operations as referred to in this Joint Operating Concept are large-scale operations conducted against a nation state(s) that possesses significant regional military capability, with global reach in selected capabilities, and the will to employ that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to US National Security*[8]. This future adversary will likely possess weapons of mass destruction[9] and significant anti-access capabilities. This concept describes an operational-level approach to warfighting and conflict resolution that exploits the capability of all instruments of national and multinational power to achieve full spectrum dominance[10] over an organized and capable adversary. It proposes

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[8] Major combat operations may be conducted against a peer, an irregular competitor or a non-peer competitor with regional focus. For scoping purposes, this joint operating concept is focused on the regional non-peer competitor as discussed in Section 1.B Scope.

[9] A Primer on the FUTURE THREAT: The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 2, Global Change, Para 6; Chapter 3, Transnational Issues -- WMD Proliferation.

[10] "Full spectrum dominance is the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations." Joint Operations Concepts Dated 3 Oct 2003

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a blending of diverse national and coalition nonmilitary capabilities with an overmatching military force.

MCO JOC requires a commitment to transformation within the military and in the **way** that military power is integrated into other elements of national and coalition influence. People remain the centerpiece of successful operations, but changes within our society, the changing international security environment, and the rapid advance and proliferation of "information age" technologies require fundamental changes in how we approach warfare and conflict resolution.

Expanding potential capabilities through incremental improvements is important; but by simply realizing more of the existing potential capabilities of warfighters and warfighting organizations we can derive greater gains. Being a post-industrial society gives us great potential for the development and exploitation of human capabilities and will. The latent power to be found in the ordinary warfighter and warfighting organization is, by industrial standards, extraordinary. We cannot count on always enjoying material advantages over our adversaries; but we can strive to be more effective with those resources at hand. The exploitation of this potential offers the most profound revolution in military affairs. The MCO JOC guides future force transformation and the way operational commanders think and act when called upon to win our Nation's wars.

1.B Scope.

The scope of a major combat operations concept must address the following three cases:

Case 1 – Major combat operations against a conventional, high-end regional threat

Case 2 – Major irregular combat operations

Case 3 – Major combat operations against a peer competitor

Since no current intelligence estimate forecasts a peer or near-peer competitor in the **20**15 timeframe, Version 1.0 of this paper focuses on Case One. This postulated high-end regional competitor possesses some near-peer like capabilities in selected niches.'[1] Such an approach captures the most challenging of the likely adversaries and conditions the US

[1] **GLOBAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES:** THE **DECADES AHEAD Statement for the House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. (Paragraphs 1, 3, and 10).**

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may face in the next decade. The scope and scale of operations against a regional competitor call attention to coherent, high-tempo, simultaneous operations conducted from multiple, distributed locations throughout the theater of war—all based upon pervasive knowledge. These types of operations may entail little or no reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) for selected **units.**

We must recognize that campaign development factors, as well **as** force capabilities and sizing will differ between the regional cornpetitor, irregular competitor and the peer. We will require additional types **of** capabilities suited to the special nature of major irregular combat. Many of the capabilities developed to respond to a regional competitor will clearly apply as we scale up to the peer competitor, but not all. In fact, the sheer scale of a peer changes the character of the fight. **As** a result, developing the capabilities identified in this version of the concept will not provide all of the capabilities needed to address either Case Two or Case Three. Later versions of this concept will further define the full set of required capabilities.

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Section 2 – DESCRIPTION OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM

2.A The Operational Environment.[12]

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 marked the start of a new national security era for America. The months that followed revealed a new kind of enemy: elusive, transnational, unconventional — an enemy as different from those of the Cold War or World War II as it was possible to conceive and one who has caused us to think about future war in a new way. These new threats against the United States and her allies seek to avoid our strengths, make many of our long-held assumptions irrelevant, and challenge the forms and conventions of industrial age warfare. The changes brought forth by these events have implications for military force design and operational concepts.

The relative certainty of the bipolar Cold War period is gone. We now face uncertainty and unknowns. Gone are the days when we were relatively sure we should prepare to fight a largely symmetric conventional war, in a defined set of theaters with improved infrastructures, against a doctrinally "template-able" enemy, with fixed alliances, for predetermined political aims. We cannot forecast the type war we will fight, against whom, with whom, where, or for what aims. Our adversaries have adapted and will continue to do so. They study our strengths and quickly devise methods to overcome them. They know that our strength is unmatchable in conventional military operations where we possess distinct advantages in sensors, mobility, and firepower. Some adversaries operate in that seam between illegal and legal activities. They target civilians directly, plan and prepare to operate in areas more civilian than military, and try to avoid detection and attack by blurring the distinction between combatant and noncombatant. They use methods to mitigate our strength and put themselves in a position where they have a chance to win — if only momentarily, or in their own eyes.

The likelihood is high that our adversaries operate from and within large, complex, and hostile urban areas. The implications of MCO in cities are dramatic.[13] In urban combat operations, the US-led coalition achieves its desired end state by understanding,

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[12] See the ***Joint Operational Environment-Into the Future,*** draft dated 5 Mar 2004, for an expanded discussion of the future operational environment.

[13] For additional detail refer to the Joint Urban Operations Integrating Concept.

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controlling, and exploiting the unique elements of the urban environment (e.g., terrain, infrastructure, population, and information); sensing, locating, and isolating the adversary; and applying power rapidly, precisely, and discriminately. Essentially, an urban area is a complicated and dynamic concentration of physical, social, informational, political, economic, religious, and criminal activities. These activities are constantly interacting, and collectively produce a unique urban culture. When exposed to major combat, this unique urban culture goes into a form of "shock and paralysis." The US-led force must tend to this urban crisis by returning the city to a functioning posture. Urban problems, in the end, tend to require very human solutions. Our joint leader must understand the operative dynamics of fighting in cities.

While the Cold War force designed to respond to a near-peer successfully deterred a general global war, the premise that such a force structure can rapidly and effectively respond to any contingency in today's uncertain global environment requires examination. The likelihood that the United States and her coalition partners will engage in major combat operations with a regional competitor is much greater than the United States conducting major combat operations against a near-peer.[14] We must identify new security concepts and organizations to fit the environment we face, not attempt to fit "our proven" concepts and organizations to the new environment.

A US-led coalition may eventually conduct major combat operations against an adversary who possesses weapons of mass destruction[15] (WMD). An adversary without the conventional forces necessary to battle a more capable US and coalition force may use this extreme form of warfighting violence. Myriad diplomatic, informational, economic, social, as well as military issues surround both adversary and friendly use of WMD. The US must remain vigilant and capable of dissuading, deterring, limiting, and denying adversary employment of such weapons. If and when WMD are employed against the US, an ally, or friend, the US strategic level response is a political decision, not a military decision. At the operational and tactical levels, US forces must be trained and ready to operate in a WMD environment with little or no degradation in posture.

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[14] **A Primer on the FUTURE THREAT: The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 3, Key Points.**

[15] **A Primer on the FUTURE THREAT: The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 3, Transnational Issues -- WMD Proliferation.**

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Operating in a WMD environment may include potential use of US nuclear weapons, when directed by the appropriate authorities, to influence the outcome of operations.

2.B Operational Level of War.

The operational level is that level that links campaigns, major operations, and tactical actions in time, space, and purpose, sequentially and simultaneously, in order to attain strategic or operational aims.[16] The MCO JOC recognizes that required actions for confrontation, conflict resolution, and major combat operations are not only military in nature, but also include the discrete actions associated with other elements of our government and those of our coalition partners. The interaction between these areas increases the complexity of the problem for the commander as evidenced by recent operations and experimental results. A joint force commander acting at the operational level must understand that the actions of the military forces over which he has command must be harmonized with the actions of other elements of government over which he has no authority and with the actions of members of the coalition. Many of these actions occur prior to actual conflict making critical contributions to shaping the confrontation and preparing the battlespace. Furthermore, some of these civilian activities will continue during hostilities, most will expand substantially as hostilities end and they will continue well into the post-conflict phase of the intervention.

The next level of complexity concerns simultaneity in military and civilian action. At the operational level, simultaneity takes two forms. The first, deployment, employment, and sustainment actions—military and nonmilitary, US and coalition, physical and information—occur at the same time. The second form takes place in multiple locations within a theater of war, and if the war is global, within multiple theaters.

Thus, the battlespace in which a joint *force commander* operates is both complex and expansive. Leadership at this level is different in both kind and degree from leadership at the tactical level. The joint force commander makes decisions and takes actions in a much more collaborative way than do tactical commanders. Directive leadership remains, but the joint force commander is also a leader among peer-leaders, something

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[16] Derived from the Joint Publication 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" definition and Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."

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uncommon at the tactical level. Exercising responsibility and achieving success at the operational level requires a skill set that is inclusive of, but much broader than, that set needed at the tactical level—it requires operational art.

2.C Operational Art.

Operational art, according to Joint Publication 3-0, describes "the employment of military forces to attain strategic or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating activities of all levels of war." The MCO JOC highlights the incompleteness of this definition. Our understanding of operational art must expand to include both military and nonmilitary instruments of government action.

Operational art begins in the mind and character of the commander. A joint force commander cannot achieve what he cannot conceive. A joint force commander must derive, describe, and communicate a set of clear, achievable effects that must be realized in order to achieve the political aims he is given. He must properly apply the principles of war and other general principles of action to the specific situation in which he is operating and mission he has been assigned. Further, he must balance competing priorities and adjust them continuously as the situation unfolds over time. The application of general principles to specific cases is a form of wisdom and art that technologies can enhance but not replace.

The joint force commander at the operational level is a leader among peer-leaders. This kind of leadership position requires the ability to build trust and confidence among his seniors and subordinates in his personal judgment and action. He must also build trust and confidence among the set of peer-leaders, military and nonmilitary, who, collectively, are responsible for the attainment of US and coalition political aims. Using the interpersonal skill necessary to create systems of trust and confidence is also a form of art that technologies can enhance but not replace.

While unity of purpose and coherency in action begin in the mind of the joint force commander, they are executed in the physical, cognitive, and information domains. The

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physical and information components concern the means the joint force commander uses to translate plans into actions, thus creating the effects he and his peers have identified as necessary to achieve the ends they have been given. The cognitive component involves not only the minds of the commander and his peer-leaders, but the mind of the adversary as well. A key avenue for cognitive effects is information operations and the emerging area of warfare in cyberspace.

The joint force commander also requires sufficient space in which to conduct his operations in the physical domain. This component of operational art recognizes that there is a relationship between numbers and types of forces and the physical space they require. One can have too few as well as too many forces relative to the space in which one is operating and the adversaries one faces. The relationships among the physical domain, forces—both military and nonmilitary—and adversaries are not fixed; they are dynamic. They change as the "terrain" changes, as the adversary adapts, as the opposition stiffens or lessens, and as missions change. Judgment is paramount.

One of the means the joint force commander requires is a deployment and sustainment system that is flexible enough to support his employment schemes as well as those of his peer-leaders. Having the ability to fight is useless if that ability is not accompanied by the ability to deploy and sustain. Further, the ability to fight in a certain style is useless if deployment and sustainment systems cannot support it.

Operational art includes the ability to achieve the proper ends-means relationship. The means used by the joint force commander and his peer-leaders do not operate in isolation; they operate most effectively within an organizational construct. There is no singular "correct" organizational construct. Rather, "correct" will vary as to the situation, the opponent, and the mission assigned. Regardless of organizational construct, however, there are some constants. Any organization needs ways in which to gather information, change that information into knowledge and then sufficient understanding to use as a basis for making decisions, taking actions, and adapting as the situation unfolds in the unexpected way it will always unfold in war. Any organization will need ways in which to achieve and sustain unity of purpose and coherency in action. Finally, any organization construct will have to be credible to those who must operate within it.

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However, no single, established, fixed organization will be suited to the near-infinite number of possible scenarios we may face.

Perhaps the most important aspect of operational art is the ability to "fit" these elements together--in harmony. Any plan that a joint force commander constructs must satisfy political leadership, attain the political aims assigned, and be constructed collaboratively with his peer-leaders-commanders of our coalition partners, officials from civilian agencies, and leaders from the host nation—who are partners and stakeholders in attaining those aims. Further, the joint force commander's plan must be executable by the forces made available—military and nonmilitary, US and multinational, in the physical and information domains, and within the organization he controls and adapts for the situation. If one of these elements is out of balance, the joint force commander must adjust the others—and continually re-balance as his operations unfold. How and when are matters of his judgment, a matter of his **art.**

The operational environment the joint force commander faces has expanded. **Our** understanding of what defines the operational level of war and the operational **art** must change in response to the changes in the environment. Some of what worked before remains essential; some, however, is distinctly counterproductive. **A** force that can adapt rapidly and successfully in the face of increasing uncertainty is a requirement in this new era. This concept addresses how we will accomplish this important **task.**

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Section 3 – MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS – THE CONCEPT

"Where there is unity, there is always victory."

--Publilius Syrus (First Century BC)

3.A Synopsis of the Central Idea.

The complexity and uncertainty of the future operational environment shape the conduct of future military operations in partnership with civilian agency activities to achieve our political goals. Given that combat remains a profoundly brutal and human endeavor, the human dimension is central to this concept. Technology does not fight an enemy; people do. Emerging technologies enable future operations, but must not constrain them. Despite unimaginable advances in sensor and information technologies, the *"fog, friction, uncertainty, complexity, and chaos"* surrounding war and combat endure, especially when facing an intelligent and determined adversary or multiple adversaries. Mental preparation is as important as the technical advantage that US forces can bring to bear in combat. But success in combat alone does not guarantee achievement of political aims.

Given this background, the central theme of the MCO JOC is this: **achieve decisive conclusions to combat and set the conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation; use a joint, interdependent force that swiftly applies overmatching power simultaneously and sequentially, in a set of contiguous and noncontiguous operations; employ joint power at all points of action necessary; and create in the mind of our enemy an asynchronous[17] perception of our actions—all to compel the enemy to accede to our will.** These decisive conclusions are enabled by the fluid[18] and coherent'' application of joint military action in conjunction with interagency and

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[17] Asynchronous, in this context, refers to our desire to create an indiscernible pattern in time and space in the mind of our enemy. Our operations, however, must retain unity of purpose and coherency of action.

[18] Fluidity, in this context, is the ability to readily adapt, shift forces, and redirect operations; the ability to seek out, create, and exploit opportunities and adversary vulnerabilities; and the ability to engage, or appear to engage, an adversary in every dimension, relentlessly, irrespective of his efforts to disengage or to seek advantage. It is analogous to the tendency of fluid to adapt to the shape of any vessel that contains it; to pour through any crack, hole, or gap; and to engulf any object that is immersed in it. It is the manifestation of the emergent behaviors of adaptability and opportunism.

[19] Coherence, in this context, is analogous to qualities of coherent light produced by a laser, as compared to incoherent or ordinary light, produced by a flashlight. Although both focus light, the light produced by a

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coalition power, using an effects-based approach and leveraging pervasive knowledge in a networked environment to increase levels of collaboration, precision, unity of purpose and coherency in action. As Figure 1 below depicts, these enablers help us move from today's paradigm of applying overwhelming force to applying overmatching power, from deconflicting actions to coherent actions, from mostly sequential to more simultaneous operations, from primarily contiguous to more noncontiguous operations, from reacting to pro-acting, and from being joint only at the operational level to becoming joint at the point of action.[20] Additionally, a profound shift in our warfighting concepts occurs when the US aligns and synchronizes deployment, employment, and sustainment activities to



Figure 1

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laser differs from ordinary light in that it is made up of waves all of the same wavelength and all in phase (synchronized); ordinary light contains different wavelengths and phase relations. The result is greater power generated by the coherent light of a laser than the incoherent light of a flashlight. Ensuring that all available elements of the combined force are "in phase," or coherent stimulates synchronization and synergy that result in increased combat power.

[20] "Joint at the point of action'' refers to being able to apply the power of any element of the joint force at any point of action the joint commander directs.

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conduct multiple, simultaneous, distributed, decentralized battles and campaigns. For example, employment options expand, allowing operational maneuver from strategic distances as well as from the sea, and tactical vertical maneuver from operational distances—capabilities vital to forcible entry as well as follow-on operations. These employment options contribute to a degree of speed and agility that allows the aggressor no opportunity to adjust his plans, reconfigure his forces, or reconstitute damaged assets. To a considerable extent, these employment options are dependent upon the adequacy of strategic and theater lift, both air and maritime. To proceed without pause and without loss of tempo, all Services are required to increase combat power output per unit of deployment and achieve a degree of interdependence not heretofore realized. The end result is the ability to achieve and maintain adaptive force dominance.

Tomorrow's Operational Commander is key to achieving success. He must be able to generate the right effects at the right time and place to achieve the operational victory in conflict while contributing to the political victory. This requires a clear understanding of the challenges he faces in the future operational environment described earlier, the ability to leverage the six building blocks that form the foundation for combat operations, and apply a set of eleven guiding principles that influence his decision process and subsequent actions in the conduct of major combat operations.

3.B Foundations for Major Combat Operations.

Credible military strength deters potential adversaries. The US military must remain prepared to demonstrate the resolve of the US government and its commitment over time in order to reap the benefits in conflict. The US military no longer has a "grace" period while transitioning to war, no "time-out" for the military to catch up, and absolutely no reprieve for lack of strategic- and operational-level preparedness. Given this unforgiving "compression of time" that affects future US force projection and operations, the US military prepares by focusing on seven core building blocks that form the foundations for US success in future major combat operations:

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1. Fight with a warrior's ethos.
2. Use a coherent joint force that decides and acts based upon pervasive knowledge.
3. Develop resourceful leaders.
4. Train under the right conditions.
5. Field capabilities to maintain adaptive force dominance.
6. Uphold the values of American democracy.
7. Conduct routine Operations to Gain and Maintain Operational Access.

3.B.1 Fight with a Warrior's Ethos.

- Focus on fighting on a day-to-day basis.
- Create unit cohesion. Technology does not fight, people **do.**
- Instill in the individual a desire to: win, overcome obstacles, and solve problems.
- Reward aggressive action.
- Inspire everyone to believe they are warriors and that every team is a team of warriors.

Warfare routinely puts property, lives, and entire nations at **risk.** Those who undertake it have a grave responsibility to themselves, their comrades-in-arms, their commands, their Services, and their country. Because of this, it demands ultimate commitment on the **part** of warfighters. Pursuing warfighting as a job, or even as a career, is not sufficient to do it justice. It must be understood to be a true profession and a way of life. Any other approach to warfighting is unfair to the warfighter and all who rely upon **him,** with potentially deadly consequences.

The commitment of the warfighter to his profession requires discipline and sacrifice beyond that of ordinary professions. The warfighter must be prepared to endure extreme hardship in the performance of his duty, In order to be able to do these things when circumstances warrant, it is necessary to be always mindful of the need to prepare to do so. This requires an extraordinary focus on the essential elements of warfighting, which

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in turn must be based on the internalization within each warfighter of a peculiar "Warrior Ethos" — a set of values or guiding beliefs.

To be effective in the face of the stresses of war, this ethos must include an emphasis on the values essential to success in warfighting. A representative list of such values would include: Honor and Integrity-doing what is right, ethically, morally, and legally; Courage—overcoming fear, danger, or adversity, both physical and moral; Commitment and Selfless Service — putting the welfare of the nation, the combined force, and your subordinates before your own; Loyalty — bearing true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the combined force, and other warfighters; Duty — fulfillment of obligations and acceptance of responsibility for your own actions and those entrusted to your care; Respect — how we treat others reflects upon each of us and all of us; and Excellence — achievement and maintenance of the highest possible standards of performance. These values form the foundation of leadership and the basis for teamwork and unity of action. These values must guide and mold the warfighter at every level and echelon - tactical, operational, and strategic?'

The warfighters, guided by a genuine warrior ethos, will dedicate their lives to constant study and practice of the skills necessary to wage war. In this way, they will prepare themselves to perform to the highest possible level when the country calls. To the degree that the combined force is manned by such warfighters, it will have maximized its human potential, and greatly enhanced its warfighting power.

3.B.2 Use a coherent joint force that decides and acts based upon pervasive knowledge.

- Develop joint interdependence among service capabilities and associated force structures.
- Employ a network centric method to collect, fuse, analyze then provide access to information supporting leader decision requirements.

[1] This **list of values is representative, not definitive or exhaustive. It is an amalgamation of the core values of each of the Services of the US Armed Forces, as contained in their respective publications.**

- Employ a joint military/interagency decision-making process that uses a collaborative information environment and functions with coalition partners.
- Translate pervasive knowledge and predictive analysis into anticipatory decisions and precise actions to achieve desired effects in a military, interagency, and multinational environment.

The network tools of the information age allow a degree in interdependence among service forces that had always been desired but had never been achievable. Interdependence, to be sure, relies upon technical connectivity that maximizes machine-to-machine interface when and how that makes sense, but even more importantly it relies upon breaking down long-developed cultural positions and barriers. As we work to solve technical problems surrounding an interdependent force, we must also use our training and leader development venues to create a new, coherently joint culture.

Core to this new joint culture is the understanding and implementation of proper supporting and supported relationships among military and interagency partners. Proper supporting and supported relationships in the 2015 and beyond environment require an expansion first of our understanding of "forces," "maneuver," and "engagement." Where these terms had referred only to military organizations, they now must apply to other elements of governmental action and national power. The second expansion concerns the dynamic aspect of supporting and supported relationships. Such relationships are not fixed. They are dynamic, and their dynamism results from changes in the battle space. A third expansion involves acknowledging that a fully networked coherently joint force can be developed in ways different from the past. In the past, commanders have dealt with the uncertainties and vagrancies of war by owning all they might need. A networked and interdependent force can deal with uncertainty and vagrancies through access to capabilities they do not own. This concept envisions a new ownership-to-access balance and sees greater interdependencies among elements of the force. The joint interdependence envisioned in this concept is the key to creating a more coherent warfighting force. Joint interdependency is more than a technical solution; it requires the breaking down of long developed cultural positions and barriers. It is developing and clearly understanding the capabilities the joint force requires and how we can maximize

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combat power and effectiveness with a given force available. This is not to say we move the joint force to a "sole" provider for each capability but instead that we balance our capabilities and core expertise to build a more coherent force.

For a coherent joint force working in a changing battle space, early understanding of potential threats rises in importance. "Understanding" in this context is more than data or information; it is pervasive knowledge. Being able to discern the precise action to take rests upon the ability to understand—not only empirically but also culturally—the nuances of that situation.

Early detection and understanding of an adversary's actions intended to challenge our interests gives us the time to take preventative actions. In many cases, pervasive knowledge will lead to predictive analysis and anticipatory action. Early understanding provides us with opportunities before an adversary takes action that may be lost after he takes it. Preventative action often succeeds using lower amounts or "softer" types of power than that which become necessary after an adversary acts.

Thus the understanding capability we seek is extensive. It is both technical and human. It is part of a multinational, interagency, government and nongovemment system of sensors and analysts. It is, furthermore, equally capable of providing us the intelligence we need regardless of weather conditions, terrain, or social-political conditions in which we must collect the raw information. We will need this capability in cities, jungles, and mountains as well as in open and rolling terrain.

A pervasive knowledge capability is the first step in creating the sense of futility and impunity in the mind of our adversary. This begins with predictive analysis long before hostilities begin. The ability to predict, to understand intention based on patterns, observed behavior, written or observed doctrine, and basic battlespace forensics - all require a change in our habits concerning the distribution of peacetime ISR assets. ISR must relentlessly focus on the most serious emerging threats worldwide with increased concentration as hostilities evolve, Thus, when hostilities begin ISR will have produced the advantage of knowledge through prediction rather than having to develop knowledge through pure discovery in the course of battle or hostilities. This pervasive knowledge system creates the impression that we can "observe" even an adversary's very intent. The adversary, aware of this system, is constantly looking over his shoulder, sure he is

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being watched, followed, tracked, and heard. This is not to say that we will be all knowing. The complexity of warfare will still involve uncertainty and conditions where we will have to fight with incomplete information. Therefore, we must be confident in how we are organized, trained, and equipped for adaptability and leverage intuition, experience, and our joint and expeditionary mindset to accomplish the assigned mission.

Our pervasive knowledge capability forms the core of all other capabilities, for it provides the knowledge base from which decisions are made and actions taken. Our ability to see and understand first enables us to decide and act first. We translate that potential capability into actual, when we create a joint, interagency decision-making and action-taking methodology. Unity of purpose and coherency of action among military and interagency partners can **only** result from recognition of a common set of desired effects; a common approach to problem solving, deciding, and acting; and an extensive collaborative environment in which all think and work.

Rapid, decentralized decisions, based upon high-quality, near-real time understanding, and executed quickly and precisely—all contribute to the adversary's sense of futility and perception of impunity. When a coherent joint force and their interagency and multinational partners can see and understand with equal clarity, they increase the probability of taking away just those options the adversary seeks while retaining freedom of action for themselves. Such decisions and actions not only need a specific kind of culture, but also the right set of open-architecture, collaborative tools.

3.B.3 Develop Resourceful Leaders.

- Use training as a leader development venue.
- Develop operational *art* explicitly.
- Identify future joint and service leader competencies and design appropriate training and education programs.

Although centralization best accommodates some aspects of joint military activity, the reliance on decentralized decision-making, shared understanding throughout the force, and decentralized execution expands in importance. The need for decentralization

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demands that our leaders be developed to anticipate and to adapt. Understanding and operating within the commander's intent are central to leader development. Leader flexibility, creativity, and resourcefulness are rewarded. Building trust, confidence, shared identity and understanding is nurtured between and among leaders in **all** components and agencies: active and reserve, and at all levels of command and staff along with their interagency, contractor, and coalition counterparts.

Leaders are developed to not only master their own specialties, but also to have **an** understanding of the capabilities and limitations of joint, interagency and coalition partners. Future joint leaders must possess technical and tactical expertise and be able to think on the move, adapting to an ever-changing situation. Leaders at ail levels are skilled at communicating, thinking flexibly, empowering others, and providing feedback during the ebb and flow of battle. If the future joint force had the luxury of working together as a team well in advance of a crisis, then leaders could learn command techniques and teamwork at their leisure. The challenge, however, is to practice effective command with quickly formed teams comprising sub-elements from throughout the joint force. The future force practices adaptive command and teamwork among soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who may have never met prior to battle. This team is able to wade into a complex, uncertain environment and prevail against a competent enemy.

3.B.4 Train Under the Right Conditions.

- Replicate operational level conditions in joint and Service exercises.
- Joint Task Force Headquarters **AND** subordinate elements—joint organize, train, and equip.
- Include Interagency and Multinational elements.

First battles and their consequences do matter. There may be no second chance for the **US** in major combat. The extension and melding of our Services' training competencies contribute to joint warfighting synergies. Joint training should strengthen joint, inter-agency, and multinational operations by preparing forces for new warfighting concepts. Force readiness improves by aligning joint education and training capabilities and

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resources with Combatant Command needs. Individuals and organizations are developed that intuitively think jointly. Individuals, staffs, and organizations improvise and adapt to crises. Unity of effort and coherency in action ensue from a diversity of means.

Achieving this level of joint training rests on joint knowledge development and distribution, joint national training, and joint assessment and enablers. Joint knowledge development and distribution prepare future leaders to respond innovatively to enemies through a global knowledge network providing immediate access to joint education and training resources.

Joint national training prepares forces by providing commands, staffs, and units with an integrated, live, virtual, and constructive training environment in a joint, interagency, and multinational context. This allows global training and mission rehearsal in support of specific operational needs. Joint assessment and enablers assist leaders in sensing the value of initiatives on individuals, organizations, and processes required to meet validated Combatant Command needs. This also yields support tools and processes that enhance both joint knowledge development and joint national training.

Creating training opportunities and effective operational relationships between the **US** military, members of the interagency community, multinational partners, and multilateral participants expands our leaders' knowledge and experience. Core competencies, capabilities, and processes are examined to determine utility in major combat. This regular exposure contributes to building trust, confidence, and shared understanding among the participants. This, in turn, contributes to more effective use of all instruments of government action as well as making well-informed decisions faster.

Training, education, and leader development must be geared to stimulating emergent qualities, notably synergy, adaptability, and opportunism. Training forces to accept willingly and to cope successfully with uncertainty, **risk,** change, friction, chaos, and the fog of war is critical to our emerging warfighting culture. Learning organizations emerge that adapt rapidly and willingly to war's uncertainties.

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3.B.5 Field Capabilities to Maintain Adaptive Force Dominance.

- Create proper active component reserve component force mix.
- Identify necessary standing joint organizations.
- Determine proper methods for routine "dynamic tasking."
- Maintain Service collective, unit competencies.

America's armed forces need to field capabilities designed with the inherent operational and tactical flexibility to defeat highly adaptive adversaries. As potential enemies strike out in new military directions, their employment options expand commensurately. Among the areas in which novel approaches are especially attractive and within the reach even of second and third tier militaries are distributed command and control, cooperative engagement from standoff, layered air defense, information operations, and the exploitation of commercial space–based communications and sensor systems. At the same time, the explosion in information technologies is a potent enabler of aspiring military forces, including transnational terrorist groups and criminal organizations such as drug cartels and Mafias. Unconstrained by legal or bureaucratic obstacles, such groups may have even greater freedom to experiment with emerging technologies than do most military organizations. Such an adversary may opt to use weapons of mass destruction to further his cause.

History has shown that any preconceived assumptions about the tactical and operational behavior of potential adversaries, especially smaller adversaries, are very likely to prove wrong in some degree—even where an adversary's prewar behavior can be observed. Moreover, it is likely to change significantly once battle is joined and the longer hostilities persist the more frequently it is likely to change. To cope with that challenge, future forces require adaptive dominance—the ability to rapidly, and without major reorganization, adapt to changing enemy patterns of operation faster than the enemy himself can exploit them. Meanwhile, our own operations must be so rapid and disorienting that an enemy's adaptation to them is belated and ineffective.

Adaptive force dominance is a product of military culture, fostered or inhibited by training, leadership, and other factors. It also presumes a versatile and robust force

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design that incorporates such qualities as rapid situational awareness, organizational modularity, ground and air mobility, close synchronization of fires with maneuver, and effective integration of deployment, employment, and sustainment. A rapidly deployable, immediately employable, lethal, versatile, and robust force that is capable of winning decisively in major combat serves not only to help dominate the adversary in conflict but also serves foremost as a deterrent to any potential aggressor.

3.B.6 Uphold the Values of American Democracy.

- Meet our moral obligation to uphold the US Constitution.
- Value human dignity.
- Use force with proportionality and discrimination.

In the employment of military power, the American warfighter has the moral obligation to uphold the Constitution and values upon which our country was founded and operates. As instruments of the people, the Armed Forces of the United States are accountable to those people through their duly elected and appointed civilian leaders.

Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of control that favors human freedom for every person in every society. We stand firmly for human dignity and its nonnegotiable demands: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.

The complex and often ambiguous nature of the 21st-century adversary complicates our ability to wage war in accordance with the law of armed conflict. Nevertheless, we vigorously adhere to the fundamental principles of humanity and discriminate use of force by distinguishing between civilians and combatants. We also avoid unnecessary harm to the adversary, civilians, civilian objects and the environment by weighing the potential military advantage realized against potential casualties and collateral damage in

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an attempt to limit the devastating effects of war. We maintain the moral high ground against our enemies, even when they resort to terrorism and other dubious tactics.

As professionals in arms, we embrace and defend those inalienable rights invoked in the Declaration of Independence, embodied in the Constitution, and cherished by the American people.

3.B.7 Conduct routine Operations to Gain and Maintain Operational Access.

- Establish a set of basing options (permanent and situational).
- Exploit interagency and coalition partnerships to guarantee basing and isolate the adversary diplomatically.
- Identify proper mix of CONUS based, forward deployed, prepositioned equipment, and rotational capabilities.
- Develop joint assured access capabilities to include expeditionary forcible entry[22].
- Develop lift capabilities that facilitate maneuver from strategic and operational distances.
- Create modular forces that require little or no reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

Assuring access through forcible entry and rapid force projection combine to expand our MCO options while limiting enemy options to inflict damage on US forces, coalition partners, and the civilian populace in harm's way. Because the US does not know when and where the next major fight may occur, our military needs a comprehensive basing strategy with a menu of options to assure global reach and access. Furthermore, most major combat operation cases will require a forcible entry operation or set of operations to set the right conditions for major combat. A complete description of forcible entry operations is contained in a separate concept, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

The US must have strategic and operational capabilities along with the flexibility and agility to counter anti-access threats and area denial strategies by various means to ensure

[22] See Joint Forcible Entry Operations Concept

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the use of needed lines of communication and infrastructure. Forward stationing and the forward-presence of US forces reassure friends and allies, and tend to dissuade potential adversaries. Also, these forward-deployed forces are potentially the first responders to counter anti-access and area denial strategies. Implementing a combination of flexible deterrent options potentially deters further aggressive acts by an adversary. Additionally, the proper mix of forces, the appropriate forcible entry as well as air and sea lift capabilities to maneuver from strategic distances and deliver forces where the adversary does not expect, reengineered mobilization processes, and the concept of modular force packaging requiring less reception, staging, onward movement, and integration —all enhance our strategic agility and deal with the anti-access challenges.

Different regions have different geo-political, ethnic and religious underpinnings that will influence chosen deterrent options. In some instances, the best course of action for the **US** will be to monitor from afar or covertly instead of maintaining an overt military presence.

US and coalition partners gain access into a joint operations area fiom all dimensions, including space and cyberspace. This access contributes to the Commander's freedom of action to seek positional advantage through rapid maneuver and engagement[23] in pursuit of his objectives. Key to providing access is the development of the requisite forcible entry capabilities combined with lift capabilities that facilitate maneuver fiom strategic and operational distances and delivers forces where the adversary does not expect. Additionally, creating modular forces that require little or no reception, staging, onward movement, and integration provides the foundation for conducting forcible entry operations when required. Further, the right **mix** of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities is employed to thwart the enemy's anti-access and area denial strategies. Coherent involvement of the interagency and coalition communities and other organizations creates powerful partnerships. This coherent application of all instruments of national and multinational power contributes to isolating the enemy diplomatically as

[23] Working definition: Engagement is the imposition of friendly combat power upon the enemy. Force application expands the view of how the enemy forces can be affected beyond the traditional use of lethal fires. Engagements on future battlefields must capitalize on the synergies of timely and effective use of kinetic and nonkinetic weapons to create lethal.as well as nonlethal effects.

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well as convincing third parties to remain neutral and uninvolved or taking positions favorable to our interests.

3.C How the Joint Force Fights: Eleven Execution Principles. Every major combat fight will be different. The following principles, however, capture what will be common to every major combat operation. These principles are not intended to be prescriptive or to limit the individual commander in the way he wages war. The principles capture both continuity and change in that they adhere to classical principles of military art while melding these principles with those found in cutting edge military, complexity, chaos, and productivity theories. The following eleven Guiding Principles of Major Combat Operations provide a set of tools to help shape commander's thoughts, decision process, and actions. The principles are meant to guide commanders as they plan and prepare to conduct major combat operations and deploy, employ, and sustain the joint force during the conduct of major combat operations. The proposed principles for Operational Commanders to consider and implement are:

1. Start with the strategic purpose in mind.
2. Achieve decisive outcomes and conclusions.
3. Employ a knowledge-enhanced, effects-based approach.
4. Employ a joint, interagency and multinational force with collaborative processes.
5. Use mission orders throughout the chain of command.
6. Gain and maintain operational access.
7. Engage the adversary comprehensively.
8. Generate relentless pressure by deciding and acting distributively.
9. Achieve coherency of action.
10. Align deployment, employment, and sustainment activities.
11. Protect people, facilities, and equipment throughout the battlespace.

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3.C.1 *Start with the Strategic Purpose in Mind.*

- Derive intent from assigned strategic aims.
- Convey intent with clarity and simplicity to achieve unity of purpose and coherency of action.
- Disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy the enemy's combat capability as a means to achieve decisive conclusions in post-combat operations.
- Harmonize combat with other elements of government action.

Action begins with a vision of the desired outcome. A policy-maker envisions first a desired political outcome, then considers the ways and means necessary to achieve it, and finally sets about taking action according to that strategic purpose. At every subsequent military planning step, the strategic purpose must be the focus **of** effort. In linking the necessary actions (or tasks), necessary ways and means (effects and resources), and the desired end state, the principle of simplicity should always be observed. The simpler the plans and relationships are, the easier it will be to implement and maintain them.

The formation and conveyance of the overarching strategic purpose take place at every level of the chain of command, throughout the combined force. At each level, the intent of higher levels guides the formation of intent tailored to the level in question. This chain reaches from the Commander in Chief to the lowest ranking warfighter in the field. In this way, the appreciation of intent is embedded in all actions taken by the combined force, and is made universal throughout the battlespace.

The process of developing commander's intent begins with the President **of** the United States or the Secretary of Defense envisioning the strategic purpose of the action, determining the means necessary to achieve it, and assigning the responsibility **for** those means, as a mission, to **an** appropriate Combatant Commander. Effects to achieve this desired political outcome would likely continue well past the conclusion of major combat operations. Achieving the political end state relies upon all relevant instruments of government action: diplomatic coercion, public diplomacy, information operations, military force, law enforcement, economic assistance, etc. The commander then develops his statement of intent in terms of a desired operational end state for the military

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campaign. This intent is translated into desired effects that are expected to satisfy the purpose. The commander's intent also incorporates supporting and supported relationships among all available elements of power. Subordinate commanders then use this process to develop their own "nested" intent, compatible with and supportive of higher-level intent. This process continues down to the lowest practical levels.

At every level, it must be understood that warfighting is but one instrument of national policy used in concert with others to achieve national aims. Achieving those aims decisively generally lies beyond the scope and duration of combat operations alone. Universal understanding of the desired political end and maintenance of focus on it at every level by both military and civilian officials are therefore the keys to achieving coherence throughout the entire operation.

3.C.2 Achieve Decisive Outcomes and Conclusions.[24]

- Achieve strategic aims: Win at the tactical level *to* set the conditions for winning at the operational level.
- Disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy the enemy fighting capabilities and will.
- Use decisive defeat of enemy combat forces as a means to achieve decisive conclusion to war.

All actions commanders take in the conduct of major combat operations must be focused on achieving a decisive conclusion to the war, Winning in combat does not necessarily equal winning the war. Successfully imposing our will on an adversary whose behavior brought us to engage him in combat operations may very well rest upon what we do after we have forcefully and successfully engaged an adversary's ability to resist. All of our actions must aim to decrease our adversary's will and increase our ability to exert our own will. Decisive conclusions result from the achievement of all the strategic objectives or goals—the desired strategic aim. The military, diplomatic,

[24] Working definition --Decisive conclusions in this context refer to the "achievement of the strategic purpose (desired political end) as rapidly as possible with the least cost of life and national treasure."

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information and economic elements of national and multinational power contribute to achieving our strategic objectives that create and maintain the desired end state.

While achieving military objectives alone will not necessarily lead to a decisive conclusion, it is a ***sine qua non*** of the desired end state. The strategic military objectives are achieved through operational and tactical level actions focused on achieving decisive outcomes and conclusions. These actions coherently apply all the capabilities of the joint, multinational and interagency forces, nuclear or conventional, lethal or nonlethal, to disintegrate, disorient, dislocate or destroy the opponent. Similarly, it is the combination, of combat and stability operations that ensures all required strategic objectives have been met. Tactical level actions in each of these type operations are undertaken with the purpose of directly contributing to operational or strategic objectives. The coherent application of military and nonmilitary capabilities, involving all instruments of national, multinational and nongovernmental power, combines to decisively conclude the war.

3.C.3 Employ a Knowledge-Enhanced, Effects-Based Approach.

- Achieve pervasive knowledge that translates into increased precision and decisiveness of action.
- Link tactical actions to operational and strategic aims.
- Avoid drawn out attrition-based campaigns and operations; focus on effects relative to enemy centers of gravity, decisive points, and other critical areas, organizations, and activities.
- Adapt: Change tasks when needed to achieve desired effects.

One of the main focuses for all operations concerns having the effects on the enemy that the commander desires. These effects, individually or collectively, result in the enemy's disintegration, disorientation, dislocation, or destruction. Effects can be lethal or nonlethal. Effects can be generated by military forces or nonmilitary organizations. They can be generated by kinetic or nonkinetic means.

The effects-based approach also enhances the effectiveness of warfighting organizations by highlighting the importance of commander's intent. Commanders and

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decision-makers at every level must determine how their organization, military and not, can best contribute to the realization of the overall intent at their level. An effects-based approach links specified tasks to necessary effects to desired end states, while preserving the freedom of decision-makers to determine the best means of achieving the necessary effect, to include the freedom, within specified limits, to change tasking. An effects-based approach leverages mutual trust and confidence and high levels of dedication, initiative, training, and competence. It also leverages organizational and procedural structures that encourage autonomy and decentralized decision and action in support of unified purpose in order to realize the full creativity and energy resident throughout the chain of command.

The effects-based approach, by focusing on intent, relies on the initiative, will and creativity of decision-makers to improvise and change these assigned tasks as needed in order to achieve desired results. An effects-based approach requires a great deal of intrinsic motivation, personal character that permits decision-making, a high degree of training, and a high level of trust up, down, and across the chain of command.

The effects-based approach serves as the framework for campaign design and reflects an appreciation of the complex web of interdependent relationships within and between the adversary, the battlespace, and ourselves. The term effects-based approach describes a way of thinking about and solving military problems and incorporates effects-based thinking, processes, operations, and targeting. Whenever possible, the effects-based approach attempts to avoid a long drawn out attrition based campaign, but should such a campaign be required, the effects-based approach still applies. It is a method that starts with the identification of higher purpose, centers of gravity, and decisive points. The effects-based approach then works downward to identify subordinate purposes and the effects necessary to achieve them. The effects themselves are understood to be physical or behavioral outcomes that result from a friendly action or set of actions. The desired effects are conveyed downward through the chain of command to provide guidance and establish both unity of purpose and coherency of action. It may, at times, be advantageous to specify guiding tasks as means of achieving desired effects, but this must always be balanced by the commander with his perception of the need of subordinate units for autonomy in order to best realize his intent. The effects-based approach is a

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commander-centric method because it encourages commanders at every level to exercise initiative by constantly looking for ways to support higher-level intent by contributing to the achievement of specified effects. Lateral transmission to adjacent units, or to interagency or coalition forces may also be appropriate. At every level, the focus remains on the achievement of specified effects, rather than tasks.

3.C.4 Employ a Joint, Interagency and Multinational Force with Collaborative Processes.

- Include interagency and multinational partners in collaborative planning and execution processes.
- Create an appropriate information-sharing environment with all partners.

Collaboration strengthens the degree to which joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities can be applied in a coherent manner to bring about the desired conditions for successful operations.

Proper collaboration increases the thoroughness of decisions, precision of actions, and the speed of adaptation within a joint force. Proper collaboration also contributes to unity of purpose and coherency of action, especially if all partners in an operation—military as well as non military—participate in the collaboration.

Collaboration simply entails working together to formulate plans, develop and analyze alterations, decisions, direct actions, assess effectiveness of those actions, then adapt accordingly. Information age networked tools have begun to redefine "working together."

In a distributed network, time and space shrink. Many more activities can be executed "now" when they are networked. In a networked environment functions can occur simultaneously both vertically and horizontally among organizations. For example, collaborative planning for an operation can include senior and subordinate leaders and their staffs, as well as interagency leaders and staffs and coalition leaders and their staffs. Furthermore, this collaboration can take place simultaneously either as a whole or in parts, usually organized along functions.

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"Physical space" also shrinks in a distributed network. "Reachback," as well as, "Forward and Rear" as concepts become irrelevant in a network environment. Simply put: everyone on the network is "here" for all practical purposes.

Certainly, operating in this kind of distributive, collaborative network takes some getting used to. Certainly such operations require extensive information sharing protocols, cultural change, and lots of practice. Equally certain, however, is this: the power of collaboration is undeniable.

3.C.5 Use Mission Orders Throughout the Chain of Command.

- Focus mission orders on effects to be achieved.
- Nest orders, disseminate them vertically and horizontally, and facilitate collaboration and decentralization.

The key to implementing an effects-based approach is commander's intent, conveyed through mission orders. Commander's intent is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the effects necessary to achieve it. It should always be crafted primarily with reference to the effect that it is intended to have on the adversary, which is a change from current practices that focus on accomplishment of friendly tasks. It must be "nested'—incorporating and promoting the satisfaction of higher headquarters intent, be clear and compelling, and should be disseminated and understood vertically and horizontally, in order to foster maximum cooperation in every direction. The commander'sdesired effects must be clearly understood and should encourage autonomy and freedom of action of subordinates to collaborate, innovate, adapt, and exploit opportunities at all levels, across the combined force, within the bounds of his intent.

Mission orders are the means of conveying commander's intent. While mission orders have no set format; in general, a joint force commander's mission order contains:

- His intent (defined in terms of the effect the commander wants to achieve relative to his enemy),
- Mission,
- Supporting and supported relationships and any constraints or limitations.

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Desired end states, and the effects necessary to achieve them, tend to stay fixed; but supporting **tasks** are subject to dynamic change. It is the emphasis on intent that allows decision-makers to innovate and adapt to dynamic circumstances as prescriptive tasks are overtaken by events. The focus on intent fosters a shared frame of reference promoting a common understanding. The scope of this understanding, and collaboration based upon it, should encompass all participants, including U.S. civilian agencies and coalition partners.

Mission orders facilitate collaboration and decentralization through empowerment. Shared understanding and creativity mean little if the command system does not allow for the exercise of appropriate authority at every level. Such empowerment results in a proliferation of decision-makers, a compressed decision cycle, and greater self-optimization. This does not mean that commanders must employ only decentralized command and control; rather, a balanced approach, allowing for centralization or decentralization as required, is needed. The level of decision-making must adapt to the mission, the terrain, the information flow, and the enemy situation on a continuous basis. Decentralized command and control cannot succeed without empowerment of competent, trusted, and trusting subordinates. Mission orders are the means of doing that.

3.C.6 Gain and Maintain Operational Access.[25]

- Establish necessary control of air, sea, space and cyberspace required to gain operational access.
- Use forcible entry operations when required.
- Use speed to thwart enemy efforts to establish operational exclusion zones.
- Overwhelm the enemy through simultaneous and sequential employment of rapid maneuver and precision engagement capabilities.
- Swiftly introduce fully capable and immediately employable forces to set the conditions for rapid transition to follow-on operations.
- Directly deliver tailored mission capability packages through a combination of strategic and intratheater lift, and self-deployment.

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[25] For additional detail refer to the Joint Forcible Entry Operations Integrating Concept.

Both before conflict erupts and once it becomes apparent that external intervention is likely, an adversary's first objective will be to use all the means at his disposal to deny intervening forces easy access to the theater. Where possible, he will seek to deter intervention altogether by means ranging from diplomacy to the threat of action against the U.S. and its allies, including threats to their respective homelands. At the same time, he will seek through a combination of persuasion, bribes, and other forms of intimidation to deprive the U.S. of regional allies, and thus of access to local territory, airspace, and port facilities.

A complete description of how the joint force sets the conditions for and conducts forcible entry, as well as how forcible entry forces support follow-on operations can be found in the joint forcible entry concept. That concept describes, in detail, how the joint force sets the initial conditions for, then uses speed, stealth, stand-off, and precision to force its way through the anti-access exclusion zone, defeat the adversary's area denial forces, and achieve the desired effects. The concept also describes the force packages that will normally accompany joint forces maneuvering from operational and strategic distances into areas lightly defended, or not defended at all. Operational access includes necessary control of air, sea, space and cyberspace required to deliver forcible entry and mission capability packages. Finally, the concept describes the continuous forcible entry operations required to sustain distributed operations and prevent our adversary from **re-**establishing their exclusion zones and area denial operations.

Adversaries employ anti-access and area denial capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, undersea minefields and salvoes of anti-ship missiles, unconventional forces, integrated air defense systems, strike aircraft, terrorism and weapons of mass effects. Conceivably, the anti-access threat facing US and coalition forces actually begins at our home stations and ports of embarkation. Area denial capabilities also include information warfare, to include deception, and space-based platform degradation. In conjunction with these efforts, the enemy may attempt to establish and enforce an operational exclusion zone encompassing areas within his reach. In this zone he may target our forces and their deployment entry points, lodgments, staging and air bases, logistical support systems, and maritime operating areas.

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Throughout, the enemy understands and applies the same synergy and simultaneity on which US operations are based, confronting the **US** with multiple and diverse threats, **any** one of which, if left unattended, potentially unhinges US and coalition operations.

To gain access in this kind of anti-access and area denial environment involves coordinating and executing difficult and complex sets of activities. The joint force commander must employ tailored capabilities-based forces to enter forcibly at multiple points of entry. The goal is to alter initial conditions and set future conditions as quickly as possible, through multiple avenues for rapid transition to follow-on operations. These entry forces are organized and employed to achieve their objectives within acceptable risk levels.[26] Direct delivery of these mission capability packages occurs by a combination of strategic and intratheater lift and self-deployment to gain and maintain access. In most cases, delivery of such mission capability packages will have to follow forcible entry operations, which set the conditions for successful combat operations. In either case, the enemy is subjected to and overwhelmed by the simultaneous employment of rapid maneuver and precision engagement capabilities.

While not a complete set of required capabilities, some examples include: special operations, predictive **ISR,** information operations to include deception, highly mobile air-mechanized assault forces, offshore naval fires, long-range precision bombing, and close air support. Additionally, dynamic, effects-based and knowledge-enhanced planning and execution contribute to quickly achieving assured access and force application as well as rapidly attaining the desired effects. **A** holistic force protection scheme must exist prior to, during, and following operations designed to gain and maintain access. There is less reliance on fixed airfields and seaports for initial entry operations. Forcible entry and initial follow-on forces require less reception, staging, onward movement, and integration activities. The entry force requires less of a logistics footprint since the units are self-sustaining for specified periods of time, and supported by a dynamic distribution network. The key aim is the swift introduction of fully capable and "immediately employable" forces into a battlespace in order to set the conditions for rapid transition to follow-on operations and quickly attain the desired effects.

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26 A complete description of forcible entry operations can be found in a separate concept.

Operations to gain and maintain access set all of the conditions required for forcible entry. To gain and maintain access, the joint force commander must establish early, sustained control of physical (air, land, sea, space) and information domains, optimize joint synergy, and focus combat power against those objectives that will have the most significant and enduring effect on the enemy's powers of resistance. Establishment of these conditions begins prior to the conduct of forcible entry operations. When the situation permits simultaneous operations, then the establishment of these conditions could begin at the same time, or just in advance of forcible entry operations. The neutralization of threats to access, such as ballistic missiles, sea mines, SAMs, and adversary air necessary to begin or continue forcible entry operations, will employ the components in a fully integrated joint operation. Furthermore, the joint force commander must sustain these conditions during the introduction of and in support of follow-on force packages. As described more fully in the Joint Forcible Entry Concept, gaining and maintaining access is not a "one time affair." Rather, in the robust anti-access exclusion zone that potential adversaries may construct, gaining and maintaining access is a continuous operation.

3.C.7 Engage the Adversary Comprehensively.

- Apply force along multiple axes simultaneously or sequentially, as appropriate, and decisively against critical objectives: enemy forces, Command and Control, Communications and Computer networks, as well as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets.
- Present asynchronous picture to the enemy without losing unity of purpose and coherency of action.

Operations should maneuver against and engage critical objectives, identified as centers of gravity and decisive points, throughout the enemy's area of operations along multiple separate air and ground axes. Such operations require early, multi-dimensional integration of precision fires, maneuver, and tactical assault to disrupt or destroy an enemy's ability to respond, fracture the operational integrity of enemy forces, sever

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enemy sensor–to–shooter links, deprive him of freedom of maneuver and mutual support, destroy selected forces and isolate the remainder from sustainment or reinforcement. Additionally, when quick decision **is** not achieved, the joint force must possess the durability to continue operations for as long as necessary. Forces committed must have the inherent ability to ramp up or down smoothly both in scale and intensity of operation.

The picture our operation should paint in the enemy's mind is an asynchronous one. While our operations must retain unity of purpose and coherency of action, our unity and coherency should not be recognizable from the enemy's perspective. To him, we should be "patternless," thus diminishing his ability to react effectively.

3.C.8 Generate Relentless Pressure by Deciding and Acting Distributively.

- Present adversary with multiple *dilemmas* and create a sense of futility.
- Go for the **jugular** and don't let up.
- Apply strength to create and exploit enemy weaknesses.
- Act distributively.

At the strategic, operational, and tactical level we seek a degree of relentlessness in the pace of our operations that yields no unintended pauses to our adversary. This degree of relentlessness can be achieved only through unity of purpose and coherency in action involving all instruments of government action, both military **and** nonmilitary, including actions taken by coalition partners. Whether our actions are taken simultaneously or sequentially or by some combination is situation dependent. The joint force initiates action on its own terms whenever possible to alter initial conditions and set conditions for future operations. The point is to create relentless pressure—strategic, operational, and tactical—as viewed **and** felt from the adversary's perspective. By deciding and acting distributively we generate constant pressure on the adversary's system and create multiple dilemmas for him. One of the results is an adversary who has a sense of "being overwhelmed." Friendly actions will be conducted *sequentially* and *simultaneously*, but to the adversary "everything is happening at once, from every direction, and in every dimension."

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Rapid, decentralized decisions based upon high-quality, near-real-time understanding, and executed coherently, quickly, and precisely—all contribute to the adversary's sense of futility and perception of our impunity. When joint military forces and their interagency and multinational partners can see and understand with equal clarity, adversary centers of gravity and decisive points can be identified. Once identified, they provide the means to achieve unity of purpose and coherency in action that increase the probability of taking away those options the adversary seeks while retaining freedom **of** action for themselves. Such decisions and actions not only need a specific kind **of** culture, but also the right set of open-architecture, collaborative tools.

Distributed operations vary in time, space, and purpose, i.e., simultaneous and sequential, multiple theaters, multiple locations within each theater, and multiple types of operations seeking multiple effects. Joint operations occurring simultaneously within the battlespace against multiple points of vulnerability provide increasing pressure on the adversary. At certain times and places distributed operations are characterized as noncontiguous and operating simultaneously with other physically separated units and areas of operations. At other times and places units will operate contiguously, more along recognized lines of operation, with more sequenced phases. **At** times capabilities are generated fiom fixed bases in the United States or abroad and along fixed lines of operation.

The forces involved all share several major characteristics. They are coherently joint, focused on achieving desired effects that lead to strategic objectives, and aimed at creating relentless pressure *on* the adversary. This involves attacking fiom multiple directions and dimensions, and with all instruments of national and multinational power. Forces combine and recombine as the situation changes. Each combination is tailored to achieve the desired effects within its own subordinate battlespace. Enemies who witness combined force operations of the future will not perceive a pattern or deduce a template. Instead, combined force operations appear patternless—even incoherent, except in the minds of the combined force leaders. This force has a shared understanding of both the enemy and the current situation, thus contributing to the continual fight for information superiority. They are capable of rapidly adapting their plans, decisions, and actions to achieve the desired effects. Distributed operations encompass all of these characteristics;

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distributing the right power, in the right manner, at the right place and time throughout the battlespace.

The net effect of creating relentless pressure by deciding and acting distributively increases the likelihood that the joint force will create three results. First, achieve a degree of pressure greater than the sum of its parts. Second, create in the minds of our adversary the clear understanding that defeat is inevitable, thus continued action is futile. Third, convince adversary leaders and actors at every level that we can act with impunity. From the perspective of an adversary, regardless of weapon used, tactic employed, action taken, he is constantly at the disadvantage. He is constantly faced with the insurmountable.

3.C.9 Achieve Coherency of Action.

- Generate complementary and reinforcing kinetic and nonkinetic actions taken by military and nonmilitary organizations to achieve the desired lethal and nonlethal effects.
- Exploit extensive connectivity and collaboration among all partners.
- Take the broadest view of engagement.
- Achieve "true" economy of power-every action contributes.

The art of war at the operational level rests on the commander's ability to realize the full potential of the joint, interagency, and coalition force by recognizing and leveraging the synergies available fiom combining the competencies and capabilities resident in each of these entities. A first step in achieving this synergy is to broaden the current common understandings of maneuver and engagement. The most common understanding of maneuver entails the movement of forces and the most common understanding of engagement involves the delivery of kinetic, lethal munitions by military units. To meet the challenges of the future, these narrow understandings must be expanded and made mutually inclusive.

We must create the capability of moving both military and nonmilitary instruments of government action to a location of positional or temporal advantage, thus expanding our

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understanding of "forces" and "maneuver." "Nonmilitary forces" such as diplomatic, economic, and informational power, for example, must be maneuverable in time and place against the adversary just as are those of the military. The combination of all instruments of government action creates a coherency of action that presents the enemy with multiple dilemmas, not only in the physical domain, but the information and his own cognitive domains. Maneuvering various types of forces of all elements of power—including our technical and human means of achieving understanding as well as our collaborative tool set—isolates and inhibits an adversary, thus limiting or eliminating his options. If he chooses to maneuver in kind, he becomes vulnerable to our engagement. If he chooses to stay in place, he is equally vulnerable. The sense of his futility and our impunity grows.

Our understanding of the term engagement must also expand. Engagements are not limited to kinetic and lethal attacks; they can be nonkinetic and nonlethal. Coherent economic actions, computer network attacks, as well as actions in the public diplomacy and public information realms represent nonkinetic and nonlethal engagements that, when coupled with kinetic and lethal military strikes, optimize the commander's ability to generate effects in the battlespace.

When correctly combined, maneuver and engagement—whether kinetic or not, lethal or not, military or not—can generate complementary and reinforcing effects on the adversary. They are complementary in that the effects may be multiplicative rather than additive; reinforcing in that each adds to the weight, and ultimately the effect, of the other. Even if not used, that they exist, that they are or could be in a position to engage whenever we want, and that they are aimed precisely because of information from the understanding base, that they are coming from so many directions—all contribute to the sense of futility within the minds of our adversary..

3.C.10 Align Deployment, Employment, and Sustainment Activities.

- Use a coherent mobilization and deployment sustainment system.
- Strategically deploy capabilities not commodities.

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- Reduce, and when required eliminate, reception, staging, onward movement and integration requirements.
- Avoid strategic or operational pause, except to achieve effect.

A profound shift in our warfighting concepts occurs when the US aligns and synchronizes deployment, employment, and sustainment activities to conduct multiple, simultaneous, distributed, decentralized battles and campaigns. A coherent mobilization, deployment, and sustainment set of systems that are as flexible and responsive as employment systems increases the strategic agility of the entire joint force. For example, employment options expand, allowing operational maneuver fiom strategic distances as well as from the sea, and tactical vertical maneuver from operational distances. A flexible, joint maritime basing option together with rapidly constructed expeditionary airfields and fixed bases offer a set of opportunities to rapidly project operationally significant air and ground forces directly into locations our enemy does not expect, thereby precluding a lengthy, transitional build-up period ashore. These employment options contribute to momentum that allows the aggressor no opportunity to adjust his plans, reconfigure his forces, or reconstitute damaged assets. To a considerable extent, these employment options are dependent upon the adequacy of strategic and theater lift, both air and maritime. To proceed without pause and without loss of tempo, all Services are required to reengineer their mobilization process and increase combat power output per unit of deployment. The end result is the ability to achieve and maintain adaptive force dominance.

Setting the conditions to employ a US-led combined force is essential. Here, pre-crisis preparations within the mobilization and military industrial bases, Services, Combatant Commands, and other supporting agencies are crucial. A unifying deployment and sustainment structure promotes force adaptability, flexibility, agility, endurance, protection, and mobility. The required deployment and sustainment enablers, both materiel and nonmateriel, are sufficient enough to allow rapid force projection and world-class provisioning.

Our deployers and sustainers are imbued with a warrior ethos. In a noncontiguous battlespace, they must be capable of defending themselves and not over-reliant upon

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traditional combat formations for security. An adaptive, ubiquitous sustainment system, along with the requisite informational architecture, exists so that few of our agile maneuver forces ever outrun or lose their ability to request and receive responsive, time-definite, sustainment support.

Rapid and global employment, mobility, endurance, and worldwide sustainment are future force hallmarks. Fully capable and immediately employable forces must be projected swiftly from the sea, from the air, over land, or by a combination thereof into a joint operations area that may have no developed infrastructure. Mobility contributes to strategic and operational reach as well as to improved protection. Endurance equates to staying power and the ability to withstand the rigors of a campaign. Sustainment and its dynamic distribution network assure unrivaled provisioning even when lines of communication are not secure, and during forcible-entry operations.

3.C.11 Protect People, Facilities and Equipment Throughout the Battlespace.

- Preserve our combat power.
- Protect the force comprehensively from homeland to points of employment.
- Prevent interruption of space and information systems.

With increased emphasis on rapid global force projection, it is vital that comprehensive protection of the joint force centers of gravity and decisive points is assured from locations of origin to points of employment. Non-peer adversaries will likely resort to asymmetric attacks at accessible locations that have been assessed as the most vulnerable of the probable staging, transit and beddown locations for **US** and friendly forces. Action may well be taken against the force through attacks on military families and friends, other civilians, food and water supplies, contracted commercial support, host nation support or other indirect means, all of which must be included within the scope of full-dimension protection.

A significant potential for such attacks on or near US soil exists because of fixed home stations, the relatively limited number of origin-to-port of embarkation combinations available for movement, and the open nature of US society. Protection of

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forces while in homeland areas, including the littoral, is largely the province of the Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept (JOC) but is critical to preserving the ability to project the force for major combat. The enemy may also attempt to attack our centers of gravity or decisive points such as the joint forces distributed operating bases and the extended lines of communication supporting the joint forces distributed operations.

A key component of protection is defense against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) attack, not only for casualty avoidance, but to limit the effect on our force access and speed of operations. **A** focused defense should require that only those units affected by the hazard take protective measures. Large numbers should not have to assume a full protective posture as a precautionary measure against a general CBRNE threat. This aspect of protection is a principal concern of the Strategic Deterrence JOC, and includes defense against weapons of mass destruction.

In order to protect friendly centers of gravity such as forces, facilities, and noncombatants from the threat of theater ballistic missiles, the US requires rapidly deployable, persistent, and multilayered missile defense capabilities, employable both in the continental United States and in operations abroad.

Force survivability is linked to its inherently offensive orientation, as well as its speed, lethality and ability to apply force from standoff distances. While speed of operations affords some degree of protection by presenting the enemy with a "moving target," the agile conduct of operations requires force enhancements that improve survivability during the intended mission. Distributed forces, including logistic support assets, are not generally afforded the luxury of dedicated accompanying defensive platforms or large-scale security forces. Defensive capability must therefore be organic and integrated at the unit of action level.

In order to prevail in the cognitive and information domains and effectively execute operational decisions, we must assure the fullest use of our information capabilities in the face of enemy attacks. This includes not only defense of our computer networks and decision-making infrastructures, but extends to defense of our space-based systems (including their ground components) upon which we rely heavily for intelligence, early warning, communications, environmental monitoring, and positional data.

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3.D Applying the Principles.

There is no single prescription or formula that operational commanders can call upon to effectively conduct major combat operations. Every conflict poses different challenges. Operational commanders must adapt to the conditions present and employ the force according to their judgment in order to achieve operational and strategic aims. The following three figures therefore, are illustrative of potential major combat operations, from long campaigns to discreet operations. The details of the application of the elements depicted will necessarily vary according to the circumstances.



Figure 2

The extended campaign, illustrated in Figure 2 above, involves multiple operations conducted over time to decisively defeat a robust enemy. Escalation to this type of major combat will likely follow a failure of crisis response measures to deter aggression outright. As soon as it is clear that deterrence has failed, the priority shifts to joint forcible entry operations to defeat enemy anti-access capabilities, arrest enemy offensive

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operations and shape the theater for transition to follow-on operations. Such operations would involve a combination of basing and prepositioning options to include projecting power directly to objectives from strategic and operational distances. The breadth and duration of the campaign demand a comprehensive effort to: dismantle the enemy's anti-access systems, including their command and support; establish robust air and missile defenses and security forces able to protect indigenous forces and populations, coalition entry points, key bases and critical facilities; and gain control of air, land, sea and space approaches to the theater. Early establishment of multidimensional battlespace dominance, coupled with the uninterrupted flow of combat power into the joint area of operations, allows us to engage the enemy comprehensively, defeat his efforts to rapidly attain key objectives, deny him a protected posture, and set the conditions for reaching decisive conclusions as described in the execution principles. The endurance demands of such a campaign place a premium on initial and prepositioned sustainment as well as an ability to anticipate requirements and develop alternative sources of supply. The ability to successfully execute the extended campaign is critically dependent upon the successful alignment of deployment, employment and sustainment activities.

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

Figure 3

The approach to the limited campaign, illustrated in Figure **3,** is similar to that of the extended campaign but involves a single joint operating area. The application of the execution principles is the same in both campaign types; however, the scope in this particular example is more limited in duration and less demanding in terms of requisite endurance. Forcible entry with associated follow-on operations remains, but force reconstitution, relocation and reemployment are less prevalent than in the extended campaign. The use of joint seabasing or other methods for limiting the buildup ashore **of** command **and** control and logistics functions is typical of this type of campaign.

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

Figure 4

In a single operation such as is illustrated in Figure 4 the application of combat power for effects generation is less distributed and of shorter duration than in the previously described campaigns. The military objective is narrow in scope. Such an operation typically employs forward positioned forces and forces with global reach executing the forcible entry and follow-on operations and is characterized by reliance on speed and surprise. While access requirements are relatively limited, both in space and time, it is perhaps the most critical element of success for this type of operation. Logistics footprint is minimal as forces are organically sustained and directly deploy to (and redeploy from) the objective. Battle command for the single operation takes critical advantage of the competencies and readiness derived from adherence to the MCO foundations described in 3.B of this concept.

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3.E An Illustration of a MCO in 2015.

The following illustration describes a notional long duration campaign conducted in a single **JOA.** An illustration of a multiple JOA, extended campaign would demonstrate even more complexity. In this illustration the joint force is conducting a major combat operation that follows a set of unsuccessful deterrence efforts. Initial forcible and early entry operations have been completed and stability operations are conducted during and following major combat. This illustration focuses on major combat operations and demonstrates the linkage of major combat operations with joint forcible entry and stability operations. Such linkage is not universal, however. It would be a stretch to say, for example, that we "forced" our entry prior to Operation Just Cause.

This illustrative campaign also depicts the dueling nature of warfare against an adaptive adversary. The joint force commander and enemy leadership engage in a mental contest that is played out in operations. Adherence to the previously described execution principles enables the joint force to maintain the upper hand in this duel and win the conflict. The conduct of major combat operations requires the joint force to plan and prepare for the conduct of operations and then deploy, employ and sustain forces.[27] Each of these elements is addressed, in turn, below.

The illustration in Figure 5 below does not use the legacy, phased campaign construct: deter, shape and enter, decisive operations, and transition operations. Instead, we use the Joint Operations Concept framework as a "placeholder" until we conduct the broad, intellectual discussion with associated experimentation that will lead us to an adequate future campaign construct. That future construct will be inserted in version 2.0 of the Joint Operations Concepts.

3.E.1 Planning. To develop a campaign plan that is fully integrated and effectively harmonized with other instruments of government action, the joint force plans for major combat in a collaborative and inclusive manner. Trusted relationships with interagency and multinational partners, developed and practiced as part of the core foundations for

[27] **The Joint Operations Concepts, JCS Version** 1.0, **2003, p. 19, states Joint Operating Concepts** will **provide "A description of how a future Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ and** sustain."

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major combat,[28] are brought to bear in dynamic plan formulation. Ongoing, distributive, collaborative planning is conducted. The pre-existing, collaborative information environment has been employed routinely for planning and training, allowing subordinate service operational headquarters to have previous relationships with the standing joint command and control elements. Multiple US agencies as well as multinational partners are part of the 2015 collaborative information environment and routinely use it to participate in campaign planning.

The presence of this in-place collaborative information environment provides one of the significant relevant differences in 2015 from today. In the fight to gain information superiority, information from immediately available ISR sources, to include human intelligence, and joint force status reporting systems is used to gain an early understanding of the situation. The information will never be perfect, but to gain information or decision superiority, the joint force's information needs only to be better than the adversary's. Based on specifics of the emerging situation, the joint force commander adjusts his plan collaboratively—that is, all those who will execute the plan, including interagency and multinational partners, help make the adjustments. This planning is supported by network structures and processes that: support synchronized collaborative planning; extend horizontally and vertically; and span the strategic to tactical levels.

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[28] See section 3.B above for a detailed description of the core foundations.



Figure 5 – Planning and Preparing: Set conditions and Envision Campaign Endstate

The joint force commander, using an effects-based approach, derives his intent from the strategic aims and a vision of the required end state (Figure ***5)***. The commander also takes into account the effects he must affect relative to enemy and friendly centers of gravity, decisive points, and other critical locations or activities. This effects-based intent describes desired lethal and nonlethal effects that then are used to develop initial tasks for the joint, multinational, and interagency force. Conceivably, initial tasks could be to set conditions for, then project an operationally significant combat force rapidly and directly into the adversary's capital city, defeat enemy forces in the urban area, remove the ruling regime, and set the conditions to return the city to a functioning posture. The effects-based approach serves as the framework for campaign design and helps create both unity of purpose and coherency of action. The effects-based intent is distributed in a nested fashion throughout the joint force through mission orders. These mission orders serve as a basis for the task organization and preparation of joint force packages. The joint force

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commander uses his best judgment to anticipate the actions of the enemy. Campaign planning of branches and sequels provides the organizational flexibility necessary to adjust to potential enemy responses and adaptation. Fully integrated joint deployment, employment and sustainment planning is continuous, adaptive, and responsive to changes. Likewise, multinational and interagency partners are available to support planning because they are part of the collaborative network.

3.E.2 Preparing. During the conduct of combat operations, preparations include a set of activities to: confirm and enhance the US-led coalition force's understanding of the operational environment; refine plans; tailor the US-led coalition force; and conduct initial operations including covert, clandestine, and overt activities.

Enhanced understanding and the adaptive nature of joint force packages change how forces will prepare in 2015. Commanders at all levels must continually fight **for** information superiority. To understand the complex environment comprehensively, the entire joint, interagency and multinational force operates with full knowledge of the commander's intent. The coherently joint force commits and exploits robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, including space-based platforms and HUMINT assets, in order to gain and maintain full-dimensional awareness. This overall net assessment of the operational environment also includes information gleaned from nongovernmental sources. This robust sensing and assessment capability reduces but does not eliminate uncertainty. It does, however, increase the probability **of** success **by** allowing leaders to make better decisions faster than the enemy—the meaning of "decision superiority." **A** common relevant operational picture emerges from **this** assessment. The collaborative information environment permits frequent updating and dissemination **of** this picture.

In **2015**, deployment preparations are distinctively different in order to conduct coherently joint operations and generate effects rapidly. These preparation differences include a unifying and adaptive force projection and sustainment construct that enables early identification of requirements, joint capabilities-based force packaging, and use of joint rotational capabilities. The US-led force consists of capabilities-based, expeditionary, networked, modular, adaptive force packages. These forces are both

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CONUS-based and forward deployed. The collaborative information environment, when coupled with delivery means that permit deployment fiom strategic and operational distances direct to areas the adversary does not expect, allow 201*5* preparation to be much more distributed than it is today. Operational security and deception are enhanced by these preparatory methodologies. An air and sea bridge to the **JOA** is activated and pre-positioned equipment and sustainment are in use. Operational forces are postured to conduct rapid and decisive combat operations, or are in the force flow. Forces that are en route to the **JOA** possess command, control, mission planning, automated decision support, and rehearsal capabilities. **As** required, air, space, sea, and cyber-space dominance is achieved, or preparations to achieve such dominance are set into place.

With the MCO conditions set, the US-led force is trained and ready to conduct multiple, simultaneous and sequential, contiguous and noncontiguous, distributed operations, regardless of conditions, and for as long as necessary to achieve military objectives. Furthermore, these operations are coherently joint, interagency, and multinational —-from the start.

3.E.3 Joint Deployment, Employment and Sustainment. With the force having pervasive knowledge, as the situation permits, and relatively full understanding of the commander's intent, combat operations commence to achieve desired effects and military objectives. Forcible entry and follow-on combat operations may actually begin from multiple locations: CONUS, forward-based, and sea-based, for example. They might also use rapidly constructed expeditionary airfields as temporary launching pads and support bases. In 201*5* deployment, employment, and sustainment activities are much more closely aligned. We developed this alignment in response to intelligent, adaptive, and committed enemies —nes that knew our reliance on fixed, improved air and seaports. The 2015 deployment, employment, and sustainment system projects a fully capable, immediately employable, and sustainable force anywhere in the world on short notice. This close alignment contributes to the commander's ability to combine, recombine, and employ capabilities to achieve the desired operational effects, and it is what differentiates the conduct of operations in 201*5* fiom today. Provided the flexibility afforded by such an alignment, the joint force commander is able to respond to changes

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in the operational situation, whether brought about by the enemy's responses, physical environmental factors, third party actions, or other causes. The joint force is able to rapidly execute the campaign branches and sequels necessary to win the aforementioned duel.

Airlift and sealift assets are available, managed, and controlled in order to go where and when we want to go, and where the enemy does not suspect we will go. **A** holistic force protection scheme exists, i.e., from space-based platforms to strategic and theater bases and lines of communication to individual combatants. The protection scheme addresses, in particular, the myriad threats to coalition forces found in hostile urban areas.

Forcible entry operations—some robust and extensive, others less so—usually precede the direct delivery of potent and fully integrated military forces from strategic and operational distances and from the sea. The timing of forcible entry operations, their extent, and their duration all will depend upon the specific situation, the "thickness" of enemy exclusion zones, and the effects the joint force commander wants to have on the enemy. Follow-on forces are fully capable; some require no RSOI while others need very little. They are adaptive, modular, and highly mobile. Operational maneuver from strategic distances and from the sea, as well as vertical tactical maneuver from operational distances creates a degree of simultaneous pressure that our enemy will find hard to resist. Creating predictable patterns of movement is avoided. The force is not reliant upon fixed seaports and airfields as initial points of entry for either maneuver forces or their sustainment. The enemy is confronted with multiple, unrelenting, simultaneous and distributed operations at all critical points the command chooses to confront. Forcible entry operations are executed for however long necessary to establish a secure operational battlespace, ensure continued sustainment of follow-on Operations, and prevent the enemy from re-establishing exclusion zones and area denial operations.

The US seeks to alter initial conditions to control the operational tempo. To do this, the US-led force continues to dismantle the enemy's residual anti-access systems to maintain access; establishes robust air and missile defenses and security forces; and achieves multi-dimensional battlespace dominance. Large-scale, simultaneous and distributed, multi-dimensional operations occur regardless **of** existing target area infrastructure and environmental conditions. The US-led force achieves operational

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momentum by moving with great speed and by engaging the adversary immediately with great discrimination. The force identifies and eliminates the enemy's asymmetric advantages, while securing and strengthening friendly asymmetric advantages. Kinetic and nonkinetic engagements are integrated with maneuver to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects (Figure *6)*.



Figure 6 – Forcible entry and follow-on operations: Early Combat Efforts Synchronized in Physical and Information Domains

Initially, there is no significant logistics build-up ashore. Maneuver forces are self-sustaining for specified periods of time. If a logistics build-up is required ashore for a protracted campaign, then multiple, small agile operating bases are established. To cope with the ever-present unpredictable nature of combat, the deployment employment and sustainment strategy is to "sense early" and to "respond quickly" in order to satisfy requirements. **A** sense and respond joint deployment, employment, and sustainment framework focuses on speed and quality of effects. **A** responsive, ubiquitous, adaptable, and survivable distribution-based sustainment system supports rapid and distributed

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combat operations. Few maneuver units will outrun or lose their ability to request and receive time-definite sustainment support. Time-definite delivery standards are stringent, and customer wait time is measured in minutes and hours rather than days and weeks. In order to conduct relentless operations, the need for sustainment pauses is reduced to **only** those the commander directs.



Figure 7 – Continued forcible entry and follow-on operations: Combat Continuation – Some Endstate Conditions Attained, transition operations begin

Assessment of current actions is undertaken to determine their impact on either achieving desired effects or demonstrating potential to do so (Figure **7).** Where directed actions no longer appear to achieve the desired effects, subordinate commanders use their initiative to change tasks or new ones are assigned. Execution in a collaborative information environment allows much more decentralized decisions and actions than in the past—without loss of **unity** of purpose or coherency of action. Similarly, the joint force commander must assess whether political aims and his supporting military endstate

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remain valid. When appropriate, the desired effects are modified if the military endstate has changed (Figure 8 below).



Figure 8 – Actual Campaign Endstate

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Section 4 - CAPABILITIES

Sections 4.A through **4.E** below are essential major combat operations capabilities, categorized by functional area (Command and Control, Battlespace Awareness, Force Application, Focused Logistics, and Protection). To execute future major combat operations against a regional nation state, the Joint Force Commander and his force require the ability to:

4.A Command and Control Capabilities.

4.A.1 Clearly express a compelling and nested intent of what needs *to* be accomplished, using common frames of reference among military, interagency and coalition partners.
4.A.2 Define desired effects discretely enough to focus planning and determine requisite actions at all levels, and communicate desired end state(s) and effects to the lowest level required in order to execute the actions that lead to desired effects, assess the results of those actions, and adapt as necessary to achieve those effects.
4.A.3 Express commander's intent that will achieve the overall strategic purpose, or the eventual political end state, while in a dynamic environment, without undue focus on specified tasks; and assure understanding of the commander's intent at the lowest, actionable, relevant level.
4.A.4 Facilitate both centralized and decentralized decision-making as appropriate, exploiting decision support tools to make well-informed decisions faster than the opponent.
4.A.5 Provide effective leadership (based on selection, training, education, and experience of leaders) in a combined, adaptive, collaborative environment.
4.A.6 Maintain a robust, joint network that (1) avoids single points of failure, **(2)** enables graceful degradation, **(3)** is based on uniform standards at the data and information level to allow warfighters throughout the force to use applications without compromising interoperability, and **(4)** promotes the ability of commanders at all levels to decide and act with greater assurance and speed.

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4.A.7 Field and employ coherently joint, trained, and practiced headquarters elements that integrate a standing joint command and control capability with Service operational headquarters without disruption to or degradation of command and control functions.

4.B Battlespace Awareness Capabilities.

4.B.1 Maintain persistent situational awareness and achieve shared understanding through a collaborative environment among joint, interagency, and multinational partners in order to know the full dimensions of the operational environment, our adversaries, others, and ourselves.

4.B.2 Conduct planning in a collaborative environment that is flexible, robust, supported by automated decision tools (including a common relevant operational picture [CROP]), and extends beyond the bounds of MCO in order to facilitate stability operations.

4.B.3 Deploy a robust, pervasive, dynamically tailored, and high-fidelity intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system, to include human intelligence (HUMINT) and space platforms.

4.B.4 Comprehensively, expertly, and robustly analyze intelligence, using in-depth knowledge of area studies, local cultures, and languages; and the ability to perform effects-assessment (including non-quantifiable effects), all incorporating a thorough appreciation of friendly, adversary, and other actors in the battlespace.

4.B.5 Establish a secure, broadly accessible, tailorable, and user-friendly common relevant operational picture (CROP), based on an Operational Net Assessment (ONA)-like system that is authoritative and updated frequently.

4.C Force Application Capabilities.

4.C.1 Develop processes, procedures, and automated support systems to fully integrate fires and maneuver, using enhanced kinetic and nonkinetic weapons, to increase lethality.

4.C.2 Provide offensive capability to counter enemy anti-access systems including:

- Rapidly detecting, neutralizing or destroying mines at standoff ranges and in-stride.

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- Using fixed and deployable detection and tracking sensors at strategic port approaches and chokepoints to complement persistent anti-submarine warfare.
- Rapidly defeating improved enemy air defense systems.
- Countering enemy theater and tactical missiles with highly deployable systems that provide warning, intent, location, launch, and destruction (pre-launch, cruise and terminal phase, and over-the-horizon).

4.C.3 Rapidly project force directly to the objective from strategic and operational distances.

4.C.4 Rapidly deploy, employ, and sustain adaptive, modular, mission capability forces and packages to and throughout the battlespace, without creating predictable patterns.

4.C.5 Fully integrate joint, interagency, and coalition (combined) capabilities, from the strategic level down to the lowest practical level, to be able to employ all useful means and avenues of influence among all relevant actors, throughout the battlespace.

4.C.6 Empower commanders to conduct flexible and responsive operations at every useful level, to include Information Operations (IO) and maneuver and precision engagement operations that are supported by enhanced integrated combined fires and compressed sensor-to-shooter-to-impactengagement capabilities.

4.C.7 Streamline deployment processes to satisfy Combatant Command needs, positioning friendly forces within operational reach ***of*** critical targets, while denying adversary forces access to key friendly targets.

4.C.8 Conduct large-scale, simultaneous and distributed, multidimensional combat operations (including unconventional and forcible-entry operations) regardless of existing target area infrastructure and environmental conditions; isolate the battlespace from unwanted influences; engage with great discrimination; move with great speed; **and** identify and eliminate or neutralize an opponent's asymmetric advantages, while securing and strengthening friendly asymmetric advantages.

4.C.9 Integrate Deployment, Employment, and Sustainment (DES) of the force in order to eliminate unnecessary redundancies, reduce friction, stimulate synergy, and enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operations.

4.C.10 Provide multidimensional precision engagement, including close fire support by exploiting high-endurance manned and unmanned launch platforms which combine **ISR**

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and engagement capabilities, deep-reach precise fire support including sea-based and long-range aerospace components to support forcible-entry operations, lethal and nonlethal (nuclear and conventional) fires, fires capable of type-target discrimination, time-sensitive targeting, and in-flight re-targeting of smart weapons.

4.D Focused Logistics Capabilities.

4.D.1 Establish and operate an adaptive, elastic, and ubiquitous distribution-based sustainment system, along with the requisite informational architecture, so that agile and dispersed forces do not outrun or lose their ability to request and receive time-definite support, with customer wait time measured in minutes and hours, not days and weeks.

4.D.2 Establish a joint sustainment force that is rapidly deployable, fully capable, immediately employable, flexible, highly mobile, modular, tailored, networked, survivable, and responsive to supported forces.

4.D.3 Maintain persistent deployment, employment, and sustainment situational awareness, and achieve shared understanding at multiple echelons (to include coalition partners), enabled by a coherently joint logistics common relevant operational picture, a reliable information and communications network, and automated decision tools in order to anticipate, predict, plan collaboratively, synchronize, and satisfy deployment and sustainment requirements that occur throughout a campaign.

4.D.4 Project and sustain forces when the adversary is competent and determined, strategic and theater lines of communication are not secure, access through fixed seaports and airfields in the battlespace is denied, and supported forces are widely dispersed in the battlespace.

4.D.5 Reduce the need for sustainment pauses, enabled by improved commonality, reliability, maintainability, sustainability, and survivability in order to conduct relentless operations.

4.E Protection Capabilities.

4.E.1 Provide security for our forces, systems and processes (to include critical infrastructure, information and space capabilities) from origin to final objective positions within the Joint Operations Area.

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4.E.2 Rapidly sense, detect, identify from standoff range, defend against, and recover the force from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced-explosives attack.

4.E.3 Employ combat vehicles and support vehicles (and platforms) designed with survivability features such as improved speed, low observable and low signature stealth, protective construction (e.g., blast mitigation coatings, fragmentation resistant materials, shock resistance, reactive armor), and organic automated defense against smart weapons.

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4.F Major Combat Operations Capability Mapping to Joint Operations Concepts Core Capabilities. Table 1 maps the capabilities identified in paragraphs **4.A** through **4.E** to the eight common core capabilities in the Joint Operations Concepts.

Table 1 - MCO Capabilities Mapping to JOpsC Core Capabilities

	Para	MCO Capability	Common Understanding	Decision Superiority	Adaptive	Rapid Employment	Continuous Pressure	Disrupt the Adversary	Distributed DES	Coordinate with IA & MN
Command & Control	4.A.1	Clear vision	X	X						X
	4.A.2	Define desired effects	X	X					X	X
	4.A.3	Express Commander's intent	X	X						
	4.A.4	Facilitate collaborative decision and action		X					X	
	4.A.5	Effective leadership		X						X
	4.A.6	Robust joint network		X					X	X
	4.A.7	Coherently joint HQ		X						X
Battlespace Awareness	4.B.1	Persistent situational understanding	X						X	X
	4.B.2	Collaborative planning & decision tools		X					X	
	4.B.3	Robust ISR systems	X	X						
	4.B.4	Comprehensive intelligence analysis	X							
	4.B.5	Timely, accessible intelligence dissemination	X	X					X	
Force Application	4.C.1	Fully integrated fires and maneuver					X	X		
	4.C.2	Counter anti-access offensive systems				X	X	X		
	4.C.3	Project force directly to objective				X	X	X	X	
	4.C.4	Rapid mobility of forces			X	X	X		X	
	4.C.5	Integrated employment of forces			X	X	X			X
	4.C.6	Empower Commanders			X	X			X	
	4.C.7	Enhanced force projection						X	X	
	4.C.8	Multidimensional force employment			X	X	X	X	X	
	4.C.9	Integrated DES							X	
	4.C.10	Multidimensional precision engagement					X	X		
Focused Logistics	4.D.1	Adaptive distribution-based sustainment			X				X	
	4.D.2	Joint sustainment force packages			X	X			X	
	4.D.3	Persistent DES situational understanding	X	X					X	
	4.D.4	Project & sustain without infrastructure				X			X	
	4.D.5	Continuous deployment & sustainment					X		X	
Protection	4.E.1	Full-dimension protection				X			X	
	4.E.2	CBRNE protection	X	X				X	X	
	4.E.3	Self-protection assets					X		X	

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CONCLUSION

"Improvement will require not only technological solutions, but also cultural change—a willingness to challenge standard practices, and question current organizational patterns and command practices."
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Today, we have a historic opportunity to transform our military as we shift from an industrial age to an information age. Our military capabilities are rapidly evolving. The power of information age technology has vastly improved our ability to achieve our objectives through the application of military power. We can move further, faster, and fight better than ever before and the future promises that these capabilities will only continue to improve. Simultaneously, we are changing the way we work together as a military and the way we work with our interagency and multinational partners. Figure 9 below depicts this evolution to a more coherent joint force.



Figure 9

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In the past, we could segregate military forces based on their primary battlespace – air, land, and sea. The overlap between battle spaces was relatively small – limited to weapons ranges and line of sight. Over the last 50 years, managing that overlap has become increasingly difficult, as it has grown in size and complexity. Today, each Service has the capability to reach hundreds, even thousands of miles, into the battlespace. That's good because it increases our capability, but it also requires a greater degree of integration. Other trends include changes in the need for dispersion, greater weapons lethality, higher volumes and increased precision of fires, evolving ideas on the employment of mass and effects, integrative technologies, changes in invisibility and detectability, and merging of deployment, employment and sustainment activities. We're moving toward a coherent joint force with full spectrum capabilities. Increased capability through greater degrees of coherence is multiplicative, not additive. But we're not there yet. What remains key to the transformation of our military is our culture.

Our warfighting culture must change if we are going to successfully conduct major combat operations in tomorrow's global battlespace. While much of our culture is a continuing source of strength, some of it can actually stand in the way of progress. Warfighting culture is **a** constantly evolving construct, influenced by our ideals, history, and shared experiences. Warfighting culture provides the animating force behind decision-making, education, doctrine, organization, training, and all other aspects of warfighting. **A** nation's warfighting culture can be a force for dynamic change, or it can be a brake to progress through unflagging conservatism. The trick is to draw strength from the past, while ushering in needed change.

What, then, must change about our warfighting culture? **As** we create new ways to combine joint forces for maximum effect, we must be ready, able, and willing to transcend old ideas of how to fight, how to organize, and how to command. Everything must be subject to question; so that we can clear the path for breakthrough ideas that will save American lives in the future. Each soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine must be willing to change his most treasured ideas on how to fight: In this way, we clear the decks for American ingenuity to find the right answers for tomorrow.

One of the most important cultural changes that must occur is the elimination of Service and functional stovepipes." Each Service has core competencies, and we must

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continue to cultivate them. Further, the Services are the touchstone of recruitment and training: our soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines learn their basic and advanced skills from Service training facilities. But it is the unproductive stovepipes that must go. This is a daunting task, and it's been tried before. From the regulatory requirements of Title 10, **US** Code to the existing organizational layout of the Services, there is a lot of natural friction against close integration of joint forces. But we must overcome the challenges if we are to realize the full potential of future joint operations. Materiel systems must be "born joint", rather than retrofitted later. Joint task optimization must replace Service-centric ideas of self-sufficiency. Rather than insisting upon ownership of organic assets, future commanders must become adept at achieving strategic and operational goals with shared joint assets and capabilities. Trust must replace ownership.

In a similar manner, we must become more adept at interagency and multinational operations. The systemic view of the enemy and friendly force leads to a greater appreciation for the integration of the efforts of the various agencies of the **US** government as well as our multinational partners. When joint force commanders transcend a strictly military view of the campaign and instead understand how all the instruments of national and multinational power—indeed, how all the diverse entities in the battlespace—relate and can benefit each other, they will multiply their strategic effectiveness. Interagency and multinational operations in the future will not be an anomalous or exceptional circumstance, but rather routine and integral to American strategy and the backdrop for effective combined force operations.

Finally, many who contemplate the nature of current and future operations have noted that military operations often result in something less than traditional military victory. In the 19th and 20th centuries, some theorists called for the utter destruction of the enemy as the logical goal of military operations. The strategic realities of tomorrow will require joint forces to combine successful engagement of the enemy's armed forces with the need to control terrain or population, assist in peace operations, or provide stability and support to struggling nations. Clausewitz was correct when he wrote, "The whole of military activity, the end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained... is simply that he should fight at the right place and at the right time." However, while ***the*** ultimate test of any military is its ability to fight and win, future commanders must also

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have the savvy and resources to fulfill a wide array of other strategic missions to help win the confrontation. This is a cultural issue, because traditional American warfighting culture has deified military victory and eschewed any other activities deemed to be a distraction from it. In the words of General Douglas MacArthur: "There is no substitute for victory." The reality of tomorrow insists that we understand victory for what it is: strategic success—attainment of the set of political aims through the effects-based and coherent application of all elements of national and multinational power.

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APPENDIX A -- TIME HORIZON, ASSUMPTIONS, AND RISKS

This concept is focused on the time horizon just beyond the Future Years' Defense Plan (FYDP), roughly 2015 and rests upon the following assumptions:

Assumption 1: War continues to be an important component of confrontation strategies and remains a fundamentally human endeavor. Our approach to warfighting in the information age must strike a balance between its technological and human elements.

Assumption 2: While the nature of war remains relatively fixed, the conduct of war has changed, is changing and will continue to change. Adversaries will include both state and non-state actors, including transnational organizations, terrorist groups, criminal elements and economic entities. We will often face enemies who operate outside the rule of law and are difficult to distinguish from noncombatants. These new adversary sets require us to develop new approaches to deterrence measures, warfighting and winning confrontations.

Assumption 3: Potential regional adversaries in the 2015[29] timeframe will be well-equipped, well-led, motivated to win, highly adaptive, with global reach in selected capabilities, and possess the will to employ those capabilities in opposition to or in a manner threatening to U.S. national security. They will also likely possess weapons of mass destruction[30] [31] and significant anti-access capabilities. They will observe our warfighting capabilities and methods and adjust their strategies and tactics intelligently in an attempt to counter our advantages. These adversaries will seek to exploit technological breakthroughs in novel ways.

Assumption 4: Technological advances[32] will continue at least at the current pace. Commercially available dual-use technology will continue to proliferate, extending

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[29] GLOBAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES: THE DECADES AHEAD Statement for the House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. (Paragraphs 1, 3, and 10).

[30] Implies ability to possess and globally export WMD effects through terrorist cells, special operations forces, intermediate range missiles, and, in some cases, intercontinental range missiles.

[31] A Primer on the FUTURE THREAT: The Decades Ahead 1999-2020, July 1999, DIA. Chapter 2, Global Change, Para 6; Chapter 3, Transnational Issues -- WMD Proliferation.

[32] GLOBAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES: THE DECADES AHEAD Statement for the House Appropriations Committee, 29 January 1998, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Future Warfare Trends.

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sophisticated niche capabilities, some approaching near peer, to even the least sophisticated and minimally funded adversaries.

Assumption ***5:*** Service competencies remain the foundation of joint capabilities.,The Services provide the cultural identities, domain expertise and core warfighting resources that are vital to implementing this concept.

Assumption ***6:*** The concept outlines three cases of major combat operations. **Of** the two likely cases, Case One, the high-end regional competitor, has the greatest impact on our total capability requirements and is accordingly the focus of Version 1.0. Case Two, major irregular combat is the other likely case in the 2015 time frame and will be the next case developed in future versions of the concept. Case Three, the peer competitor, while the most dangerous, is not anticipated within the time frame of focus and will be the last of the three developed.

Risks are hypothetical events that could render this concept invalid. They help frame the context in which this JOC applies.

Risk: **A** new generation of warfare could emerge that employs concepts and technologies that have not been envisioned—and whose consequences have not been considered. Developments could occur that compromise or negate today's critical force structure investments and thereby offset or eliminate projected US advantages in such areas as low observability (stealth), precision targeting and information operations. Conceivably, we could witness the convergence of information technologies, biological sciences, and advanced manufacturing techniques with significant military implications. There is potential that advances in energy-based weapons, immersive technologies, biology-based or psychotronic weapons, and other capabilities designed to alter the ability of the human body to process stimuli may have a profound effect on warfare in the information age.

Risk Mitigation: Risk posed by the uncertainties inherent in future science and technology advances can be mitigated by the continued investment in national and cooperative science and technology programs. Adequate funding will enable continued

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development of maturing technology and development of methods to counter its exploitation by the competition.

APPENDIX B --PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN A NETWORKED AGE

Under development for inclusion in MCO JOC Version 2.0

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